Difference between revisions of "Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey"
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# Upstream localities /river tributaries (Local Governments) | # Upstream localities /river tributaries (Local Governments) | ||
# Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest) | # Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest) | ||
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|NSPD=Water Quantity | |NSPD=Water Quantity | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest | |Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest | ||
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# Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest) | # Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest) | ||
# Turkey (National Government) | # Turkey (National Government) | ||
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|NSPD=Water Quality | |NSPD=Water Quality | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | |Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | ||
}}{{Issue | }}{{Issue | ||
| − | |Issue=Both natural and agricultural ecosystems will be affected. | + | |Issue=Both natural and agricultural ecosystems will be affected. |
|Issue Description='''Sub-Issues:''' | |Issue Description='''Sub-Issues:''' | ||
# Negative impact of 400 km of ecosystems along the river and its tributaries | # Negative impact of 400 km of ecosystems along the river and its tributaries | ||
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}}{{Issue | }}{{Issue | ||
|Issue=No process was provided for input by affected populations | |Issue=No process was provided for input by affected populations | ||
| − | |Issue Description= | + | |Issue Description=# Inadequate protection of displaced population at dam/reservoir site |
| − | # Inadequate protection of displaced population at dam/reservoir site | + | |
# Lack of consultation processes for addressing the displacement of local population | # Lack of consultation processes for addressing the displacement of local population | ||
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* NGOs (Organized Citizens) | * NGOs (Organized Citizens) | ||
* ECAs, possible investors (Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest) | * ECAs, possible investors (Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest) | ||
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|NSPD=Governance | |NSPD=Governance | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | |Stakeholder Type=Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | ||
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Displaced communities (Community) | Displaced communities (Community) | ||
Farmers (Community/Corporate interest) | Farmers (Community/Corporate interest) | ||
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|NSPD=Assets | |NSPD=Assets | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | |Stakeholder Type=Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | ||
}}{{Issue | }}{{Issue | ||
| − | |Issue=Archaeological and Cultural sites are slated for inundation. | + | |Issue=Archaeological and Cultural sites are slated for inundation. |
|Issue Description=The Ilisu dam will flood Hasankeyf and hundreds of historical/archaeological sites. There is uncertainty about reallocation plans for archeological patrimony. | |Issue Description=The Ilisu dam will flood Hasankeyf and hundreds of historical/archaeological sites. There is uncertainty about reallocation plans for archeological patrimony. | ||
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* Current communities dependant on tourism (Community) | * Current communities dependant on tourism (Community) | ||
* NGOs (Cultural interests) | * NGOs (Cultural interests) | ||
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|NSPD=Assets; Values and Norms | |NSPD=Assets; Values and Norms | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | |Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens | ||
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Local governments and communities (Community) | Local governments and communities (Community) | ||
Turkey (National Government) | Turkey (National Government) | ||
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|NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems | |NSPD=Water Quality; Ecosystems | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Community or organized citizens | |Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Community or organized citizens | ||
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NGOs (cultural interests) | NGOs (cultural interests) | ||
European governments (National governments) | European governments (National governments) | ||
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|NSPD=Governance | |NSPD=Governance | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government | |Stakeholder Type=Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government | ||
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Regarding stakeholders, it is important to point out the role that groups from civil society have played in this case. NGOs and independent experts have influenced the course of events in the Ilisu Dam project. NGOs played a decisive role for ECAs to require the compliment with international standards and for the implementation of the Committee of Experts. Have the recommendations been followed by the Turkish parties, the project would have benefited from an adjustment process and better results. Civil organizations have also been effective in the transmission of valuable up-to date information in the site. This provided a way to keep the decisions more appealing to reality and flexible, and link them at an international level with other organizations and institutions (NGOs, World Bank, etc.). They also managed to institutionalize their action in an organized and plural way (for example, “Keep Hasankeyf Alive”). | Regarding stakeholders, it is important to point out the role that groups from civil society have played in this case. NGOs and independent experts have influenced the course of events in the Ilisu Dam project. NGOs played a decisive role for ECAs to require the compliment with international standards and for the implementation of the Committee of Experts. Have the recommendations been followed by the Turkish parties, the project would have benefited from an adjustment process and better results. Civil organizations have also been effective in the transmission of valuable up-to date information in the site. This provided a way to keep the decisions more appealing to reality and flexible, and link them at an international level with other organizations and institutions (NGOs, World Bank, etc.). They also managed to institutionalize their action in an organized and plural way (for example, “Keep Hasankeyf Alive”). | ||
