Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal
Geolocation: | 15° 12' 12.1024", 114° 29' 13.7476" |
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Total Population | 2,0002,000,000,000 millionmillion |
Total Area | 3,685,0003,685,000 km² 1,422,778.5 mi² km2 |
Climate Descriptors | Moist tropical (Köppen A-type), Monsoon |
Predominent Land Use Descriptors | industrial use, mining operations |
Important Uses of Water | Fisheries - wild, Industry - non-consumptive use, Mining/Extraction support |
Water Features: | sea, sea |
Riparians: | china, philippines, Vietnam, china, philippines, Vietnam |
Agreements: | UNCLOS, DOC, UNCLOS, DOC |
Contents
Summary
China’s claim of its ‘indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea’ based on the historical rights of the infamous ‘Nine-Dash’ line has caused complications and contention among the ASEAN stakeholders including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei as well as Taiwan and Japan. The Nine Dash Line overlaps with the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelve of the maritime territory of the neighboring states. The undercurrent interests for the stakeholder’s claims over maritime boundary and the insular features are associated with the acquisition of rights to exploit the abundant natural resources including fishery and hydrocarbon reserved on the South China Seabed. The growing conflict was reignited in 2013 when the Philippines submitted claims against China and unilaterally initiated an external dispute resolution mechanism of arbitration. The arbitral tribunal proceeding, served by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), had announced recent jurisdiction award on July 2016, stating the invalidity of China’s Nine-Dash line claim, spurring the cooperation between the conflicting parties and hinders future collaboration.
Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework
Issues and Stakeholders
The ‘Nine-Dash Line’ claimed by China has caused an international competition over territorial sovereign rights and natural resources associated with overlapping maritime delimitation in the South China sea. The conflict has tarnished collaborations between China and ASEAN nations including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei as well as Taiwan and Japan. The paper specifically focuses on the conflict between China and the Philippines which have arisen since early 1970s over islands and reefs and has been escalated by the recent arbitral tribunal procedure. Following the warships confrontation, the Philippines brought the conflict against China to an interstate arbitration in January 2013 which was opposed by the defendant State as a breach to the ASEAN-China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in The South China Sea and bilateral joint agreement made between the nations in 2002 and 2011 consecutively. China and the ASEAN claimants posed different views on the international dispute resolution through the compulsory arbitration system based on the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Annex VII. To defend their interests through legal framework, China uphold the regulation of the customary international law for the historical rights whereas the ASEAN nations followed the revised regulations implemented by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This divide impedes the attempt for negotiation and increase tensions over the dispute, muting the communication between states.'
NSPD: Governance, Assets, Values and Norms
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union, Non-legislative governmental agency
The ‘Nine-Dash Line’ claimed by China has caused an international competition over territorial sovereign rights and natural resources associated with overlapping maritime delimitation in the South China sea. The conflict has tarnished collaborations between China and ASEAN nations including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei as well as Taiwan and Japan. The paper specifically focuses on the conflict between China and the Philippines which have arisen since early 1970s over islands and reefs and has been escalated by the recent arbitral tribunal procedure. Following the warships confrontation, the Philippines brought the conflict against China to an interstate arbitration in January 2013 which was opposed by the defendant State as a breach to the ASEAN-China Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in The South China Sea and bilateral joint agreement made between the nations in 2002 and 2011 consecutively. China and the ASEAN claimants posed different views on the international dispute resolution through the compulsory arbitration system based on the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Annex VII. To defend their interests through legal framework, China uphold the regulation of the customary international law for the historical rights whereas the ASEAN nations followed the revised regulations implemented by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This divide impedes the attempt for negotiation and increase tensions over the dispute, muting the communication between states.'
NSPD: Governance, Assets, Values and Norms
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union, Non-legislative governmental agency
Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight
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Key Questions
Transboundary Water Issues: How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?
China'a indisputable Nine-Dash Line claim has caused contentions among the stakeholders. The initiation of an arbitration process, thought to have equalized the situations has, on the contrary, created a serious zero-sum game and strained relations between the parties.
Transboundary Water Issues: What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?
There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.