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The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure.

Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party.

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:

Clarity about rights and obligations
Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement

From: Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River.

From: Addressing the Transboundary Water Conflict Between the Blue Nile Riparian States

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power. In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement. In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve. The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states agree to equal access to transboundary water resources, equal and joint management, investment and distribution of that resource is feasible. In the water resources sector, neither Brazil nor Argentina has used their economic or military superiority to maintain greater control over water resources or hydroelectric potential.

From: Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation

There is limited shared cooperation and consultation. The Navajo Nation is technically a sovereign nation and thus, should work directly with the United States government. In practice, the Navajo Nation is sovereign to the extent allowed by the United States government.

This makes for an awkward asymmetry of power as the Navajo Nation and the United States government interests may not always align. The Navajo are in a complex place to negotiate. They must negotiate at the state level (for example, with New Mexico) and at the federal level (for example, with the EPA). Often times, the Bureau of Indian Affairs may also step in, adding another layer of complexity. The complexity of the number of players needs to be simplified.

The best-case scenario would involve the Navajo Nation to be respected and treated as a sovereign nation. The varied history between the US government and the Navajo Nation make this complicated in practice, as the US government financially supports some of the operations of the Navajo Nation.

In leaning towards full sovereignty, a structure needs to be developed that would enable the Navajo an equal voice alongside the United States federal government. The Navajo Nation should be able to have the final say on how their lands are used and be able to hold parties accountable for any damage caused.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

The five littoral states differ greatly in their political and economical power. For the new states, projects which will enhance their economy are very attractive, and so they are welcoming foreign energy players to start cooperating as soon as possible. Russia and Iran, which are much more advanced in the field of energy, and have reserves outside the Caspian Region, are much more causious about the involvement of foreign players.

From: The Helmand River Basin Dispute

The asymmetry of power has influenced the history of the water negotiations in the Helmand River dispute. In addition, the power of international participants in the negotiation process could have contributed towards an agreement being formed or the level of trust placed in an agreement. Currently, Afghanistan has power geographically being the upstream country. Being the upstream riparian in conjunction with the position that Iran has violated the treaty and is inhibiting Afghanistan’s economic growth, provides the state with the incentive to push forward with potentially impactful water and agricultural developments. Iran has generally been more powerful in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, the state is likely more interested in pursuing future negotiations over the Helmand waters prior to any development in Afghanistan, as this could ensure that majority of the flow is allocated to Iran.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits. South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries.

From: The Role of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project for Regional Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin

Water sharing and transfer is an important mechanism that the three states are using to address asymmetry of geopolitical power in the basin. For example, Jordan receives 35 million cubic meters of water from Israel every year, according to the peace treaty signed between the two countries. In the Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyance project the desalination plant that will be built by Jordan and will run through Jordanian territory will provide freshwater from the port of Aqaba to Israel’s southern Arava region as a water swap. Similarly. Jordan will buy Israeli water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to provide drinking water to Amman, the capital of Jordan, instead of building extraneous infrastructure to pump water to the city from the south (Reed, 2017). Identification of such mutual gains and competitive advantages is one way to address asymmetries in power and access to resources. Nonetheless, Palestine’s access to water remains a key question that is unresolved and may require repeated negotiations through the Joint Water Committee.

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How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?

From: Addressing Declining Groundwater Supply in Umatilla County, Oregon, USA

Selection of Stakeholders: the Critical Groundwater Areas primarily are located within the western portion of Umatilla County and the Planning Commission recognized that basin-wide water use needed to be addressed before any plans were developed. The members of the Task Force were chosen based upon their respective geographic areas rather than vocational, urban, or Tribal designations. Members were selectively chosen by the Board of Commissioners based upon level of commitment to resolve the water management issue, not to represent vested interests or groups.

