Jordan River: Lessons learned and creative outcomes

About this Article
Contributed by: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton, Matthew Pritchard
Article Type(s): Analysis
Contributor Perspective(s): Academic
Article last edited 12 Feb 2013 by Amanda
Article originally added by Mpritchard

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This article is linked to Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/

Lessons Learned

• In highly conflictual settings, separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy.
• Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

1. May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm
2. May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights. By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

• The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
• Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

• Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities.

The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of control reservations about a water master.

• Ignoring a riparian party, even one without political standing, can hamper agreement.

There was some concern over whether the Plan was designed to "liquidate the Palestinian refugee problem rather than to give the refugees their right of return." In fact, Palestinians were not addressed as a separate political entity.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, leaving no water at all for in-stream uses.

• Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful.

Egypt was included in the negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

• All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface- and groundwater, ignores hydrological reality.

Groundwater was not explicitly dealt with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely.

• Even in the absence of an explicit arrangement, some degree of implicit cooperation may be possible, perhaps leading to fairly high stability, if also to sub-optimum water management.

While the lack of ratified agreement left a legacy of unilateral and generally sub-optimum water development in the basin, the implicit arrangement which resulted, particularly between Israel and Jordan, decreased tensions and added a certain stability between these most active riparians. The "Picnic Table" talks have allowed a venue for some level of technical agreement, and an outlet for minor disputes, for more than forty years.

Creative Outcomes Resulting From Resolution Process

• The plan called for water allocations to be determined according to the amount irrigable land each state had within the basin, then allowed each country to do what it wished with its water, including out-of-basin transfers.
• The development plan was created without regard to political borders, guaranteeing a degree of objectivity and engineering efficiency.
• The plan incorporated issues of hydrological variability. For example, Israel was to receive the "residue" after Arab withdrawals, sometimes more, sometimes less from the average flow.