Conflicts over development in India's Narmada River Basin

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Case Description
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Geolocation: 22° 24' 44.2148", 71° 3' 52.6813"
Total Population 16.216,200,000 millionmillion
Total Area 98,79698,796 km²
38,145.136 mi²
km2
Climate Descriptors Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type), Arid/desert (Köppen B-type), Monsoon, temperate
Predominent Land Use Descriptors agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, industrial use, forest land, religious/cultural sites
Important Uses of Water Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation, Industry - consumptive use, Livestock
Water Features: Narmada River, Narmada River Basin
Riparians: India, Indigenous Population, Gujarat, India, Maharashtra, India, Madhya Pradesh, India
Water Projects: Sardar Sarovar Dam
Agreements: Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award, Interstate River Water Disputes Act

Summary

The Narmada River is the fifth longest river in the Indian subcontinent, and one of the five holy rivers of India. Plans to develop the river for irrigation and hydropower have been discussed for over a century. It was only after India’s independence from Great Britain in 1947 that plans began to take shape, thanks to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s aggressive development agenda. Flowing 1,312 kilometers through three states in Central and Western India, Gujarat, Maharastrha, and Madhya Pradesh, the Narmada basin now boasts over 3000 dams, a “giant staircase of reservoirs.” The largest of these dams, the Sardar Sarovar, also boasts of causing a protracted conflict starting shortly after Indian independence and continuing through the present day, involving countless government agencies, decades of negotiations between four states, one of the largest people’s mobilizations in India’s history, pressure from international environmental organizations and governments, the World Bank, multiple supreme court cases, and tens (or by some counts, hundreds) of thousands of people displaced. As of May 2014, the construction of the dam is still not complete, so this list of actors could potentially grow.

The conflict began as an interstate issue over the right of the state of Gujarat to raise the height of a dam on its portion of the Narmada River, creating a submergence area that would impact plans for hydropower development in co-riparian states Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The central government of India intervened, establishing the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, which allocated shares of water and power from the dam between the three states and an extremely arid non-riparian state, Rajasthan, according to estimates of river flows and hydropower potential based on its own study. The Tribunal’s award also established minimum requirements for rehabilitation and resettlement of “Project-Affected Persons,” based on its study’s estimates of the dam’s submergence area and the number of land-owning families living in those areas. This initial, binding decision was made by a three-judge panel, and did not involve participation by representatives of the four states involved, nor did it include any efforts to consult with communities whose villages would be submerged, over half of which were Adivasis (indigenous Indians) who are subject to special protections in the Indian constitution.

In the mid 1980s, when the World Bank agreed to finance the project before an environmental impact assessment was conducted, communities scheduled to be submerged by the dam construction organized themselves into the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), a coalition of farmers, Adivasis, and activists. The NBA successfully mobilized the interest of international environmental organizations, which prompted the World Bank to conduct an independent review of the project and eventually withdraw based on issues surrounding environmental impacts and inadequate resettlement and rehabilitation. The project has continued to this day, financed by the Indian central government and individual states, and the NBA continues to be active in national politics and advocate for just compensation.



Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework

Background

History

Timeline of Narmada River Development

Date Event Description
1901 Construction of dam on Narmada River proposed.
1947 Investigations begun into Narmada’s potential for irrigation and electricity.
1961 Prime Minister Jawalarl Nehru lays foundation stone for Narmada dams project.
1961 Government of Gujarat gives approval for Narmada Valley Project. The project includes plans for 3,165 small, medium and large dams. Prime Minister Nehru inaugurates the project.
1985 World Bank approves $450 million loan to India for Sardar Sarovar. Residents affected by the dam organize protest movement.
1986 Construction begins on Sardar Sarovar dam.
1993 Citing project irregularities, World Bank withdraws from Sardar Sarovar.
1995 India’s Supreme Court stops construction of dam.
2000
2002 Narmada Bachao Andolan protest movement reports est. 30,000 families not resettled. Dam’s height increased to 95 meters (312 ft.).
2003 Sardar Sarovar dam reaches 103 meters (338 ft.). In July, earthquake of 4.3 magnitude shakes dam.

Ecological and Geographical Background

Governmental, Political, and Legal Context

Water and Power Allocations of the Sardar Sarovar Project according to Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award, 1979

Party States Allocated share of water  % Share of power
Madhya Pradesh 18,250,000 acre feet (22.51 km3) 57
Gujarat 9,000,000 acre feet (11 km3) 16
Maharashtra 250,000 acre feet (0.31 km3) 27
Rajasthan (non-riparian) 500,000 acre feet (0.62 km3) 0
Total 28,000,000 acre feet 100

Social, Economic, Cultural Context

Issues and Stakeholders

Stakeholder Categories and the Issues of Greatest Importance to Each Group



Stakeholder groups Water for irrigation for agriculture Drinking water for drought-prone areas Hydropower generation Water for irrigation for agriculture
Government of India High priority. Not originally part of plans. High priority. No national resettlement and rehabilitation policy. Established a package and guidelines through the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award, but left implementation and interpretation up to the states. Defines eligibility as exclusively those who have formal titles to land, landless and “encroachers” are not entitled to compensation.
Government of Gujarat Highest priority. Large areas of the state are drought-prone, and decades of policies encouraging land formerly used for grazing to be used for agriculture created high need for irrigation. Also encouraging growing water-intensive crops like sugar to build sugar processing industry along river. Not in original plans, but became a high priority when Gujarat realized the political power of using drinking water provision as justification for construction of the dam. High priority. Has contracts with sugar processing plants along river to provide electricity. Package goes beyond minimum requirements of NWDT award, includes land-for-land replacement for prior land-holders, landless, and “encroachers.” Defines “Project-Affected Persons” narrowly, so many left without compensation.
Government of Maharashtra Not a priority. Not a priority. Highest priority. Package goes beyond minimum requirements of NWDT award, provides mix of land and monetary compensation.
Government of Madhya Pradesh Not a priority. Not a priority. Highest priority. Package goes beyond minimum requirements of NWDT award, including land-for-land replacement, but lack of available land and narrow definition of “Project-Affected Persons” has left many Adivasis, the vast majority of PAPs, without any compensation.
Government of Rajasthan Highest priority. Extremely arid state. Highest priority. Extremely arid state. Not allocated share of hydropower. Very few “Project Affected Persons.”
World Bank Priority, but did not fund drainage system for land traditionally farmed based on monsoon cycle that would transition to being irrigated. Not part of original plans. Secondary priority to irrigation. Not originally a priority. Approved loan before environmental impact assessment was completed. Withdrew from the project after independent review showed negligence on the part of the government and the World Bank in protecting human rights and the environment.
Narmada Bachao Andolan (Coalition of people’s movements in areas scheduled to be submerged) 28,000,000 acre feet The NBA questions the fundamental premise of the states’ and central government’s development agenda. Questions whether this will actually happen. Questions legitimacy of estimates for hydropower production. Highest priority.
International Environmental NGOs Questions legitimacy of estimates. Questions legitimacy of estimates. Questions legitimacy of estimates. Highest priority. Successfully pressured governments with financial interests in the Sardar Sarovar project to disinvest. Brought NBA’s cause to world stage, pressured World Bank to conduct independent investigation.


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ASI:Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework to the Narmada River Basin conflict

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Contributed by: Rachel Finkelstein (last edit: 23 May 2014)