Task Force agreed upon a methodology: after the Task Force was created, they based their public involvement/outreach strategy loosely along the lines of the principles of Collaborative Learning, which was designed at Oregon State University.(Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. 2001). This methodology utilizes systems thinking processes to structure conflict management and foster alternative dispute resolution, which is useful in broad natural resource situations with a variety of stakeholder involvement.

From: Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley

Key Tools and Frameworks

The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. For example, during the assessment, mediators observed that the region had a high degree of distrust and was hesitant about issues of representation so the facilitation team recommended the large, open groundwater stakeholder forum as a tool to vet and recommend the proposals that would ultimately move forward.

Identifying stakeholders to participate in the process was also a critical tool or element of the process. Low trust and collaborative capacity among stakeholders emerged during the stakeholder assessment. The mediation team worked with interest groups to identify representatives that would have credibility to represent each interest in the smaller collaborative work group. The mediators met with representatives of agriculture to clarify different segments, such as berry growers and processors in addition to other agricultural interests. And, the mediators met several times with environmental organizations to help them understand the law and the negotiate representation. In addition, the mediators networked with different nongovernmental organizations and agencies to identify rural residential well owners and disadvantaged community representatives who might participate in the collaborative work group.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and stakeholders informing one another about their interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Lastly, professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and negotiate outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents.

Transparency was another important element of success. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. The project had a web site (www.salinasgroundwater.org, now www.svbgsa.com) that was updated regularly with all materials and process information.

From: Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County

Key Tools and Frameworks The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and agencies informing one another about their stakeholders' interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing agency stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and consider outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. Amongst other outcomes, this resulted in Advisory Boards for each GSA where agricultural, rural, and environmental interests are represented and can oversee the process of achieving long-run groundwater sustainability.

Transparency was another important element of success. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. A website (sonomacountygroundwater.org) continues to document ongoing progress by each GSA and provides notifications about prior and upcoming meetings.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

Without stakeholder participation in the management of water resources, efficiency and effectiveness are limited.

With little or no stakeholder participation in the management of the Lake Titicaca basin, ALT has only been minimally effective at producing results. It is clear that a more comprehensive system of inclusion of the public is needed to take place in order for the Authority to complete its goals. If three out of the four problems identified by the institution deal with the people's actions on the water and land in the basin, then they must be included for optimal functioning of the initiative. Otherwise, gaps and resentment are created by an organization acting above those who most use the lake.

From: Northeast Regional Ocean Planning

As the case overview outlines, the Northeast Regional Ocean Planning Process had a robust stakeholder engagement process. The process included different methods and meetings for stakeholders to get involved, different locations, and different levels of engagement.

Perhaps most notable in this case, the stakeholder engagement process was integrated into the ocean planning process from early on. It was not just a one stop check box for general input, but a thoughtful and coordinated approach throughout every phase of planning. This is a valuable lesson for other processes as it helped ensure stakeholders were engaged early on and had meaningful input throughout.

If the Northeast Regional Planning Body had not integrated such engagement throughout, it is unlikely that their final Plan would be as widely supported. Often times, in such circumstances, stakeholders instead feel they are asked to rubber stamp something that has already been decided. By engaging early on, incorporating feedback throughout, and continuing to dialogue, the Northeast ocean planning process was more effective in their stakeholder engagement.

In addition, the engagement process was facilitated by third-party neutrals which allowed for productive and meaningful conversations between decision-makers on the NE RPB and the broader community of ocean users. The third-party neutral team also provided neutral documentation of the meetings that allowed all parties to be on the same page with what feedback needed to be incorporated into the planning process.

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Stakeholder participation should be included at all levels of decision-making processes for optimal mutual gain. When local populations were not included on the decision-making processes within the Senegal River basin, there tended to be frustration, confusion and economic losses directly as a result of not participating. Participation by all stakeholders can only benefit all groups involved in making agreements more sustainable, mutually beneficial and efficient.

