The Syr Darya River Basin Upstream Downstream Disputes
| Geolocation: | 40° 40' 30.6128", 70° 37' 55.6805" |
|---|---|
| Total Population | 1818,000,000 millionmillion |
| Total Area | 444,000444,000 km² 171,428.4 mi² km2 |
| Climate Descriptors | Dry-winter |
| Predominent Land Use Descriptors | agricultural- cropland and pasture, industrial use |
| Important Uses of Water | Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Hydropower Generation |
Contents
Summary
The Syr Darya River (SDR) basin flows through four riparian countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the four republics have been facing challenges due to various economic and political reasons. The main challenges are related to the need for water in agriculture for the countries downstream, and for hydro-electric power production for the countries upstream. The four riparians have two choices to address these challenges. One option is to fight with each other. The second and recommended option is to engage in a collaborative approach and search for a solution that can satisfy all four countries and effectively bring mutual benefits. Forming a mutual gains management scheme is the utmost challenge to these countries.
Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework
2.1 Geographic Outline
The Aral Sea was once the world's fourth largest lake in the world. The SDR is one of the two main rivers flowing into the Aral Sea. The other major river in the basin is the Amu Darya River (ADR). The SDR basin covers 444,000 km² and is home to about 18 million people. [2] The river begins from the Tien Shan mountain in Kyrgyzstan and passes through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the southern part of Kazakhstan, and enters the Aral Sea. [1] The river flows approximately 2,500 km. [2] For the basin as a whole, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the upstream countries, while Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the downstream countries. Kyrgyzstan contributes approximately 74% of the flow into the river basin, followed by Kazakhstan (12%), Uzbekistan (11%), and Tajikistan (3%). [6] The SDR converges from two tributaries, the Naryn and the Karadarya, which originate upstream from Kyrgyzstan. [1] The Naryn tributary is of upmost importance as it passes through five reservoirs: Togtogul, Kurpsai, Tashkumur, Shamaldysai, and Uch-Kurgan. [1] The Togtogul reservoir is a multi-purpose reservoir which was built in 1970 and is used for regulating and controlling flows and irrigation. [1] The reservoir also produces hydro-electric power.
2.2 Environmental Problems
One of the most visible environmental problems is the volume of water flow and the amount of flow reaching the Aral Sea. When the water demand for irrigation is at its highest during the summer months, little water reaches the sea. [2] The diversion of water for agriculture from the SDR almost equals its annual inflow. [2] Similarly during winter months, when the demand for water for producing hydroelectric power is its highest, little water flows downstream. [2] Diminished water flow is not only detrimental to the ecosystem but also causes the desiccation of the Aral Sea. Due to the reduced water flow into the downstream regions, the concentrations of salts and minerals increased from around 0.5-0.8 g/l to about 2g/l in the deltas of both the SDR and the ADR. [2] As a result, data from the year 2000 revealed that approximately 28% of the irrigated lands suffer from high salinity levels. [2] Moreover the pollutants that arise from the agricultural practices flow back into the water through the drainage infrastructure, aggravating the water quality downstream. [4] Reduced water flow and the water volume flowing into the Aral Sea has caused additional secondary problems. These problems include reduced fisheries, negatively affecting the commercial fishing industry, and changes in climate, shortening the crop growing season which inevitably forces farmers to switch to different crops. [2] The issue of climate change brings uncertainty to the impacts to the water resources in the future. [4]
2.3 What are the key disputes?
2.3.1 Water Allocation - concerning the water need for agriculture downstream.'
As indicated in the table above, the allocation and the water usages are not equal for the riparians. After independence, every country began developing their own national strategies to increase productivity for food and promote sustainable economies. [1] As a result, downstream countries continued Soviet era practices and used the water for crop cultivation. The upstream countries also expanded their own ways to produce their own food. For instance, Kyrgyzstan's increased water demand for agriculture meant that there would be less water available for the countries downstream. [1] Although not as dominant as in the downstream countries, agriculture accounts for 36% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP. [1]
