Threats to Addressing a Water Strategy for Gaza

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Contributed by:Christine Buesser

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Article last edited 25 Jun 2014 by Christine.Buesser
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This article is linked to Gaza Strip Water Management

The task faced in improving the water sector in Gaza is thus of significant scale and difficulty. No ‘magic bullets’ exist at least in the absence of an equitable and reasonable reallocation of shared fresh water between Israel and the State of Palestine and there will be a need for a major overhaul of the sector as a whole in Gaza. In the event of not being able to settle a final agreement with Israel on the final status, there will be no possibilities to implement the long-term water strategy objectives and it will have a very negative impact on the water situation in the territories, which will give right to announce these territories as water disaster areas. Practical difficulties even for the short-term solutions can only be addressed if [a] the blockade is dealt with; [b] water is ‘kept out of politics’ and [c] there is the formation of an interim government decided upon by Fatah and Hamas. Otherwise current challenges are just too manifold for any technical solution to work effectively and efficiently:

There is no income

• Currently the Gaza population is being kept alive by the humanitarian community as there is barely any income; 80% of Gazans receive some form of assistance (UN, 2012)

Delays in project approvals by Israel

• The Coordination Liaison Administration (CLA), which is a civil-military body, is the link between Gaza and the outside world; everything has to pass through them and then they deal with the other ministries
• The CLA is the bottleneck as it has its ways to delay projects
• Projects have to presented to the CLA with all kinds of specifications (location of materials; GPS location; photos of materials being used to be sure that they are not going to Hamas or any affiliation of Hamas, etc.)
• All these approval processes take a long time (on average UN projects are on hold for 9 months)

Israeli rules for Gaza are not always clear

• Import restrictions of materials and equipment dates back to 2007 when Hamas came into power
  • From 2007 to now, Israel has lifted some restrictions (over the years some things have been allowed to be imported but the rules are never clear)
  • As of May 2014, Israel prevents the entry of essential materials necessary for construction and rehabilitation on of WATSAN infrastructure, which also applies to projects supervised by international organizations (EWASH, 2014)
  • Israel classifies these materials as dual-use items and prohibits their entry (EWASH, 2014)
• According to one INGO working in Gaza, there are no clear rules when it comes to the importation of materials and equipment into Gaza hence it is very difficult to do any kind of long-term planning: “You never know what happens tomorrow which is the case for construction materials!”
  • There is a recent change that Israel only allows construction material for projects which are supervised by international organizations
  • UN has adopted it but makes their work in Gaza quite complicated as they need staff around the clock for example in the cement factory
• This is has a severe impact on WATSAN services in Gaza, the breakdown of which is placing public health and the wider environment at risk
• A lot of donors and states are trying to pressure Israel to release some of these restrictions but without much effect (UN, personal communication, unknown date)

Big infrastructure projects are costly

• E.g. US$ 450 million for the regional desalination plant in Gaza, which is a lot of money especially for the PA that has few resources
• Most rely on donors which is not sustainable (who pays for running costs of infrastructure projects?) (M. Muenchenbach, personal communication, April 25, 2014)

Donor money is slow

• A lot of donors need to find a consortium of donors to finance big infrastructure projects which takes years not months as donors cannot fund it individually (anonymous, personal communication, April 25, 2014)
• Moreover, donors are scared and hesitant of Gaza context (e.g. on-going blockage, Hamas considered as a terrorist organization by some countries, possibility of infrastructure being demolished by a single Israeli air strike, Fatah-Hamas division, lack of political willingness to support the sustainability of longer-term projects, etc.)

Wastewater reuse not standardized

• There are still not approved standards so it is difficult to get projects going and the environmental quality authority will have to give its approval too

Situation of electricity is not sustainable

• Electricity supply in Gaza is estimated at around 180 MW while demand can reach up to 360 MW in peak hours, resulting in a 50% shortfall and therefore the present rationing of electricity, with electricity blackouts of up to 8 hours in every Gaza neighborhood, every day affecting approximately 600,000 people at any given moment (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
  • Very often the GPP cannot produce at 100% of capacity because of insufficient fuel supply
  • Israel currently supplies half the energy needs of Gaza but is itself running at near full capacity, with little electricity to spare (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
  • Egypt is supplying Gaza with less electricity then already promised (political unrest in Egypt has dramatically reduced energy exports from the country) and Hamas is reluctant to import more fuel from Israel to power the existing GPP as tax revenues for fuel imports coming in from Israel are paid to the PA in Ramallah and not to Hamas in Gaza (anonymous, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
• Demand is continuing to increase (growing by ~10% because of new infrastructure projects in the health and water sectors, increased household demands) but production is stable (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
• There are many ideas to increase supply but none of them have materialized in the past years and are unlikely to materialize in the coming years
  • As example, the PWA is ready to start operating a new project (WWTP) in the north of Gaza but does not have electricity to operate it (needs permanent supply); there have been Israel-Palestine discussion to install a separate power line, which started in the summer of 2013 but nothing has moved