From: Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues

Involving all relevant stakeholders would go far beyond government ministries or local water districts to bring in representatives from agriculture, tourism, industry, conservation, and others. This will help with building trust and also transparency to the decisions, while ultimately achieving buy-in among the stakeholders.

Values Many stakeholders only acknowledge actions that have taken place or plan for a terminal output, such as a dam or irrigation diversion. This ‘conclusion thinking’ disregards the values and underlying principles that guide those wants. Ultimately, this limits creativity and drives a ‘winner and loser’ negotiation where one achieves the end goal, or they are unsatisfied with the result. By working to identify underlying values, more creativity can produce deeper and far reaching results for many more parties. This step supports the notion that the resources available could be much larger than, creating a ‘bigger pie.’ In a peri-developed country in the process of rebuilding, acknowledging common goals and understandings can have a far-reaching impact beyond the realm of water.

Accountability Accountability from within and outside the country is important to build trust in the process of any agreement. Being held to agreements and priorities is vital in a country where skepticism between stakeholders is rampant. A non-partisan third party with authority over all stakeholders is necessary to make this achievable. Establishing this outside party would prove difficult, as neutrality is scarce, especially within a single nation, but an outside party that is able to cut through local and national politics would be vital to the process.

From: River Basin Management and Environment Protection through a Conservation Trust Fund in Quito, Ecuador

Once information was gathered about the nature and location of threats to key ecological features in the Quito watershed, consultation among downstream stakeholders produced a mechanism to alleviate and mitigate the environmental threats. The creation of FONAG is an example of multiple knowledge frames harmonizing toward the common goal of ecological preservation that stand to benefit all stakeholders in the long-term. The governance structure of the fund demonstrates an effective way to incentivize stakeholder participation, which in context is monetary contribution. Without a harmonized knowledge framework, however, it is unlikely that incentives would lead to cooperation between stakeholders.

From: The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

This case demonstrates how the right negotiation conditions, transparency, time to develop trust, and other factors foster cooperation.

From: Urmia Lake: The Need for Water Diplomacy

The government of Islamic Republic of Iran established the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (ULRP) in 2013. This program is under auspices of the President and then has more power than of the former program initiated by DOE. After several meetings, this program produced a set of guidelines, including 19 potential solutions for the lake. One of these solutions was to rent the lands of the Zarrinehrud River (which provides roughly 40% of all inflow to the lake) from farmers who did not harvest during winter seasons of the preceding three years. However, this solution was rejected by members of the local parliament who claimed the plan would negatively impact employment and waste funding on farmers, who do not possess effective tools to invest. Another solution mentioned by the ULRP was reallocation of water among the lake's three neighboring provinces. When applied, however, this approach resulted in each province making greater demands, and ultimately claiming more water.

Consensus building among these stakeholders is vital to the survival of the lake. As the ULRP lacks the authority to enforce compliance among local provinces, agricultural and water ministries, and parliamentary units, the introduction of a "water parliament" is one solution in which all formal stakeholders can receive equitable consideration toward the development of a successful mandatory policy.

From: Water Competition & Cooperation in the Las Vegas Valley

In the Las Vegas Valley, municipalities competing for a limited water supply led to great inefficiencies. The formation of a cooperative water management utility created incentives for conservation and led to decreased water demands. Serious near-term shortages sparked interest in cooperation but good leadership was critical in navigating the transition.

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How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River.

From: Addressing the Transboundary Water Conflict Between the Blue Nile Riparian States

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power. In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement. In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve. The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states agree to equal access to transboundary water resources, equal and joint management, investment and distribution of that resource is feasible. In the water resources sector, neither Brazil nor Argentina has used their economic or military superiority to maintain greater control over water resources or hydroelectric potential.

From: Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation

There is limited shared cooperation and consultation. The Navajo Nation is technically a sovereign nation and thus, should work directly with the United States government. In practice, the Navajo Nation is sovereign to the extent allowed by the United States government.