2.3.2 Other provisions - concerning the agreement on energy supply.
Despite Kyrgyzstan's obvious increase in agriculture, the main and perhaps more central dispute was on other uses of water, primarily the use of water in winter for the Kyrgyzstanis to produce hydroelectric power. This is because if Kyrgyzstan releases water from Togtogul reservoir for hydropower in the winter, there will be less water for the countries downstream in the dry summer season, as well as reducing the level water being discharged into the Aral Sea. [1]
To improve the situation, Kyrgyzstan and the two downstream countries Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, signed an agreement “On the use of water and energy resources of the Syrdarya basin.” [1] This agreement created an understanding that the downstream countries will buy electricity from Kyrgyzstan and sell other energy sources, such as oil, gas, and coal, to Kyrgyzstan in the winter when they are most needed. [1] The agreement did not effectively minimize the disputes on water use for energy because there was no enforcement mechanism in the agreement. Moreover, the price of hydropower was cheaper than that of other energy sources, giving the downstream countries an advantage. [1]
Another weakness in the agreement regarding the exchange of energy sources to meet the winter demands in Kyrgyzstan was the level of uncertainty in predicting the annual availability of water. Making a decision on the amount of water to be released during the summer and autumn seasons for the downstream countries can be delayed due to not knowing exactly how much water will be available. [1] During water surplus years, the irrigation needs in the downstream countries could be satisfied without having to "buy" more water from the upstream countries in exchange for other energy sources. [1] Conversely, at times of water scarcity, Kyrgyzstan did not abide by the agreement and stored water for its own use. [1] The agreement on water energy resources in the SDR basin suffers from durability, failing to into account fluctuations of water availability, be it extremely low or high levels of water availability. Furthermore, there is an absence of a formal and fair dispute resolution mechanism in the agreement. As a result, the downstream countries are trying to solve the problems on their own by building more dams for themselves as well as constructing reservoirs which will be used to absorb additional water. [1] Such actions will exacerbate the ecological status of the basin and exacerbate existing tensions between the countries.
Kyrgyzstan then came up with an interesting interpretation of water within the framework of its own domestic laws. In 2001, the president of Kyrgyzstan signed a law "On interstate use of hydrological facilities and water resources in Kyrgyzstan". [1] The intention was to treat water as a "national good" equal to other natural resources such as oil and gas. [1] This meant that the law supports the idea that the other downstream countries should pay for the water they use. [1] The law does not have any effect on the downstream countries, but this idea is interesting because Kyrgyzstan is arguing that the downstream countries should pay the "transit" cost. [1] However, the downstream countries are making the argument that since water is not being extracted from underground or going through additional refining procedures for use, it cannot be considered equal to oil or gas. [1]
2.4 Why did the disputes arise? - History of "Production of Hydropower VS. Agriculture Industry"
In the Soviet Era, water distribution and the usage of water were not a source of conflict between the current republics. [1] This is because the Soviet central authority provided sufficient subsidies for the upstream countries who released the water for irrigation downstream. [1] At the time, the upstream countries did not worry about producing hydroelectric energy. Now hydropower is the center of the dispute. Water management during the Soviet Era was administered by the Ministry of Water and Land Reclamation of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), executing the plans developed by the head of the government in Moscow. [1]
Upstream, dams were built; downstream, land for irrigation was cultivated. The dam functioned for the purpose of supplying the water to the irrigated land, primarily released during the summer and autumn seasons. [1] Historically, the production of cotton was a major source of income, therefore priority was given to the cotton production in the countries downstream. [1] Statistics show that the production of cotton has increased by two-thirds from 1965 by early 1990s. [1] When the majority of water in the SDR was used for irrigation purposes, the upstream region did not have any conflicts with the downstream. As mentioned before, the less water for the upstream republics was compensated by the USSR authorities. [1]
The subsidy plan was based on a barter-trade scheme heavily subsidized by Moscow as the upstream countries were compensated for their lack of energy production from hydropower, and supplied with other sources of energy such as oil, gas, and coal. [1] The compensation was sufficient enough at the time that the upstream countries did not produce hydroelectricity even during the winters, when energy is most needed and released water downstream for the irrigation. [1] The SDR, having been managed in such a way, has been faced with serious challenges after the collapse of the USSR. As the countries were accustomed to the system of the downstream enjoying the flow of water for their agriculture and the upstream benefitting from the subsidies from Moscow, the question remained as to who would replace the centralized authority of the Soviets and effectively manage the water resources for their two main uses across the SDR: hydropower and irrigation. [1]
With the absence of subsidies and replacement energy resources disputes of water use between the upstream Kyrgyzstan and the downstream Uzbekistan intensified. [1] To address the disputes, the riparians had to develop alternative ways to manage the water use in the SDR.