| − | The players involved have exercised a crucial role, although some of them were not considered at the beginning. They all have helped to formulate a more consistent project and to avoid the implementation of a project with considerable negative effects. The most relevant player that has been left out is the directly affected population: subsistence farmers and local workers that are dispersed and fear participation or opposition due to political reasons. | + | The players involved have exercised a crucial role, although some of them were not considered at the beginning. They all have helped to formulate a more consistent project and to avoid the implementation of a project with considerable negative effects. The most relevant player that has been left out is the directly affected population: subsistence farmers and local workers that are dispersed and fear participation or opposition due to political reasons. |
| + | |Synthesis===Final Remarks and Lessons Learned== | ||
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| + | At the center of complex water problems, such as the Ilisu Dam development, are three characteristics. First, they are part of a network of interactions that are open, continuously changing and with dynamic boundaries. These elements lead to unpredictable outcomes and, as such, must be planned accordingly. | ||
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| + | Second, the management of such networks must assume a non-linear process that will be adaptable based on continuing feedback. Since forecasting is always a limited solution for this kind of interactions, multiple-scenario planning is highly recommended. | ||
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| + | Third, due to the characteristics described, the solution-finding process should be adaptive and should look for cooperative approaches. A mutual gains negotiation theory approach is an alternative for generating value for all parties. Finding a satisfactory solution for the stakeholders requires parties to negotiate preferences and to prioritize them. | ||
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| + | Taking into account these three considerations, we may draw the following lessons from the Ilisu Dam project: | ||
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| + | # It is a powerful example of the influence that international non-governmental actors may have in the outcome of a project. Turkey was one of the countries that rejected the World Commission on Dams guidelines. Nonetheless, multople groups, especially the ones concerned with ECAs’ activities in their respective countries, exercised enough pressure as to put in place an Expert Committee and to condition funding to the fulfillment of international standards. In this sense the Ilisu Dam case highlights the potential that civil society and non-governmental actors have as balancing agents to international financing institutions and national governments. It also demonstrates that it is necessary to take possibly unforeseen social forces into account. | ||
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| + | # The GAP Project is considered by the Turkish Government to be an integrated regional development approach. The government is considering investments in several fields such as infrastructure in urban and rural areas (roads, airports, etc.), agriculture (particularly irrigation), industry, social welfare (education, health and housing), as well as tourism. Nonetheless, It seems that possible negative effects such as environmental and health affectations or effective management of displaced population are not being properly addressed. Without the institutional capability to react to such problems, the project may fail in its attempt to reduce poverty and enhance employment opportunities. Furthermore, the lack of institutional capabilities to respond effectively to problems would be even worse for unforeseen challenges in uncertain scenarios, such as climate change. | ||
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| + | # The possible access of Turkey into the European Union (perhaps not a very likely scenario in the short term) will imply the adoption of the European legal framework applicable to the case, like the European Environmental Law and the international agreements to which the European Union is bound. Turkey could profit from proceeding with projects such as the Ilisu Dam before the adoption of such standards. | ||
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| + | Also, Turkey must consider that the withdrawal of European funding due to the lack of compliance with stipulated standards diminishes Turkey’s position as a potential responsible member of the European Union. Turkey’s prestige, as well as domestic accountability, could be compromised in an scenario where it accepts funding from more lax financial sources, for example, Chinese financial institutions. | ||
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| + | # The Project must include reliable and shared data in order for main stakeholders to take informed decisions. For the time being, this is an area of opportunity. Ideally, an initiative should be developed to help with scenario planning through participatory solutions. Otherwise, challenges on specific issues, e.g., salinization of agricultural land or agreements on minimum flows, will be very difficult to address effectively. | ||
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| + | In this sense, understanding context-specific information is crucial, but implies the involvement of local actors. Without doing so, it would be difficult to put together the pieces of interactions among the variables of the water network. In the Ilisu Dam, a history of conflict in the region has prevented the participation of the directly affected population from exposing their views and from being part of the decision-making process. | ||