This makes for an awkward asymmetry of power as the Navajo Nation and the United States government interests may not always align. The Navajo are in a complex place to negotiate. They must negotiate at the state level (for example, with New Mexico) and at the federal level (for example, with the EPA). Often times, the Bureau of Indian Affairs may also step in, adding another layer of complexity. The complexity of the number of players needs to be simplified.

The best-case scenario would involve the Navajo Nation to be respected and treated as a sovereign nation. The varied history between the US government and the Navajo Nation make this complicated in practice, as the US government financially supports some of the operations of the Navajo Nation.

In leaning towards full sovereignty, a structure needs to be developed that would enable the Navajo an equal voice alongside the United States federal government. The Navajo Nation should be able to have the final say on how their lands are used and be able to hold parties accountable for any damage caused.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

The five littoral states differ greatly in their political and economical power. For the new states, projects which will enhance their economy are very attractive, and so they are welcoming foreign energy players to start cooperating as soon as possible. Russia and Iran, which are much more advanced in the field of energy, and have reserves outside the Caspian Region, are much more causious about the involvement of foreign players.

From: The Helmand River Basin Dispute

The asymmetry of power has influenced the history of the water negotiations in the Helmand River dispute. In addition, the power of international participants in the negotiation process could have contributed towards an agreement being formed or the level of trust placed in an agreement. Currently, Afghanistan has power geographically being the upstream country. Being the upstream riparian in conjunction with the position that Iran has violated the treaty and is inhibiting Afghanistan’s economic growth, provides the state with the incentive to push forward with potentially impactful water and agricultural developments. Iran has generally been more powerful in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, the state is likely more interested in pursuing future negotiations over the Helmand waters prior to any development in Afghanistan, as this could ensure that majority of the flow is allocated to Iran.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits. South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries.

From: The Role of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project for Regional Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin

Water sharing and transfer is an important mechanism that the three states are using to address asymmetry of geopolitical power in the basin. For example, Jordan receives 35 million cubic meters of water from Israel every year, according to the peace treaty signed between the two countries. In the Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyance project the desalination plant that will be built by Jordan and will run through Jordanian territory will provide freshwater from the port of Aqaba to Israel’s southern Arava region as a water swap. Similarly. Jordan will buy Israeli water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to provide drinking water to Amman, the capital of Jordan, instead of building extraneous infrastructure to pump water to the city from the south (Reed, 2017). Identification of such mutual gains and competitive advantages is one way to address asymmetries in power and access to resources. Nonetheless, Palestine’s access to water remains a key question that is unresolved and may require repeated negotiations through the Joint Water Committee.

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What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?

From: 2008 Kosi Flood

The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure.

Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party.

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:

Clarity about rights and obligations
Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement

From: Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Mutual trust can be nurtured through

seamless sharing of data and information through the most efficient means of communications,
promotion of mutual exchanges to stake holders to build fraternal bonds (e.g experts, academia, farmers, intelligentia, opinion makers, politicians, civil society organizations etc) through conferences, sharing of knowledge, interactive engagements.

Specific situations to be avoided are:

misleading emotive and irresponsible statements
unilateral start of projects without resolution of issues upfront.
violations of provisions of treaties
tendencies to gain political mileage or media exposures.
non water actions (such as political, military, commercial, terrorism etc) which can vitiate the general feeling of mutual trust.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

China'a indisputable Nine-Dash Line claim has caused contentions among the stakeholders. The initiation of an arbitration process, thought to have equalized the situations has, on the contrary, created a serious zero-sum game and strained relations between the parties.

From: Red River of the North - Fargo-Moorhead Diversion

Case shows the results of extended negotiation that does not recognize needs of the other party

From: The Helmand River Basin Dispute

Throughout the dispute, trust has eroded between the two countries. Disagreement over the interpretation of the treaty and the measurement of the volume of water allocated has contributed. Continued drought and potential future droughts will likely further erode trust without agreement over how to manage the river in drought. Political actions, such as the alleged border skirmish to divert irrigation water across the border, and alliances with other nations, such as historical British and US involvement in the border and water dispute, and giving aid in development infrastructure, can reduce trust. Lack of quality and available data prevents a building of trust.

