Additional Notes on Gaza Water Management

About this Article
Contributed by: Christine Buesser

Contributor Perspective(s): Observer
Article last edited 22 Oct 2014 by Christine.Buesser
Article originally added by Christine.Buesser

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This article is linked to Gaza Strip Water Management

Christine is the initial contributor for this case and also wrote the related ASI articles: Short and Long Term Solutions for Water Problems in Gaza and Threats to Addressing a Water Strategy for Gaza. This article is a note on the evolution and development of the case.

A Palestinian colleague of mine gave me the following feedback when clicking on the link to the case study: How can you have the word Water Diplomacy and Gaza in the same title? Because of the high emotional and value judgments carried by the Palestinian and Israeli people, I felt that it was important to frame the case study.

The Gaza Water Management Case was written for the final case study for the seminar titled WATER DIPLOMACY: THE SCIENCE, POLICY AND POLITICS OF MANAGING SHARED RESOURCES and taught by Professor Lawrence (Larry) Susskind at the MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA, USA. This particular seminar was taught for the first time during the spring semester 2014 and introduces a new Water Diplomacy Framework (WDF) that provides a better way to understand and resolve water resource management disputes around the world (trans-boundary or shared water resources).

The case is about available water sources (or the lack thereof) in the Palestinian Gaza Strip (Gaza), which is currently under Israeli military land, air and sea blockage, highlighting the gap between supply and demand. Also, I demonstrated that technical solutions cannot be ‘used’ to derail political solutions. This is emphasized by the following quote from the case study: “Technical solutions should not be an excuse for the international community to stop the pressure on Israel to meet its obligations under International Law to secure water for the occupied Palestinian population or to absolve the Israelis of its respective responsibilities.”

When choosing the final case study, I decided to focus on the Gaza Strip (Gaza) as my recent impressions from the March 2014 Harvard student-led trek to Israel and the West Bank in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) were still very much on my mind. Given the fact that I was not allowed to visit Gaza as a tourist during the trek due to the on-going blockage, I initially felt compelled to analyze and explain the physicality of the dispute linked to the Coastal Aquifer, which is a trans-boundary water source that stretches from the northern Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, via Gaza to Israel in the north.

I decided to start preliminary discussions with different regional stakeholders, as I was unsure how to best present the issues linked to water in Gaza. One interlocutor responded as follows: “The Coastal Aquifer isn’t a good case study for a trans-boundary watercourse as the Gaza part is relatively small and most of the recharge is at the Israeli side. There is no shared management of the aquifer. Israel is supplying water to Gaza (a few million cubic meters a year).” Another difficulty was that the Palestinian-Israeli dispute over water (not just in Gaza) has been elaborately documented and interpreted by many commentators. Hence I had to find a fresh perspective of the story for Aquapedia, and not necessarily talk about the Gaza Coastal Aquifer disputes in the context of the larger, well-documented, water conflicts.

After additional interviews with regional stakeholders and further research, I agreed with Professor Susskind to write something about water in Gaza and the conflicts within Gaza and the rest of Palestinian state including the various interests in Gaza. I would do so by highlighting the water demand and supply (since the latter has been getting lower while demand has been increasing). Furthermore, I would do an analysis on ways to match supply and demand including a strategy for closing the gap (with a handful of different ways to solve it), such as increasing supply (e.g. if Israel provides more water, desalinate more water with an investment in desalination and energy).

Unfortunately, the on-going Israel-Palestinian conflict, with an escalation in violence between Gaza and Israel in July and August 2014, makes it even less likely that the collaborative efforts required on water management in Gaza will be initiated. The renewed level of destruction of infrastructure makes the situation 100% humanitarian in nature. I understood from one of my sources that the dialogue at the technical level is there, but neither side is ready to go deeper than necessary at this moment. Trust, not water, has been scarce for a long time. Without trust, it is not impossible to have an overall water solution, but it is very difficult. Relationships around working projects would have to be created. Could a big desalination plant in Gaza with Israeli technology (solar energy? upgrade Gaza power plant from diesel to gas?) and financing act as such a project? If the necessary local engagement is there, and if sufficiently realistic steps are undertaken, then the resulting momentum could lead to longer strides, without either side noticing the magnitude of the change. So the question becomes what situation could you construct where either side does not talk about the real issues, but some principles that could guide some resolution of differences to move forward? This question is rhetorical though, as long as Gaza’s blockade does not end.

I would like to express my thank you and gratitude to all the individuals that were contributing to the writing of this final case study.

Warmly,

Christine