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| + | # Conflicting priorities are difficult to sort out without a participatory process. For example, economic gains are being questioned in face of the possible costs in terms of cultural destruction. Energy production and regional economic gains are faced by long-term concerns of loss of invaluable historical sites. It is very difficult to evaluate such different types of priorities because very different sets of values are assumed. It is highly recommended that scenario planning is made with enough reliable data. It must be discussed broadly in order to find creative and participatory solutions. | ||
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| + | ==Scenarios and recommended intervention points== | ||
| + | Continue with the construction of Ilisu Dam. Although the European funding was withdrawn in 2009, the construction of the dam with solely Turkish financial sources is already underway. Considering that Turkish government’s priority is to complete the established plan for the GAP, it is very likely that Ilisu will not be an exception. In this case, the following are recommended intervention points: | ||
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| + | # Settle an institutionalized arena to discuss the different parties’ needs. Allow a participatory process with organizations, experts, local and directly affected population. | ||
| + | # Construct a coherent strategy for income and job creation in the affected region. Minimize the negative social impact of the project in the medium and long term due to displacement and reduced income for affected population. | ||
| + | # Comply with international standards as much as possible. This will help minimize future negative impacts and would enhance Turkey’s international prestige and domestic accountability. | ||
| + | # Update the technical project and construct a shared platform for data collection and scenario planning. | ||
| + | # Agree upon a minimum flow for downstream countries. Promote an integrative approach with neighboring countries to face water problems and water development projects. Because neighboring countries are also pursuing water resource development; further cooperation to plan jointly the development of such projects (e.g. dams) will help in figuring out adequate solutions for environmental and social issues. | ||
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| + | Reconsider Project. It is unlikely that the Turkish government would reconsider the development of the project as it is formulated. The GAP strategy is one of the pillars of the government’s development strategy and it is a source of national pride. This drastic scenario would force Turkey to search for other sources of energy production and of development for the region. | ||
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| + | Other intermediate alternatives could include the building of a smaller dam, which might not diminish energy production in the same proportion and therefore mean an increase in its productivity rate; it will also imply a reduction in the flooded area with which Hasankeyf could be saved. | ||
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| + | Additionally, project opponents believe that there is an area of opportunity for reducing inefficiencies. A modernization of the transmission system would provide savings in energy supply, a solution that would be cheaper than constructing more dams (Bosshard). | ||
| + | In any case, there are enough possibilities to be explored and enough know-how developed in the country as to work on a comprehensive and participatory scenario planning that would lead to better outcomes for stakeholders. Unfortunately, Turkey’s national policy is not making enough room for discussing possible alternatives. | ||
|User=Mark Rafferty | |User=Mark Rafferty | ||
Revision as of 10:54, 12 June 2012
| Geolocation: | 37° 31' 27.0012", 41° 50' 35.0016" |
|---|---|
| Total Population | .07878,000,000 millionmillion |
| Total Area | 57,61457,614 km² 22,244.765 mi² km2 |
| Climate Descriptors | Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type) |
| Predominent Land Use Descriptors | agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, urban, religious/cultural sites |
| Important Uses of Water | Agriculture or Irrigation, Fisheries - wild, Hydropower Generation, Livestock |
| Water Features: | Upper Tigris Basin (Turkey) |
| Water Projects: | South Eastern Anatolia (GAP) Project, Ilisu Dam |
Contents
Summary
Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework
Historical, Social, and Political Factors
It is impossible to understand water issues in this basin without paying due attention to the longstanding political and social factors that shape life in the region. One of the most important of these factors is the basin’s population itself.
A Century of Ethnic Conflict
Southeastern Turkey is primarily inhabited by Kurds, members of an Indo-European ethno-linguistic group that consider themselves distinct from the Turkish-speaking majority of Turkey. Currently, between 9% to 13% of Turkey’s residents self-identify as Kurds (Garfield, 23). As Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have long aspired to a nation state of their own, the Kurds’ inclusion in modern day Turkey has posed existential problems for both the minority and the state.
The Turkish Republic, which was founded in 1923 after a long war of independence against major European states, rests upon an ideology of secular nationalism that emphasizes the geographic, ethnic, and linguistic unity of the Turkish State (Robbins, 660). Turkish politics is also dominated by an ideological tendency toward centralized government control and state led economic development for the benefit of the Turkish people. The Turkish Government until 2002 denied the existence of a Kurdish identity and banned the use of the Kurdish language in the media official contexts (Garfield, 23).
In response to what many Kurds feel has been political, economic, and ideological disenfranchisement, Kurdish communities have waged a number of uprisings against the Turkish state. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) waged a bloody insurgency against the state; in the years of strife between the insurgents and the Turkish government, tens of thousands were killed. (Estimates are disputed, but go as high as 40,000) Although recent changes of government have produced policy changes more favorable to Kurdish communities, relations between the Kurdish periphery and the Turkish center are characterized by mistrust and resentment. At the same time, the region remains severely underdeveloped, as evidenced by poor development indicators in almost all sectors (see Economics section below).