From: The Republican River Compact

Many actions can erode trust amongst riparians. In the Republican River Compact three key actions can be identified: (1) a riparian repeatedly voices concerns that are disregarded or ignored by the other compact parties, (2) a riparian violates the terms of the compact in a manner that is perceived to be intentional, (3) riparians engage in arbitration or litigation to resolve their disputes.

Recent efforts in the basin demonstrate how trust can be nurtured or rebuilt. In the Republican River Compact three key actions can be identified: (1) the compact administration committed to meeting more frequently to better understand the concerns and interests of each state, (2) Nebraska thoroughly explained the steps and mechanisms it had put in place to avoid overuse in water short years to ease Kansas’ concerns about future noncompliance, and (3) the recently negotiated agreements are temporary, allowing for time to test new options without a binding commitment and continue negotiating a long-term agreement that works for everyone.

From: The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

This case shows that time, transparency, and jointly developing science can developed trust among involved parties.

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

Data sharing and regular forums for communication and cooperation can foster mutual trust amongst riparians. Lack of transparency around infrastructure projects and data sharing can erode that trust.

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What effective mechanisms can downstream states/countries use to protect their water related interests/rights?

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Mutual Treaties clearly delineating rights and obligations of the parties involved with a suitable balance between water and benefit sharing with a dispute resolution mechanism as described for IWT above (while addressing it’s weaknesses) with binding nature of Third Part decisions is a good mechanism. Alternatively, the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 May 1997, which recently became effective, if ratified by the parties concerned can provide protection to the downstream riparians. (Note: Remember that some times the upper riparians need to protect their rights as well; e.g. in Nile Basin).

From: Upstream Hydropower Development in the Syr Darya River Basin, Downstream Impacts, and Potential Opportunities

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What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.

From: China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.

From: Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities

Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.

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How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When one riparian holds the most geographic and military power, equitable agreements are difficult to reach. With the large majority of water originating in Turkey and Turkey having the most advanced military power, it has less incentive to work cooperatively with Syria and Iraq and to approach negotiations with a "basket of benefits" outlook.

From: Drinking Water Supply in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Cambodia is a downstream country in the Mekong river Basin and has potentially much to lose from uncontrolled upstream development of the river. China, the most upstream country in the basin, and Lao PDR have ongoing construction or plans to construct hydropower dams in the mainstream of the Mekong River, which has raised concerns of potential environmental, economic, and social impacts to downstream countries. As an upstream country with vast economic resources, there is little incentive for China to cooperate with downstream countries.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts. The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

Because hydropower projects require large financial investments, groups that are unable to make financial contributions may be marginalized. This seems to be the case for the Columbia River Treaty, in which the traditional fishing grounds of a large number of Native American tribes were altered and fisheries destroyed to provide protection for cities in the United States and economic opportunities for Canada. Because of this tendency to undervalue stakeholders who are unable to invest in the project itself, it may be necessary for decision-makers to be especially vigilant and sensitive to stakeholder needs when dealing with hydropower projects.

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

The population size, poverty levels, dependence on river flow for agriculture, and electricity needs can make certain parts of a basin more compelling candidates for the benefits of hydropower. However, the issue is complicated at the transnational level when the hydropower electricity generation will benefit one marginalized population and disadvantage another marginalized population downstream.

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How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River.

From: Addressing the Transboundary Water Conflict Between the Blue Nile Riparian States

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power. In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement. In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve. The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states agree to equal access to transboundary water resources, equal and joint management, investment and distribution of that resource is feasible. In the water resources sector, neither Brazil nor Argentina has used their economic or military superiority to maintain greater control over water resources or hydroelectric potential.