Weak private sector

• Opportunities for profitability are not significant
  • GDP per capita of Gaza is close to half of that of the West Bank (UN, 2012)
• There are good contractors and suppliers to do the construction work and there are good suppliers but there are not any private sector contractors to operate for example a wastewater management plant
• Foreign companies are doing some work but are funded by their own governments (consultants)

Lack of willingness and ability to pay for services

• According to one INGO working in Gaza, when Hamas came into power, the government did not want to push taxes on population as they wanted to be seen as an authority who is socially nice and could rely on the support from other governments (e.g. Egypt, Qatar, Iran) and in the past from the taxes from the tunnels (to be seen if the closure of many of the tunnels by Egypt will put enough pressure on Hamas to start taxing population)
• As Hamas is not involved in the business of water and/ or infrastructure, there is no pressure and regulation from the government to make consumers pay for services such as water
• No clear understanding of why customers are not paying for water services: are consumers not paying because of the bad services, out of bad habit (was never enforced by the Hamas government), sheer lack of willingness and/ or because they are simply too poor?
• The fact that many people are not paying for services such as water reduces the income of the operators but the operators are supposed to maintain all this infrastructure (UNICEF, personal communication, April 25, 2014)
  • All the water losses in the networks cannot be addressed if the operators do not have the money to extend the networks

Pending water sector reform

• The water system in Gaza is the result of many different regimes (from the Ottomans to the British to the Israelis) and there is a need for reform
• Currently, the PWA acts like a ministry of water (in charge of managing water resources, monitoring the sector and operators) (PWA, personal communication, April 24, 2014)
  • In addition, there are various bodies depending on the region: CMWU acts as service provider/ utility company and the water departments of the different municipalities act as service providers with municipalities that are not connected to the network and village councils that take care of their own water system
• Separation of municipalities is the result of the following factors: a) some municipalities are strong Hamas authorities and CMWU is seen as a Fatah institution so they do not want to collaborate , b) personal issues between the Mayor of Gaza and the Chairman of CMWU cause the municipality of Gaza not to cooperate with CMWU , c) no powerful mechanisms to bring the different water departments together because of the lack of a strong regulatory body and the pending new water law.
  • However, there is not a complete separation because most networks and production are managed by CMWU (some kind of cooperation on-going)
• Challenge of CMWU to fulfill its role which is a problem for municipalities because they do not have technical capacity to manage it properly and plan for the future (e.g. expand their networks in the context of Gaza where you have contamination and where it would be good to balance pumping from one area to another)
• Currently there are 4,000 wells (average figure) which are not licensed and are not registered; mostly for agricultural use and even though the farmers are not pumping a lot they still pump a few cubic meters here and there which adds up

Fractioned stakeholders

• PWA is linked to the PA but there are other political actors that are outside the control of the PA including some municipalities and ministries, etc.; however to implement such a big water strategy, all the stakeholders need to work together
• The new reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas (April 2014) is still questionable can only succeed if both sides can agree on a new government
  • If both sides agree on a plan for new elections, this may make a difference by having a common united Palestinian front in negotiation with Israel
  • If Hamas becomes part of the Ramallah government, it is not clear what Israel will do (will Israel cut all or most of the ties with PA?)

Ramallah approval can be slow

• All legal documents need to be approved by Prime Minister (PM) in Ramallah
• New water law is still not approved by the President because there is a political blockage at the level of the PA because of the Fatah/ Hamas division, which questions the legitimacy of the President
• Without the new water law, which is built on a system recognized by the World Bank, there will not be a water sector reform with a clearer differentiation of responsibilities between the players in the water sector to better manage the resources cannot be implemented

No effective central data collection system

• No central data management (municipalities and CMWU have their own data and PWA is accessing data from here and there)
  • One of the INGOs in Gaza is currently working with PWA to improve the monitoring of the Coastal aquifer to have data over the entire Gaza strip to improve the quality of the water
  • Gaza is small so if there are a few monitoring wells, it is relatively easy to get a clear model (PWA has the capacity to do a proper analysis/ modeling of aquifer)

Non-existence of trans-boundary water management

• Palestinians would like trans-boundary management of the Coastal aquifer but Israelis are not willing to make allowances for that as it will not give positive effects to Israelis
• According to different expert sources, Israel does not consider the Coastal aquifer as shared (Gaza is the downstream entity)
• No official data exchange about shared water resources from Israel (no information regarding pumping, abstraction, etc.)
• No information on the Israeli-Egyptian management of the Coastal aquifer; however there are no formal or informal agreements for the optimization of use, protection and sustainability

