| Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind.
The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies.
It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:
# International: among the basin countries
# National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
# Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
# Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.
Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers.
At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created. |
| Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality | How can increasing urban water demand be balanced between the needs of the urban population and industry? | The use of public participation within the Strategic Action Plan of the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/531ENG.pdf International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR)] since its inception in 1994 has permitted the basin states of the Danube to move forward rather quickly with several initiatives. |
| International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin | How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated? | If riparian states agree to equal access to transboundary water resources, equal and joint management, investment and distribution of that resource is feasible. In the water resources sector, neither Brazil nor Argentina has used their economic or military superiority to maintain greater control over water resources or hydroelectric potential. |
| International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today. |
| International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin | To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated? | The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation. |
| International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless. |
| Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation | How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated? | There is limited shared cooperation and consultation. The Navajo Nation is technically a sovereign nation and thus, should work directly with the United States government. In practice, the Navajo Nation is sovereign to the extent allowed by the United States government.
This makes for an awkward asymmetry of power as the Navajo Nation and the United States government interests may not always align. The Navajo are in a complex place to negotiate. They must negotiate at the state level (for example, with New Mexico) and at the federal level (for example, with the EPA). Often times, the Bureau of Indian Affairs may also step in, adding another layer of complexity. The complexity of the number of players needs to be simplified.
The best-case scenario would involve the Navajo Nation to be respected and treated as a sovereign nation. The varied history between the US government and the Navajo Nation make this complicated in practice, as the US government financially supports some of the operations of the Navajo Nation.
In leaning towards full sovereignty, a structure needs to be developed that would enable the Navajo an equal voice alongside the United States federal government. The Navajo Nation should be able to have the final say on how their lands are used and be able to hold parties accountable for any damage caused. |
| Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation | How can government be dis/incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process? | The lasting impacts of uranium mining on the Navajo Nation have led to greater costs (environmental, health and economic) for the Navajo Nation and the United States government. In addition, the US government has also been criticized for its treatment of the Navajo population.
The US government, which often sees itself as a leader in the provision of fair judicial processes, has failed to protect the Navajo’s health and livelihoods. Navajo sovereignty is limited by the United States government. The structure of the government is not set up to best serve the Navajo Nation. Thus there are at least two different ways the US government could be incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process:
* First, build a joint committee between the US government and the Navajo Nation to oversee all uranium mining. This would enable greater transparency and encourage more conversations and understanding of the variety of positions.
* Second, the US government needs to recognize the full cost of the uranium cleanup. They have already spent more than $100m on assessment and cleanup. That adds to the total cost of uranium mining and decreases the total value. That funding is still minimal in comparison with what the US government may be spending in the future to continue to remediate the impacts. |
| Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean | What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties? | The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement |
| Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean | What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions? | a. The stakeholders in the case study recognize the changing climatic conditions in the Arctic ecosystem. They are building in CAM in the agreement by conducting scenario analysis and identifying conditions needed that might trigger a decision such as in the case of conditions that can trigger creation of an RFMA/O
b. The stakeholders in the case recognize the lack of understanding of the importance of scientific information of the Arctic ecosystem and are using science experts to inform the diplomatic process |
| Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean | How can government be dis/incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process? | The case study is an example of taking a precautionary approach in fish stock management as it learns from previous experiences (Bearing sea case in 1970s that resulted in over exploitation of fish stocks) |
| Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca | How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered? | * Without stakeholder participation in the management of water resources, efficiency and effectiveness are limited.
With little or no stakeholder participation in the management of the [[Lake Titicaca]] basin, [[ALT]] has only been minimally effective at producing results. It is clear that a more comprehensive system of inclusion of the public is needed to take place in order for the Authority to complete its goals. If three out of the four problems identified by the institution deal with the people's actions on the water and land in the basin, then they must be included for optimal functioning of the initiative. Otherwise, gaps and resentment are created by an organization acting above those who most use the lake. |
| Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | * By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.