2.5 What they have done so far?
Water management of trans-boundary rivers was first discussed in the 2001 International Conference on Fresh Water held in Bonn, Germany. As an international approach to river management, the report from the conference suggested that: [1]
"Water should be equitable and sustainably allocated, firstly to basic human needs, and then to the functioning of ecosystems and different economic uses including food security.”
The report also stated that:
"Water can promote regional cooperation. Such cooperation across internal and international boundaries should be intensified as a means to share the upstream and downstream benefits.”
These two statements are of great value because the first addresses that meeting the basic human needs and the functioning of the ecosystem comes before economic uses. When managing the SRB, this is very important because the riparians are primarily focused on sustaining their national economic interests by either securing water for hydroelectricity production or for the purpose of irrigation. Without restoring the ecosystem from unsustainable use and minimizing the negative consequences from climate change, the economic benefits will not last long.
The second statement is worth noting because the statement itself describes the key assumptions of the water diplomacy framework: that water is not the source of conflict, and that it is not a finite resource. The report suggests that "water can promote regional cooperation" and this cooperation comes from sharing the benefits between the downstream and upstream countries. The creation and expansion of benefits is key in resolving the disputes in the SDR basin.
2.5.1 Institutional Reforms
1992 agreement "On Cooperation in the Field of Joint Water Resources Management and Conservation of Interstate Sources" [1] - This agreement was reached in order to emphasize the need for joint actions in addressing the problems of the Aral Sea in general. An agreement on water sharing, use, conservation, financing and management. [2]
The establishment of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) [1] - Composed of ministers or delegates of each member state in the Aral Sea. The ICWC is the highest decision making body regarding the water management of both the SDR and ADR basins. The meetings are held quarterly. - Discusses monitoring of water deliveries, any problems in water supply, and compliance with agreement. [2] - Operates through the Basin Valley Organization (BVOs), Scientific Information Center (SIC), and the ICWC Secretariat.
Basin Water Organization (BWO) for both the SDR and ADR basins [1] - Responsible for water quality monitoring, technical aspects of water allocation, and day-to-day operations of water supply facilities. [1], [2] It is each country's national policy. - Problems with BWOs are: [1] (1) Data collection on water resources are not transparent and accurate. The analysis of the data collected still remains inadequate. (2) The organization is not entirely independent. Initially, the organization was intended be a regional organization, but in reality the organization is under the influence of the national water agencies. Moreover, the location of both of the BWO for SDR and ADR basins is in Uzbekistan, staffed with Uzbek specialists. The transparency and legitimacy of the organization has been questioned and is one of the main sources of mistrust among the riparian countries.