From: Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation

There is limited shared cooperation and consultation. The Navajo Nation is technically a sovereign nation and thus, should work directly with the United States government. In practice, the Navajo Nation is sovereign to the extent allowed by the United States government.

This makes for an awkward asymmetry of power as the Navajo Nation and the United States government interests may not always align. The Navajo are in a complex place to negotiate. They must negotiate at the state level (for example, with New Mexico) and at the federal level (for example, with the EPA). Often times, the Bureau of Indian Affairs may also step in, adding another layer of complexity. The complexity of the number of players needs to be simplified.

The best-case scenario would involve the Navajo Nation to be respected and treated as a sovereign nation. The varied history between the US government and the Navajo Nation make this complicated in practice, as the US government financially supports some of the operations of the Navajo Nation.

In leaning towards full sovereignty, a structure needs to be developed that would enable the Navajo an equal voice alongside the United States federal government. The Navajo Nation should be able to have the final say on how their lands are used and be able to hold parties accountable for any damage caused.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

The five littoral states differ greatly in their political and economical power. For the new states, projects which will enhance their economy are very attractive, and so they are welcoming foreign energy players to start cooperating as soon as possible. Russia and Iran, which are much more advanced in the field of energy, and have reserves outside the Caspian Region, are much more causious about the involvement of foreign players.

From: The Helmand River Basin Dispute

The asymmetry of power has influenced the history of the water negotiations in the Helmand River dispute. In addition, the power of international participants in the negotiation process could have contributed towards an agreement being formed or the level of trust placed in an agreement. Currently, Afghanistan has power geographically being the upstream country. Being the upstream riparian in conjunction with the position that Iran has violated the treaty and is inhibiting Afghanistan’s economic growth, provides the state with the incentive to push forward with potentially impactful water and agricultural developments. Iran has generally been more powerful in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, the state is likely more interested in pursuing future negotiations over the Helmand waters prior to any development in Afghanistan, as this could ensure that majority of the flow is allocated to Iran.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits. South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries.

From: The Role of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project for Regional Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin

Water sharing and transfer is an important mechanism that the three states are using to address asymmetry of geopolitical power in the basin. For example, Jordan receives 35 million cubic meters of water from Israel every year, according to the peace treaty signed between the two countries. In the Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyance project the desalination plant that will be built by Jordan and will run through Jordanian territory will provide freshwater from the port of Aqaba to Israel’s southern Arava region as a water swap. Similarly. Jordan will buy Israeli water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to provide drinking water to Amman, the capital of Jordan, instead of building extraneous infrastructure to pump water to the city from the south (Reed, 2017). Identification of such mutual gains and competitive advantages is one way to address asymmetries in power and access to resources. Nonetheless, Palestine’s access to water remains a key question that is unresolved and may require repeated negotiations through the Joint Water Committee.

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To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.

From: China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.

From: Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities

Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.

,

To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.

From: China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.

From: Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities

Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.

,

What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?

From: 2008 Kosi Flood

The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure.

Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party.

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:

Clarity about rights and obligations
Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement

From: Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

,

What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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How do national policies influence water use at the local level?

From: Competing Demands Among Water Uses in the Apalachicola- Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin

This case study indicates that national policies, such as government subsidies for certain crops, can significantly influence water use at the local level. By altering subsidies to encourage farmers to grow more water-efficient crops, national policy could potentially support more sustainable water use. However, it is important to keep in mind that changing government agricultural subsidies will have many other social and economic effects that must be considered.

From: Northeast Regional Ocean Planning

In the case of the Northeast ocean planning process, the National Ocean Policy was certainly a driving factor in helping to catalyze improved regional coordination that built off of existing state level initiatives. When the National Ocean Policy was created, the Northeast already had two state-level ocean plans and a regional ocean council working to improve coordination on ocean management.