By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering [[Lake Titicaca]] as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations. |
| Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights | What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions? | |
| Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights | To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated? | |
| Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities | What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties? | This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem. |
| Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | The answer is twofold:
# Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
# Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse. |
| Northeast Regional Ocean Planning | How do national policies influence water use at the local level? | In the case of the Northeast ocean planning process, the National Ocean Policy was certainly a driving factor in helping to catalyze improved regional coordination that built off of existing state level initiatives. When the National Ocean Policy was created, the Northeast already had two state-level ocean plans and a regional ocean council working to improve coordination on ocean management.
The national level policy helped bring federal agencies to the table with a clear mandate from the Executive branch to focus on supporting regional ocean planning. In addition, it helped bring tribal governments to the table as an important resource in planning, technical ecological knowledge, and cultural resources. Having increased leadership and collaboration from both federal and tribal representatives, overall improved the ocean management work in the Northeast.
Perhaps most importantly with this national initiative, it encouraged regions to help drive the process and tailor their needs from the bottom-up. It did not create additional regulatory requirements, but instead encouraged existing entities to improve their work through increased coordination and stakeholder input towards a collective future vision of ocean management. |
| Northeast Regional Ocean Planning | What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions? | Although parties have not yet adjusted their Northeast Ocean Plan to adaptive management needs, the Plan prioritizes this in future work. Adaptive management was a key principle for the planning process and central in the Ocean Plan. In prioritizing this, parties also focused on research needs and information gaps as priorities to inform future work. This will ideally help shape future adaptive management work. Integrating collaborative adaptive management into the planning process and future meetings for implementation are positive approaches for success. |
| Northeast Regional Ocean Planning | How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered? | As the case overview outlines, the Northeast Regional Ocean Planning Process had a robust stakeholder engagement process. The process included different methods and meetings for stakeholders to get involved, different locations, and different levels of engagement.
Perhaps most notable in this case, the stakeholder engagement process was integrated into the ocean planning process from early on. It was not just a one stop check box for general input, but a thoughtful and coordinated approach throughout every phase of planning. This is a valuable lesson for other processes as it helped ensure stakeholders were engaged early on and had meaningful input throughout.
If the Northeast Regional Planning Body had not integrated such engagement throughout, it is unlikely that their final Plan would be as widely supported. Often times, in such circumstances, stakeholders instead feel they are asked to rubber stamp something that has already been decided. By engaging early on, incorporating feedback throughout, and continuing to dialogue, the Northeast ocean planning process was more effective in their stakeholder engagement.
In addition, the engagement process was facilitated by third-party neutrals which allowed for productive and meaningful conversations between decision-makers on the NE RPB and the broader community of ocean users. The third-party neutral team also provided neutral documentation of the meetings that allowed all parties to be on the same page with what feedback needed to be incorporated into the planning process. |
| Organization for the Development of the Senegal River | Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project? | Mutually beneficial projects and integrated investments create good neighbors. As a result of the OMVS and the design and implementation of joint projects, the relations between the countries has improved and economic development has increased thereby making cooperation rather than conflict a meeting point with regards to the Senegal River. |
| Organization for the Development of the Senegal River | How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered? | Stakeholder participation should be included at all levels of decision-making processes for optimal mutual gain. When local populations were not included on the decision-making processes within the Senegal River basin, there tended to be frustration, confusion and economic losses directly as a result of not participating. Participation by all stakeholders can only benefit all groups involved in making agreements more sustainable, mutually beneficial and efficient. |
| Organization for the Development of the Senegal River | To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated? | Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies. |
| Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity. |
| Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities | To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated? | Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution. |
| Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world. |
| Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use | To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated? | In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal. |
| Red River of the North - Fargo-Moorhead Diversion | How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust? | Case shows the results of extended negotiation that does not recognize needs of the other party |
| Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues | How can government be dis/incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process? | The current state of mismanagement and authority provides a strong basis for an inclusive planning process. Top-down authority is weak already, thus including many local and regional actors should be natural. This also would help to address the regional power structures that have been outside the national government structure. Furthermore, the current challenges are large and require buy-in from the entire population. The government is under-resourced in staff capacity and financially (El-Fadel) so there should be a sizable incentive to bring additional parties into the planning process for ideas but also investment options. |
| Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues | How do national policies influence water use at the local level? | National policies have been influential to local users, yet not in a positive way. This can be seen in that only 47% of households were connected to the public water network in 2007 (UNESCWA), illegal connections to the water network (El-Fadel) or that there is a general disregard to the environmental policies by the public (Daily Star). Decades of conflict and unrest eroded the capacity for many federal and local government agencies – water included. Masri (1997) also notes that soil, wildlife, forestry, along with water and other natural resources has a long history of neglect and mismanagement. The lack of capacity has since translated to a crumbling infrastructure (El-Fadel) and a disillusioned population that has little to no expectation from their government. ‘Non-sustainable development and a lack of awareness’ (ARD Report) also highlight a lack of oversight of water resources from the government. This has been exasperated by the structure for water management agencies, but truly is represented in the lack of accountability of those responsible for water governance. |
| Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues | How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered? | Involving all relevant stakeholders would go far beyond government ministries or local water districts to bring in representatives from agriculture, tourism, industry, conservation, and others. This will help with building trust and also transparency to the decisions, while ultimately achieving buy-in among the stakeholders.
Values
Many stakeholders only acknowledge actions that have taken place or plan for a terminal output, such as a dam or irrigation diversion. This ‘conclusion thinking’ disregards the values and underlying principles that guide those wants. Ultimately, this limits creativity and drives a ‘winner and loser’ negotiation where one achieves the end goal, or they are unsatisfied with the result. By working to identify underlying values, more creativity can produce deeper and far reaching results for many more parties. This step supports the notion that the resources available could be much larger than, creating a ‘bigger pie.’ In a peri-developed country in the process of rebuilding, acknowledging common goals and understandings can have a far-reaching impact beyond the realm of water.
Accountability
Accountability from within and outside the country is important to build trust in the process of any agreement. Being held to agreements and priorities is vital in a country where skepticism between stakeholders is rampant. A non-partisan third party with authority over all stakeholders is necessary to make this achievable. Establishing this outside party would prove difficult, as neutrality is scarce, especially within a single nation, but an outside party that is able to cut through local and national politics would be vital to the process. |
| River Basin Management and Environment Protection through a Conservation Trust Fund in Quito, Ecuador | How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered? | Once information was gathered about the nature and location of threats to key ecological features in the Quito watershed, consultation among downstream stakeholders produced a mechanism to alleviate and mitigate the environmental threats. The creation of FONAG is an example of multiple knowledge frames harmonizing toward the common goal of ecological preservation that stand to benefit all stakeholders in the long-term. The governance structure of the fund demonstrates an effective way to incentivize stakeholder participation, which in context is monetary contribution. Without a harmonized knowledge framework, however, it is unlikely that incentives would lead to cooperation between stakeholders. |
| The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake? | To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated? | In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement. |
| The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake? | How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated? | The five littoral states differ greatly in their political and economical power. For the new states, projects which will enhance their economy are very attractive, and so they are welcoming foreign energy players to start cooperating as soon as possible. Russia and Iran, which are much more advanced in the field of energy, and have reserves outside the Caspian Region, are much more causious about the involvement of foreign players. |
| The Helmand River Basin Dispute | How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust? | Throughout the dispute, trust has eroded between the two countries. Disagreement over the interpretation of the treaty and the measurement of the volume of water allocated has contributed. Continued drought and potential future droughts will likely further erode trust without agreement over how to manage the river in drought. Political actions, such as the alleged border skirmish to divert irrigation water across the border, and alliances with other nations, such as historical British and US involvement in the border and water dispute, and giving aid in development infrastructure, can reduce trust. Lack of quality and available data prevents a building of trust. |
