Browse data

Case Study	Question	Answer
2008 Kosi Flood	What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?	The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure. Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party.
A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?	Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.
A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River	How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?	Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River.
Addressing Declining Groundwater Supply in Umatilla County, Oregon, USA	How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?	Selection of Stakeholders: the Critical Groundwater Areas primarily are located within the western portion of Umatilla County and the Planning Commission recognized that basin-wide water use needed to be addressed before any plans were developed. The members of the Task Force were chosen based upon their respective geographic areas rather than vocational, urban, or Tribal designations. Members were selectively chosen by the Board of Commissioners based upon level of commitment to resolve the water management issue, not to represent vested interests or groups. Task Force agreed upon a methodology: after the Task Force was created, they based their public involvement/outreach strategy loosely along the lines of the principles of Collaborative Learning, which was designed at Oregon State University.(Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. 2001). This methodology utilizes systems thinking processes to structure conflict management and foster alternative dispute resolution, which is useful in broad natural resource situations with a variety of stakeholder involvement.
Addressing the Transboundary Water Conflict Between the Blue Nile Riparian States	How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?
Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India	What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?	Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances: Clarity about rights and obligations Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works. A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties. Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question. Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense. A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing. Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.
Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India	How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?	Mutual trust can be nurtured through seamless sharing of data and information through the most efficient means of communications, promotion of mutual exchanges to stake holders to build fraternal bonds (e.g experts, academia, farmers, intelligentia, opinion makers, politicians, civil society organizations etc) through conferences, sharing of knowledge, interactive engagements. Specific situations to be avoided are: misleading emotive and irresponsible statements unilateral start of projects without resolution of issues upfront. violations of provisions of treaties tendencies to gain political mileage or media exposures. non water actions (such as political, military, commercial, terrorism etc) which can vitiate the general feeling of mutual trust.
Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India	What effective mechanisms can downstream states/countries use to protect their water related interests/rights?	Mutual Treaties clearly delineating rights and obligations of the parties involved with a suitable balance between water and benefit sharing with a dispute resolution mechanism as described for IWT above (while addressing it’s weaknesses) with binding nature of Third Part decisions is a good mechanism. Alternatively, the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 May 1997, which recently became effective, if ratified by the parties concerned can provide protection to the downstream riparians. (Note: Remember that some times the upper riparians need to protect their rights as well; e.g. in Nile Basin).
Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?	Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.
Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)	To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?	In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.
Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin	How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?	When one riparian holds the most geographic and military power, equitable agreements are difficult to reach. With the large majority of water originating in Turkey and Turkey having the most advanced military power, it has less incentive to work cooperatively with Syria and Iraq and to approach negotiations with a "basket of benefits" outlook.
Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin	How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?	When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power. In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement.
China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project	To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?
China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project	To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?
Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead	What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?	Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.
Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?	The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.
Competing Demands Among Water Uses in the Apalachicola- Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin	How do national policies influence water use at the local level?	This case study indicates that national policies, such as government subsidies for certain crops, can significantly influence water use at the local level. By altering subsidies to encourage farmers to grow more water-efficient crops, national policy could potentially support more sustainable water use. However, it is important to keep in mind that changing government agricultural subsidies will have many other social and economic effects that must be considered.
Competing Demands Among Water Uses in the Apalachicola- Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin	What role can agricultural subsidies play in finding solutions to complex water management problems?	1. Do agricultural subsidies influence water use in the Flint River Basin? Our analysis shows that agricultural subsidies play a key role in influencing what crops farmers grow, thereby directly affecting water use in the basin. 2. Can agricultural subsidies potentially be used to improve water management and reduce conflict in the ACF basin? This analysis suggests that altering national subsidies for certain crops could significantly reduce agricultural water requirements in the Flint, thereby freeing up water for other uses in the ACF and potentially reducing conflict. 3. Can agricultural policy and management—particularly subsidies—promote more sustainable water use in water-stressed basins? The case of the Flint River Basin suggests that agricultural policies and management strategies, such as direct subsidies to farmers, can be used to reduce water demand and potentially promote more sustainable water use in water-stressed basins. See the article Agricultural Subsidies for more information on agricultural subsidies within the Flint River Basin
Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin	To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?	Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.
Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?	Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.
Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin	How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?	Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement. In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve. The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.
Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?	==Creating and packaging options== The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.
Drinking Water Supply in Phnom Penh, Cambodia	How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?	Cambodia is a downstream country in the Mekong river Basin and has potentially much to lose from uncontrolled upstream development of the river. China, the most upstream country in the basin, and Lao PDR have ongoing construction or plans to construct hydropower dams in the mainstream of the Mekong River, which has raised concerns of potential environmental, economic, and social impacts to downstream countries. As an upstream country with vast economic resources, there is little incentive for China to cooperate with downstream countries.
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin	How can government be dis/incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process?	Upstream nations with superior strength can hinder joint management of river basins. China, with far more military might and economic power than both Thailand and Myanmar combined, has little incentive to work jointly with them in the management of the Salween River. Thailand and Myanmar's water resources from the Salween may be at great risk depending on what China decides to do on the upper part of the river.
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin	How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?	Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts. The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin	To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?	Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin	What calculations and considerations should be investigated by countries looking to harness additional hydropower? Which potential outcomes should be investigated or identified?	The importance of water cooperation/economic development can supersede working with an oppressive regime. Even though Myanmar is controlled by a junta that is blamed for human rights violations, Thailand is still willing to cooperate with their government in order to promote regional management of the Salween River. For Thailand, the development of the Salween River and the benefits received from such development takes precedence over working with an oppressive regime. National sovereignty to protect water resources goes beyond international pressure.
Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?	A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.
Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin	What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?	Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.
Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin	What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?	Maritsa River is subject to great variations in its flow during flooding season, especially in the last 10-15 years. Flooding monitoring and early warning systems can be beneficial for all riparian states as flooding impacts agricultural and urban areas in all three parts of the basin. Yet, biggest beneficiaries will be downstream countries. There were initiatives funded by the EU in the past few years for technical expertise sharing through Bulgaria-Turkey cross border cooperation projects. Technical experts from DSI (Turkey) and NHMI (Bulgaria) met in several meetings, agreed on basic principles for sharing information and initiated plans to install monitoring stations on the Bulgarian side during 2006-2010 period. Subsequent to the completion of three separate EU projects during this period, Bulgaria started to share river flow and dam capacity data to Turkish government experts. However, fast paced developments for cooperation in the basin stalled after momentum in Turkey’s EU accession process is lost. Following three project conducted with EU cross-border funds, successive projects that were initially planned to complement and improve outcomes of previous projects were not executed. The primary reason is the inadequacy of EU cross-border cooperation funds that are allocated for a transboundary river basin shared with a non-EU country. After 2010, there are sporadic technical committee meetings organized by technical experts from Bulgaria and Turkey without an EU framework solely based on bilateral efforts. Under the current circumstances, steps to adopt good EU practices for flood prevention in other transboundary and trans-regional water basins of the EU can be taken. With EU’s political encouragement and financial support, a flexible tripartite plan between riparians for managing Maritsa River Basin can be enacted with regard to the EU Water Framework Directive. This plan can adopt good practices of river basin management and flood prevention plans in Elbe River Commission’s Flood Protection Action Plan, Ebro River Basin Plan and Rhine 2020 (for Rhine river basin). Also extending the scope of European Flood Alert System (EFAS) to Maritsa River basin can be suggested by the EU member states Greece and Bulgaria with support of candidate country Turkey. The limiting factor is Turkey’s reluctance to adopt EU WFD before acceding to the EU as a full member state and political hurdles to proceed with Environment Chapter in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.
Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley	How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?	Key Tools and Frameworks The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency. The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. For example, during the assessment, mediators observed that the region had a high degree of distrust and was hesitant about issues of representation so the facilitation team recommended the large, open groundwater stakeholder forum as a tool to vet and recommend the proposals that would ultimately move forward. Identifying stakeholders to participate in the process was also a critical tool or element of the process. Low trust and collaborative capacity among stakeholders emerged during the stakeholder assessment. The mediation team worked with interest groups to identify representatives that would have credibility to represent each interest in the smaller collaborative work group. The mediators met with representatives of agriculture to clarify different segments, such as berry growers and processors in addition to other agricultural interests. And, the mediators met several times with environmental organizations to help them understand the law and the negotiate representation. In addition, the mediators networked with different nongovernmental organizations and agencies to identify rural residential well owners and disadvantaged community representatives who might participate in the collaborative work group. Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and stakeholders informing one another about their interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions. Lastly, professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and negotiate outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. Transparency was another important element of success. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. The project had a web site (www.salinasgroundwater.org, now www.svbgsa.com) that was updated regularly with all materials and process information.
Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County	How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?	Key Tools and Frameworks The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency. The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and agencies informing one another about their stakeholders' interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions. Professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing agency stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and consider outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. Amongst other outcomes, this resulted in Advisory Boards for each GSA where agricultural, rural, and environmental interests are represented and can oversee the process of achieving long-run groundwater sustainability. Transparency was another important element of success. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. A website (sonomacountygroundwater.org) continues to document ongoing progress by each GSA and provides notifications about prior and upcoming meetings.
Gaza Strip Water Management	What types of benefit sharing models can be used to make desalination more economically feasible and beneficial in water-scarce regions?
Gaza Strip Water Management	What roles can desalination play in a country's national water policy and what energy ecological and water quality considerations ought to go into making such a decision?
Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal	How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?	China'a indisputable Nine-Dash Line claim has caused contentions among the stakeholders. The initiation of an arbitration process, thought to have equalized the situations has, on the contrary, created a serious zero-sum game and strained relations between the parties.
Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal	What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?	There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.
Impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Downstream Countries	Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians	To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?	The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians	What calculations and considerations should be investigated by countries looking to harness additional hydropower? Which potential outcomes should be investigated or identified?
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians	What role(s) can hydropower play in a nation's energy strategy?	Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians	What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?	Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians	Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians	How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States	How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?	Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States	What approaches are most beneficial for rapidly growing cities in the developing world to link water management to sustainable urban growth strategy?	All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface- and groundwater, ignores hydrological reality. Groundwater was not explicitly dealt with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely.
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States	What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?	The parties defined some of the key aspects of their deal with relative vagueness. Some of this could have been intentional, so that both countries’ home governments would be able to interpret the agreement in different ways. This allowed negotiators to ‘sell’ the deal to their internal constituencies and also gave them the time they needed to conduct further studies that allowed them to adjust the details of the agreement during implementation. Yet, some ambiguity in the agreement was not helpful. For example, there was disagreement after the treaty was signed as to who should bear the cost of transferring Jordan’s water. According to Israel, Jordan was responsible for the additional cost since the water was for its benefit. Not surprisingly, Jordan did not agree. This highlights the two sides of the ‘ambiguity coin.’ On one side, ambiguity helped allow for some measure of adaptive management. At the same time, the tensions that were not resolved during the negotiations did not go away.
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States	What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?	Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan: May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights. By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons. Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included: The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time. Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S. The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel. Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States	To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?	Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support. In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river. Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.
Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality	How can costs for water quality projects be distributed between polluters and beneficiaries?	The degree of cooperation among representatives of participating governments, and the importance given to public participation in developing the SAP, mark significant achievements in promoting regional cooperation in water resources management. Ultimately, the success of this process will be revealed by the degree to which the goals, strategies, and targets set in the agreement are implemented "on the ground." It is one thing to agree to goals and targets in timeframes; it is another thing to, for example, agree to shut down a polluting factory, or to create and enforce industrial wastewater pretreatment standards, or to develop rigorous monitoring and enforcement regimes. Additionally, because agreement signatories are at the Ministerial level in the water sector (vs. at the level of the Foreign Minister), it is not clear if the agreement has the force of an international treaty behind it.
... further results

@@ Line 10: / Line 10: @@
 =Key Question=
-{{Special:RunQuery/Browse_Key_Question|Browse by Key Question}}
+<!--{{Special:RunQuery/Browse_Key_Question|Browse by Key Question}}-->
-{{#ask:  [[Category:Case Study]] [[Key Question::+]]
+{{#ask:[[Question::+]]
- | mainlabel=-
- | ?Key Question
- | ?Key Question Description
- | format=table
-}}
-{{#ask:[[KQandA::+]]
 |mainlabel=-
   | ?Case Study
-  | ?Q# -
+  | ?Question
-  | ?A# -
+  | ?Answer
 }}

Browse data

Revision as of 14:48, 2 July 2012

2

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

I

I cont.

L

M

N

O

P

R

T

T cont.

U

W

Y

Case Studies

Agreements

Water Features

Water Project

Navigation menu

Personal tools

Namespaces

Variants

Views

Actions

Search

Explore

Learn More

Advanced