The national level policy helped bring federal agencies to the table with a clear mandate from the Executive branch to focus on supporting regional ocean planning. In addition, it helped bring tribal governments to the table as an important resource in planning, technical ecological knowledge, and cultural resources. Having increased leadership and collaboration from both federal and tribal representatives, overall improved the ocean management work in the Northeast.

Perhaps most importantly with this national initiative, it encouraged regions to help drive the process and tailor their needs from the bottom-up. It did not create additional regulatory requirements, but instead encouraged existing entities to improve their work through increased coordination and stakeholder input towards a collective future vision of ocean management.

From: Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues

National policies have been influential to local users, yet not in a positive way. This can be seen in that only 47% of households were connected to the public water network in 2007 (UNESCWA), illegal connections to the water network (El-Fadel) or that there is a general disregard to the environmental policies by the public (Daily Star). Decades of conflict and unrest eroded the capacity for many federal and local government agencies – water included. Masri (1997) also notes that soil, wildlife, forestry, along with water and other natural resources has a long history of neglect and mismanagement. The lack of capacity has since translated to a crumbling infrastructure (El-Fadel) and a disillusioned population that has little to no expectation from their government. ‘Non-sustainable development and a lack of awareness’ (ARD Report) also highlight a lack of oversight of water resources from the government. This has been exasperated by the structure for water management agencies, but truly is represented in the lack of accountability of those responsible for water governance.

,

What role can agricultural subsidies play in finding solutions to complex water management problems?

From: Competing Demands Among Water Uses in the Apalachicola- Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin

1. Do agricultural subsidies influence water use in the Flint River Basin? Our analysis shows that agricultural subsidies play a key role in influencing what crops farmers grow, thereby directly affecting water use in the basin.

2. Can agricultural subsidies potentially be used to improve water management and reduce conflict in the ACF basin? This analysis suggests that altering national subsidies for certain crops could significantly reduce agricultural water requirements in the Flint, thereby freeing up water for other uses in the ACF and potentially reducing conflict.

3. Can agricultural policy and management—particularly subsidies—promote more sustainable water use in water-stressed basins? The case of the Flint River Basin suggests that agricultural policies and management strategies, such as direct subsidies to farmers, can be used to reduce water demand and potentially promote more sustainable water use in water-stressed basins.

See the article Agricultural Subsidies for more information on agricultural subsidies within the Flint River Basin

,

To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.

From: China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.

From: Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities

Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.

,

What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

,

How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River.

From: Addressing the Transboundary Water Conflict Between the Blue Nile Riparian States

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power. In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement. In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve. The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states agree to equal access to transboundary water resources, equal and joint management, investment and distribution of that resource is feasible. In the water resources sector, neither Brazil nor Argentina has used their economic or military superiority to maintain greater control over water resources or hydroelectric potential.

From: Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation

There is limited shared cooperation and consultation. The Navajo Nation is technically a sovereign nation and thus, should work directly with the United States government. In practice, the Navajo Nation is sovereign to the extent allowed by the United States government.

This makes for an awkward asymmetry of power as the Navajo Nation and the United States government interests may not always align. The Navajo are in a complex place to negotiate. They must negotiate at the state level (for example, with New Mexico) and at the federal level (for example, with the EPA). Often times, the Bureau of Indian Affairs may also step in, adding another layer of complexity. The complexity of the number of players needs to be simplified.

The best-case scenario would involve the Navajo Nation to be respected and treated as a sovereign nation. The varied history between the US government and the Navajo Nation make this complicated in practice, as the US government financially supports some of the operations of the Navajo Nation.

In leaning towards full sovereignty, a structure needs to be developed that would enable the Navajo an equal voice alongside the United States federal government. The Navajo Nation should be able to have the final say on how their lands are used and be able to hold parties accountable for any damage caused.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

The five littoral states differ greatly in their political and economical power. For the new states, projects which will enhance their economy are very attractive, and so they are welcoming foreign energy players to start cooperating as soon as possible. Russia and Iran, which are much more advanced in the field of energy, and have reserves outside the Caspian Region, are much more causious about the involvement of foreign players.