| The Helmand River Basin Dispute | How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated? | The asymmetry of power has influenced the history of the water negotiations in the Helmand River dispute. In addition, the power of international participants in the negotiation process could have contributed towards an agreement being formed or the level of trust placed in an agreement. Currently, Afghanistan has power geographically being the upstream country. Being the upstream riparian in conjunction with the position that Iran has violated the treaty and is inhibiting Afghanistan’s economic growth, provides the state with the incentive to push forward with potentially impactful water and agricultural developments. Iran has generally been more powerful in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, the state is likely more interested in pursuing future negotiations over the Helmand waters prior to any development in Afghanistan, as this could ensure that majority of the flow is allocated to Iran. |
| The Lesotho Highlands Water Project | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility. |
| The Lesotho Highlands Water Project | How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated? | Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits. South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries. |
| The Lesotho Highlands Water Project | Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project? | It is more economically sound to begin impact studies before nations start to construct projects. It was shown through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project that if impact studies are started after the initiation of a major hydro-project, the costs for the project go up as necessary components for the project may not have been considered pre-study. For the Phase II of the LHWP, studies are being conducted to judge the feasibility of a project that was designed more than 15 years to ago to investigate in a more comprehensive manner the possible impacts of the project. |
| The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation. |
| The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute | What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties? | The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible. |
| The Republican River Compact | How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust? | Many actions can erode trust amongst riparians. In the Republican River Compact three key actions can be identified: (1) a riparian repeatedly voices concerns that are disregarded or ignored by the other compact parties, (2) a riparian violates the terms of the compact in a manner that is perceived to be intentional, (3) riparians engage in arbitration or litigation to resolve their disputes.
Recent efforts in the basin demonstrate how trust can be nurtured or rebuilt. In the Republican River Compact three key actions can be identified: (1) the compact administration committed to meeting more frequently to better understand the concerns and interests of each state, (2) Nebraska thoroughly explained the steps and mechanisms it had put in place to avoid overuse in water short years to ease Kansas’ concerns about future noncompliance, and (3) the recently negotiated agreements are temporary, allowing for time to test new options without a binding commitment and continue negotiating a long-term agreement that works for everyone. |
| The Role of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project for Regional Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin | How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated? | Water sharing and transfer is an important mechanism that the three states are using to address asymmetry of geopolitical power in the basin. For example, Jordan receives 35 million cubic meters of water from Israel every year, according to the peace treaty signed between the two countries. In the Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyance project the desalination plant that will be built by Jordan and will run through Jordanian territory will provide freshwater from the port of Aqaba to Israel’s southern Arava region as a water swap. Similarly. Jordan will buy Israeli water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to provide drinking water to Amman, the capital of Jordan, instead of building extraneous infrastructure to pump water to the city from the south (Reed, 2017). Identification of such mutual gains and competitive advantages is one way to address asymmetries in power and access to resources. Nonetheless, Palestine’s access to water remains a key question that is unresolved and may require repeated negotiations through the Joint Water Committee. |
| The Syr Darya River Basin Upstream Downstream Disputes | How can packages or options that link issues creatively or build on possible technology innovations be employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations that include water resources? | |
| The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs | What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions? | The parties have changed the primary focus of the Programs over time as the needs and obstacles have evolved. At first, the Programs focused on achieving certain flow regimes and developing habitat for the protected species, and as these problems have been addressed, the Programs have shifted their focus to control of nonnative species, the largest current threat. |
| The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs | How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered? | This case demonstrates how the right negotiation conditions, transparency, time to develop trust, and other factors foster cooperation. |
| The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs | How can packages or options that link issues creatively or build on possible technology innovations be employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations that include water resources? | A pivotal moment in this case occurred when water users changed their focus from protecting their water rights to working to recover the endangered fishes. This turn allowed them to continue to use their legal water allocations while working towards the delisting of the species. |
| The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs | How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust? | This case shows that time, transparency, and jointly developing science can developed trust among involved parties. |
| Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.
Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements. |
| U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management | What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties. |
