Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework

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Contributed by:Aline Brachet

Article last edited 11 Jul 2014 by Aline Brachet
Article originally added by Aline Brachet

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This article is linked to Water Management, Environment and Self-determination in Catalonia, Spain

Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework to the Catalan Case allow to challenge the institutions and process around water negotiation in Catalonia, and also stress the complexity of water diplomacy in a context of self-determination.

Participation of the right Stakeholders

Several representatives of the diverse sectors concerned by the Ebro planning were interviewed during the consultation process; the CHE actually published their comments and demands regarding the first version of the EPTI. This process was very technocratic and top-down: official answers were given to each participant about what would be taken into account and what would not. In addition, the increasing number of farmers benefiting from Ebro’s water is likely to bring some imbalance in the equal representation of interests.

The debate and the negotiation regarding the PHE is today exclusively happening between the central government and the Catalan government. Other organizations such as the PDE are trying to obtain the cancellation of the PHE beside the European Commission.

Joint fact finding

Both sides ensure their proposals are based on scientific reliable data. The PDE regrets that decisions are made on political considerations rather than on existing scientific data. The CHE is expected to be the common data collector but is never mentioned by the parties. It is unclear if it is seen as neutral or as the central government body. The high level of irregularity in the natural flow of the river makes prediction really useless, but they are still kept as a basis for analysis and programing. Climate change should add to this level of uncertainty in the coming decades.

Neutral facilitation or joint problem solving

The instance were the stakeholders meet and lobby is the CHE, but the industrial, urban and agriculture users are a majority, and mainly in accordance with the technical proposal of the central government (more water to answer increasing demand for irrigation and domestic uses). Many stakeholders are calling for a revision of the entire economic model of Spain, especially the agricultural policy and the intensive urbanization which by definition imply a lot of water unsustainable use of water and are dependent on speculative economy. This scope of the water problem is not shared by the authorities in general.

Although there is some problem solving dynamics during the elaboration of the PHE, they are driven by the Basin Confederation, under the authority of the Spain Government. In addition, they do not include non-zero sum negotiation.

Search for non-zero sum options or packages and technological innovation

Catalonia is expected to have a lot of underground water resources which have never been part of the debate on water uses. The process is a planning one, without much space for negotiation, which should occur between the central State, the different Autonomous Communities concerned, the different users and the civil society. Political divergences prevented this to happen, as well as the absence of an adequate institutional and organizational frame for it. The desalination plant was a first step toward technological inputs for creating more water and brought part of the solution. More plants are planned in this part of Spain.

Collaborative adaptive management

The Ebro Plan (PHE) is reviewed every 5 years, with evaluation of the achievement from the precedent period and elaboration of new objectives. In the meantime there is no policy adaptation, although the volumes of water concerned for each use are presented as a range, to adapt to the irregular natural flows of the River.

Institutional capacity building efforts

The PDE increased its capacity to have its voice heard, from its first movements in the 70’s. It is now identified as one of the parties to the issue and conflict. It is connected with the green party in the Parliament, which made the rejection of the PHE happen.

Political credibility

There is a lack of credibility in the decisions and solutions offered between the central government and the Catalan government. The last dialogue echoed by the media revealed the national minister for Environment open for negotiation to get the approval by the Catalan government, but not to revise the whole plan. The risk for Spain is to be charged financially by the UE if the plan is not approved before mid-June. To what the President of Catalonia answered that he would agree to negotiate if the option of the deviation from the Rhone is reopen to discussion. This proposal is an equivalent to a politically correct “no”, as the deviation from the Rhone is not anymore economically viable, ecologically a non-sense and would imply France who has never been included in the dialogue. In addition, it is likely that the environmental arguments provided by the Catalan Parliament to reject the PHE are part of a deal between the green party and CiU, which means that CiU has probably other interests which are not expressed here.

Implementation of the decision/solution

The fact that the role of each level of authority is not clearly defined implies a lack of enforcement of the decisions taken. If the different decision makers were committed by their public announcement, more solutions and wise proposals would probably be brought.

Any measurement of the effectiveness of the solutions and decisions

By reviewing the PHE every 5 years, there is actually a quantitative evaluation of the achievement of the previous plan on the ground. The evaluation is not participative though, and based on the CHE criteria.

The Case of water management of the Ebro River Basin resources in Catalonia demonstrates the limit of a top-down process, as well as the limit of public consultation as a process. If stakeholders are consulted only, nothing says that they will be heard, and it does not mean that they will finally agree with the decision made. This is the main difference between consultation and consensus building, when the parties are ultimately bond by their position during the process. It does not mean that they are all happy with the final decision, but that being part of the negotiation and having been involved in trades, problem solving and joint analyzis, they understand the rationale behind the decision. They are “part” of the decision process.

Having a real consensus building approach is even more relevant when the political context is as present and freezing as in Catalonia today. Decisions are mainly made upon political considerations, as water is included in an overall game between the Central government and the Autonomous Community. Water becomes a pretext for disagreement rather than a problem to solve. It would be therefore useful to include the stakeholders in a regional consensus building process, allowing the political interests to be represented together with technical, legal, economic and environmental frames at the same table. This negotiation process would allow to build a consensus around water rights, environmental risks, self-determination expression and national solidarity through packages and technical as well as institutional innovation. In addition, different parties expressing their interests at the same time could lead to coalitions between specific interests, rather than polarization of positions through the media. Confidentiality could be a rule for such an instance of negotiation.

Finally, it will be interesting to see the position of the EU in a few weeks, as it may rise some further questions: how should the regulator react if a process that corresponds to the Directive theoretically (as the PHE elaboration process may well do), does not bring the expected outcomes as a result (PDE estimates that the environmental standard was not respected and that their position was not heard). Should the regulation (the Directive) be stricter? Should the EU support the capacity building of the organizations that are less heard so that they take ownership on their national process? Or should the EU support the existing PHE, for it is an actual improvement of water management in the Ebro compared to past policies? Giving time for opposing stakeholders to build more power for the next period, and hoping that the Delta ecology and other interests are not irremediably affected in the meantime?