State Development
For leaders in the Turkish government, development of the region has a number of significant advantages. Projects within the GAP may boost the standard of living in the region and may serve to quiet discontent and agitation while improving the standing of the government in the eyes of the Kurdish population. While creating jobs and economic opportunities, the government hopes to reduce support for armed groups, particularly the PKK. In addition, the completion of the GAP project can be seen as an issue of national pride for the government that represents centralized control of the periphery, continuity of a project across multiple administrations, and top down development and control. In addition to the economic benefits that the entire country will derive from the project, many Turkish leaders hope to gain electoral boosts from their constituents as the project is completed (Carkoglu, 42).
Kurdish and local government leaders in the provinces affected by the GAP Project have complained of feeling left out of the development process. For many in Southeast Anatolia, the government is another attempt by the central government to exercise its muscle in the region at the expense of local interests.
Membership aspirations: the European Union
Many Turkish leaders hope to incorporate Turkey into the European Union in the near future, and so there is considerable pressure on the Turkish Government to conform to standards and norms of the EU community. While Turkish leadership remains nationalistic and protective of state sovereignty, it is eager to prove itself a responsible state and a good candidate for EU membership.
Water Regime Information
To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. (Yale, 176)
Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this (KHRP, 2007, 3).
Major Economic Factors
Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% (Ronayne, 20). In 1997, the region’s per capita GDP was less than half the national average. In different provinces, between 21.8% and 44.7% of households fall below the poverty line (Unver, 1). For the residents of the region, there is a need for infrastructure development and the opening of economic opportunities.
Issues and Stakeholders
Decreased downstream flow will have ecological, human, and economic consequences
NSPD: Water Quantity
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest
Sub-Issues:
- Greater decreased downstream flow
- No commitments on minimum flows downstream
- Increased flood levels, channel migration upstream and diminished capacity for energy-generation due to sedimentation
Stakeholders for these issues:
- Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
- Iraq and Syria (National Government)
- Turkey (National Government)
- Upstream localities /river tributaries (Local Governments)
- Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
Water quality impacts from dam construction/implementation have not been addressed
NSPD: Water Quality
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
There is a great possibility of poor drinking water quality and impacts to aquatic life due to: a) salinization; b) pesticide concentration increase; c) potential euthrophication of the reservoir water.
Stakeholders for this issue:
- Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
- Farmers, local settlers (Community)
- Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
- Turkey (National Government)
Both natural and agricultural ecosystems will be affected.
NSPD: Ecosystems
Stakeholder Types: Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
Sub-Issues:
- Negative impact of 400 km of ecosystems along the river and its tributaries
- Diminished fertility of land for production; prone to salinization
Stakeholders for these issues:
- Farmers (community/Corporate interest)
- Environmental NGO’s (Environmental interest)
No process was provided for input by affected populations
NSPD: Governance
Stakeholder Types: Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
- Inadequate protection of displaced population at dam/reservoir site
- Lack of consultation processes for addressing the displacement of local population
Stakeholders for these issues:
- Displaced communities (Community)
- NGOs (Organized Citizens)
- ECAs, possible investors (Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest)
Economic benefits are limited and long-term impacts are likely negative
NSPD: Assets
Stakeholder Types: Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
Sub-Issues: Low temporary job creation by dam project in a region with high unemployment and illiteracy rates. Potential increase of urban poverty and social conflict due to: a) lack of alternative subsistence means for displaced population; b) diminished income for displaced population; c) Loss of 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land; potential loss of productivity of irrigated land
Stakeholders for these issues: Big cities and muncipal governments (Local governments) Displaced communities (Community)
Farmers (Community/Corporate interest)Archaeological and Cultural sites are slated for inundation.
NSPD: Assets, Values and Norms
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
The Ilisu dam will flood Hasankeyf and hundreds of historical/archaeological sites. There is uncertainty about reallocation plans for archeological patrimony.
Stakeholders for this issue:
- Municipal governments (Local governments)
- Current communities dependant on tourism (Community)
- NGOs (Cultural interests)
Potential increase of malaria and water born diseases
NSPD: Water Quality, Ecosystems
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Community or organized citizens
Template:Detail box Stakeholders for this issue: Local governments and communities (Community)
Turkey (National Government)Political processes will be influenced not only after dam completion, but by the process of funding and building the Ilisu dam
NSPD: Governance
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government
Sub-issues:
- Power shift in favor of Turkey vis à vis Iraq and Syria through control of water flow downstream
- Social control over East Anatolia Kurdish region
- Pressure from international actors (ECAs, NGOs) and social national movements to comply with international standards.
Stakeholders for these issues: Irak and Syria (National Government) Kurds (Community. Local Gov.) NGOs (cultural interests)
European governments (National governments)
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