Scientific Information Center (SIC) - The SIC has 14 branches and is responsible for creating the information base, supporting and carrying out programs for water conservation. [2]
1997 establishment of the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS) - Led by the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP, two special bodies have been created: IFAS and the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS). [2] Later the two were merged into a single IFAS. [2] - IFAS is headed by each of the presidents of the five Central Asian countries on a rotation basis. [2] - The Executive Committee of IFAS (EC IFAS) consists of the five prime-ministers of each country and is responsible for carrying out its functions in preserving the Aral Sea. The location of the EC IFAS has been: Almaty (1993-1997), Tashkent (1997-1999), Ashgabat (1999-2002), and Dushanbe (2003-2009). Since 2009, the EC IFAS has been based in Almaty again. [5]
2.5.2 The dynamics of institutional structure
In a regional inter-state level, the institutional mechanisms work in two ways. [2] One way is IFAS and ICWC dealing with the overall macro-level water resources, management, and funding decisions. [2] The second way works under the boundaries of the BWOs which deal with the technical aspects of water regulation among the riparian states. [2]
At the domestic country level, each countries’ ministries are responsible for the management of the water resources. [2] The ministries plan policies, make decisions on the allocation, regulation, and distribution of water resources to the provinces within the countries. [2]
At the provincial level, the provincial water management organizations make decisions on the distribution of water to major irrigation programs. [2]
2.5.3 Relevant Legal Framework
All the riparian countries of both the SDR and ADR basins have acknowledged: The Helsinki Rules of 1966: "a basin state may not be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an international drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin sate a future use of such waters" [1], and The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse signed in New York in 1997. [3]
2.5.4 The Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP)
The ASBP, with the assistance from the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP, was officially launched in 1993 after the ICAS and IFAS were founded. The ASBP is one of the main activities of IFAS and its main objective is to promote sustainable development in the region, specifically the sustainable use and management of water resources of the SDR and ADR Basins. [5] The four main goals of ASBP are as follows:
1. Stabilizing the environment in the Aral Sea Basin; 2. Restoring the disaster zone around the sea; 3. Improving management of transboundary waters in the basin; 4. Developing the capacity of the regional organizations to plan and implement the program. [5]
ASBP has developed into the most “comprehensive” international program in the Aral Sea region, supplemented by diverse support and participation from international donors. These donors included the ADB, UNESCO, EU and the governments of the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland and others. [5]
Since 2002, the second phase of the program has been initiated by the five riparians in the region. The objective of IFAS was to address a wide range of environmental, socioeconomic, water management and institutional issues from 2003 until 2010. According to the ICAS report, the contributions from the member countries of the IFAS has amounted to over $1 billion, with additional funding provided by the international donors such as the UNDP, the World Bank, ADB, USAID, and various other governments in the world. [5]
2.5.5 IFAS Summit 2009 and onwards
In April 2009, the heads of states gathered for an IFAS summit, where they produced a joint statement emphasizing the importance of IFAS as well as the need to improve its organizational structure. [5] In this summit meeting, they agreed to begin developing the third phase of the ASBP.
In 2010, EC IFAS began the preparation process, as the third phase was decided to cover the years 2011 to 2015. [5] The preparation process involved intensive consultations with various national and international experts. The objective of the third phase of ASBP (ASBP-3) is to improve the environment by:
1. Applying the principles of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM); 2. Developing a mutually acceptable mechanism for water sharing; and 3. Being able to improve the environment while taking account all of the national interests in the region. [5]
So far, 335 project proposals have been received by EC IFAS. [5] Based on the objectives of ASBP-3, a set of criteria has been agreed upon to make decisions on which projects will be included in the program. The list of criteria is as follows:
• National projects to be implemented within one state and primarily financed from the national budget; • Regional projects to be implemented in the territory of two or more states; • Meeting the ASBP goals and objectives; • Meeting one of the directions of ASBP; • Linking with the corresponding national and regional policy goals and programs. [5]
After an extensive consultation processes with the experts and international donors, 45 projects were selected and are part of the ASBP-3. [5] In December 2010, the draft ASBP-3 was presented to the international donors and the IFAS board and won full support. [5]
Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight
Individuals may add their own Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight (ASI) to a case. ASI sub-articles are protected, so that each contributor retains authorship and control of their own content. Edit the case to add your own ASI.
Learn moreASI:A Way Forward: Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework
A number of opportunities exist to improve the situation in this basin. Inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, the design and implementation of joint-fact finding, exploration of mutual gains (rather than zero-sum) negotiation, and opportunities to create additional value by exploring how to expand benefits from water through addressing irrigation inefficiencies in the basin are explored here.(read the full article... )
Contributed by: Jungwoo Chun (last edit: 14 May 2014)
