Difference between revisions of "The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute"
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|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues | |Subject=Transboundary Water Issues | ||
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|Key Question - Transboundary=What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties? | |Key Question - Transboundary=What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties? | ||
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|Key Question Description=The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible. | |Key Question Description=The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible. | ||
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|Subject=Transboundary Water Issues | |Subject=Transboundary Water Issues | ||
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|Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | |Key Question - Transboundary=What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution? | ||
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|Key Question Description=Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation. | |Key Question Description=Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation. | ||
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* 2001 – Continued failure to meet agreement results in Interstate Stream Commission (ISC) calling a committee of stakeholders to find a long-term solution | * 2001 – Continued failure to meet agreement results in Interstate Stream Commission (ISC) calling a committee of stakeholders to find a long-term solution | ||
* 2003 – ISC and New Mexico agree on plan to purchase land and water rights from CID and the Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District, to be pumped in order to meet any shortfall in delivery to Texas | * 2003 – ISC and New Mexico agree on plan to purchase land and water rights from CID and the Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District, to be pumped in order to meet any shortfall in delivery to Texas | ||
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+ | == Stakeholder Overview == | ||
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== Ecological and Geographical Background == | == Ecological and Geographical Background == |
Revision as of 22:21, 14 May 2014
Geolocation: | 32° 0' 0", -103° 58' 48" |
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Total Population | ~0.39390,000 millionmillion |
Total Area | 115,000115,000 km² 44,401.5 mi² km2 |
Climate Descriptors | Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type) |
Predominent Land Use Descriptors | agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, rangeland |
Important Uses of Water | Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation |
Water Features: | Pecos River |
Riparians: | New Mexico (U.S.), Texas (U.S.) |
Agreements: | Pecos River Compact (1948) |
Contents
Summary
The Pecos River originates in New Mexico and travels through Texas, but highly variant flows have caused a century and more of conflict between the two states. After decades of scrapped plans and congressional plotting, a 1948 compact between the states was created with the goal of finally settling the issue of Pecos water rights. Unfortunately, the compact did not succeed in eliminating controversy. Debates raged over the accuracy of scientific information, the appropriation doctrine and protected uses, and the ability to rework an existing agreement, leading to a protracted Supreme Court lawsuit. Ultimately, New Mexico has had to aggressively curtail its surface and ground water usage in order to comply with the court order, including buying up and retiring irrigated farmland. This case will cover the history of the Pecos River dispute, with the early sections focusing on the bad blood and poor negotiation prior to the 1948 compact, and later sections covering how that history caused the compact to fail through a combination of vagueness and an undeserved trust in a new scientific model.
Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework
Timeline
- 1821 – first settling, at headwaters
- 1862 – US Army builds Fort Sumner to promote settling in basin
- 1880s – first major basin irrigation projects (independent)
- 1900s – first settlers in the Texas part of Pecos, fail within a decade due to high salt content of water
- 1905 – Bureau of Reclamation begins Carlsbad project, repairing dams, canals, and reservoirs that were failing under private ownership
- 1923 – Texas plans to construct reservoir near New Mexico border in order to support irrigation, formal solution attempted
- 1925 – compact to jointly build Red Bluff dam and reservoir passed by both state legislatures but vetoed by New Mexico governor over insufficient storage for upper river needs (offsetting sedimentation)
- 1926 – New Mexico successfully blocks Texas’ attempts to get the federal government to fund a dam at Red Bluff, near the state border
- 1932 – Bureau of Reclamation project ends, stewardship transferred to Carlsbad Irrigation District (CID)
- early 1930s – both New Mexico and Texas petition individually for federal assistance in dam projects (Alamogordo and Red Bluff, respectively) while opposing the other project, and are ordered by Secretary of Interior to reach an agreement or lose both
- 1935 – Alamogordo Agreement is created, indicating both states will agree to each other’s dams as long as Texas receives the same proportion of waters from above the Carlsbad projects, with a formal compact to follow
- 1938 – Red Bluff and Alamogordo dams are finished, Texas attempts to officially ratify the Alamogordo Agreement as a compact but New Mexico refuses
- 1939 – as an interim step to the creation of a formal compact, National Resources Planning Board begins Pecos River Joint Investigation (PRJI) of water supply and availability, irrigation, salinity, water use, flooding, erosion, and sedimentation
- 1941 – Royce Tipton becomes the chairman of the PRJI
- 1941 – Texas repeals Alamogordo Agreement to open up possibility of lawsuit in response to flooding and high salinity
- 1942 – Pecos River Joint Investigation publishes results
- 1942 – Texas and New Mexico assign representatives to negotiate a binding agreement on water use (including CID representation)
- 1947 - Royce Tipton joins negotiations a federal representative
- 1948 – Pecos River Compact is signed, ensuring Texas annual water flow in proportion equal to the 1947 flow, not to be reduced by manmade efforts of New Mexico, and establishing the Pecos River Commission to monitor the agreement
- 1951 – a dry year proves impossible for the existing models to calculate the 1947 condition, and Texas disputes the amount of water they receive
- 1957 – the Pecos River Commission begins a Review of Basic Data to update the hydrological models
- 1961 – the Review of Basic Data is released, determining that New Mexico underdelivered a total of 50,000 acre-feet of water since 1948 but manmade reasons were responsible for only 5,000
- 1974 – Texas files suit against New Mexico for failure to deliver water equal to the 1947 levels beginning in 1950 according to the original agreement, in the amount of 1,500,000 acre-feet
- 1988 – Lawsuit resolved, New Mexico must pay 10,000 acre-feet per year in addition to agreed amount, a $14M settlement, and compliance is overseen by a federal River Master
- 1991 – in response to water shortage leading to inability to comply with the revised compact, New Mexico creates the Water Resource Conservation Project, mainly tasked with purchasing and retiring water rights in the basin
- 2001 – Continued failure to meet agreement results in Interstate Stream Commission (ISC) calling a committee of stakeholders to find a long-term solution
- 2003 – ISC and New Mexico agree on plan to purchase land and water rights from CID and the Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District, to be pumped in order to meet any shortfall in delivery to Texas
Stakeholder Overview
{
Issues and Stakeholders
Water Quantity (NM)
NSPD: Water Quantity, Ecosystems
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Local Government, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens
Water Quantity and Quality (TX)
NSPD: Water Quantity, Water Quality
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Community or organized citizens
Infrastructure Funding
NSPD: Assets
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government
Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight
Individuals may add their own Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight (ASI) to a case. ASI sub-articles are protected, so that each contributor retains authorship and control of their own content. Edit the case to add your own ASI.
Learn moreASI:The Pecos River Compact - Good decisions can still lead to bad outcomes
The history of the Pecos River negotiations between Texas and New Mexico are full of contention and dissatisfaction. Yet, it is clear that they still took many important steps in the Water Diplomacy Framework. What went wrong and how can we learn from this case?(read the full article... )
Contributed by: Matt Fitzgerald (last edit: 14 May 2014)
Key Questions
Transboundary Water Issues: What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?
The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible.
Transboundary Water Issues: What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.