In the absence of a peace agreement between the State of Palestine and Israel, the international community should keep advocating for Israel to: - Fulfill its obligations under international law by allowing free passage of goods and people to and from the Gaza Strip, subject to individual security checks and subject to arrangements that meet both Israel’s security needs and its obligation to facilitate normal life in Gaza (Gisha, 2011) - Allow for sustainable and economic growth and poverty alleviation in Gaza - Allow Palestinians their rightful share of trans-boundary water resources - Open the valve for the additional 5 MCM/ year water flow from Israel to Gaza

Conclusions

Unless the blockage is lifted and a transfer of goods to the West Bank and exports to Israel and movements of people are allowed, a state of de-development and poverty will continue to make WASH related problems for the Gazan population worse. In order for the water strategy to be fully implemented, the political landscape has to change hence the on-going advocacy by the international community on the points mentioned in the above paragraph is of utmost importance. Otherwise the challenges are too many to overcome, especially with the on-going blockage. However, in the absence of a political solution, the PWA, other local stakeholders and the international community should explore and implement all technical solutions as highlighted in the above paragraphs weighing the benefits and constraints (as long as these solutions are not suggested at the expense of the political rights of Palestinians).

They can be put into two different categories: low-hanging fruit (water demand management increasing system efficiency, collection of rain/ storm water, capacity building with farmers for managing agricultural consumption etc.) and investment intensive solutions (WWTPS and desalination). In between the low-hanging fruits and the investment intensive solutions are the low- to high-volume water transfers from Israel and/ or other countries. On one hand, some experts argue that high-volume transfer of water from Israel, its allies and/ or other countries in the neighborhood are not reliable and sustainable solutions given the current political environment or the financial unfeasibility. On the other hand, other experts say that the only answer to the water crisis is the equitable transfer of fresh water from Israel because Gaza would become physically, not politically, a large-scale recipient of water from Israel (not as a favor or as a purely commercial client, but in fulfillment of its political water rights).

Low-hanging fruit solutions such as the repair of infrastructure are absolutely needed and important no matter what other type of solutions might be found. These solutions will alleviate the pressure on the system but will not provide large-scale sustainable solutions providing sufficient quality water to 1.8 million Gazans (including 70% of Palestinian refugees). Hence the investment intensive solutions have a larger impact and can be more beneficial. However, both long-term options -WWTPS and desalination plants - are very vulnerable to the Israeli restrictions and obstacles and the energy needs. They make Gaza more dependent on power supply from Israel (and/ or Egypt) than ever. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that wastewater is not fit for drinking purposes when it comes out of the plant hence it can only be used for agricultural uses. Hence, desalination is needed to provide immediate drinking water needs. The environmental concerns of desalination also need to be addressed in terms of impact of discharging brine (salty water and chemicals) into the sea as the Gaza Strip is already so heavily polluted and pressured by untreated wastewater flowing into the sea every day and other waste being thrown into it.

When weighing the benefits and constraints of the different solutions, it becomes evident that both the low-hanging fruit and the investment intensive solutions (including the ones in between) are necessary to provide the population with enough quality drinking water, increase the resilience of the population and have a better emergency preparedness (e.g. floods from the Alexa storm in December 2013). However, there is a need for integrated solutions (the water, energy and food security nexus) as highlighted during the roundtable in Gaza on April 30, 2014. Moreover, the donors and the international community need to be aware of the consequences and impact of any of the choices and support the investment needed for the mid-term to longer-term solutions. This requires a joint approach between the local authorities and the international community to see the big investment picture and identify priorities of how the money should be spent in the most sustainable way. For example, why should Gaza WATSAN services be maintained by millions of dollars in Qatari fuel subsidies if with half of this money the GPP could be upgraded in a period of eight months? The question is to find the solutions that help Gaza to get out of the vicious cycle of humanitarian relief (where possible) to get to more sustainable solutions.

Most western government donor agencies prefer to consider technical solutions for a purely political problem and all political approaches are dismissed as unrealistic, utopian and counterproductive. However, technical solutions should not be an excuse for the international community to stop the pressure on Israel to meet its obligations under International Law to secure water for the occupied Palestinian population or to absolve the Israelis of its respective responsibilities. For example, large-scale desalination plants should not reduce Gaza’s prospects to successfully negotiate a larger share in the Coastal aquifer’s freshwater potential.

Certainly, practical solutions are needed to move forward in the current environment and to keep advocating for lifting the blockage and other points mentioned above. Yet, these solutions should not be suggested at the expense of the political rights of Palestinians. The technical and political solutions have to go in parallel. In addition, in the absence of a peace agreement between the State of Palestine and Israel, access to water should not be held hostage to a final agreement because solutions to the water problems cannot wait.