From: The Helmand River Basin Dispute

The asymmetry of power has influenced the history of the water negotiations in the Helmand River dispute. In addition, the power of international participants in the negotiation process could have contributed towards an agreement being formed or the level of trust placed in an agreement. Currently, Afghanistan has power geographically being the upstream country. Being the upstream riparian in conjunction with the position that Iran has violated the treaty and is inhibiting Afghanistan’s economic growth, provides the state with the incentive to push forward with potentially impactful water and agricultural developments. Iran has generally been more powerful in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, the state is likely more interested in pursuing future negotiations over the Helmand waters prior to any development in Afghanistan, as this could ensure that majority of the flow is allocated to Iran.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits. South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries.

From: The Role of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project for Regional Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin

Water sharing and transfer is an important mechanism that the three states are using to address asymmetry of geopolitical power in the basin. For example, Jordan receives 35 million cubic meters of water from Israel every year, according to the peace treaty signed between the two countries. In the Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyance project the desalination plant that will be built by Jordan and will run through Jordanian territory will provide freshwater from the port of Aqaba to Israel’s southern Arava region as a water swap. Similarly. Jordan will buy Israeli water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to provide drinking water to Amman, the capital of Jordan, instead of building extraneous infrastructure to pump water to the city from the south (Reed, 2017). Identification of such mutual gains and competitive advantages is one way to address asymmetries in power and access to resources. Nonetheless, Palestine’s access to water remains a key question that is unresolved and may require repeated negotiations through the Joint Water Committee.

,

What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

,

How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When one riparian holds the most geographic and military power, equitable agreements are difficult to reach. With the large majority of water originating in Turkey and Turkey having the most advanced military power, it has less incentive to work cooperatively with Syria and Iraq and to approach negotiations with a "basket of benefits" outlook.

From: Drinking Water Supply in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Cambodia is a downstream country in the Mekong river Basin and has potentially much to lose from uncontrolled upstream development of the river. China, the most upstream country in the basin, and Lao PDR have ongoing construction or plans to construct hydropower dams in the mainstream of the Mekong River, which has raised concerns of potential environmental, economic, and social impacts to downstream countries. As an upstream country with vast economic resources, there is little incentive for China to cooperate with downstream countries.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts. The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

Because hydropower projects require large financial investments, groups that are unable to make financial contributions may be marginalized. This seems to be the case for the Columbia River Treaty, in which the traditional fishing grounds of a large number of Native American tribes were altered and fisheries destroyed to provide protection for cities in the United States and economic opportunities for Canada. Because of this tendency to undervalue stakeholders who are unable to invest in the project itself, it may be necessary for decision-makers to be especially vigilant and sensitive to stakeholder needs when dealing with hydropower projects.

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

The population size, poverty levels, dependence on river flow for agriculture, and electricity needs can make certain parts of a basin more compelling candidates for the benefits of hydropower. However, the issue is complicated at the transnational level when the hydropower electricity generation will benefit one marginalized population and disadvantage another marginalized population downstream.

,

How can government be dis/incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process?

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Upstream nations with superior strength can hinder joint management of river basins. China, with far more military might and economic power than both Thailand and Myanmar combined, has little incentive to work jointly with them in the management of the Salween River. Thailand and Myanmar's water resources from the Salween may be at great risk depending on what China decides to do on the upper part of the river.

From: Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation

The lasting impacts of uranium mining on the Navajo Nation have led to greater costs (environmental, health and economic) for the Navajo Nation and the United States government. In addition, the US government has also been criticized for its treatment of the Navajo population.

The US government, which often sees itself as a leader in the provision of fair judicial processes, has failed to protect the Navajo’s health and livelihoods. Navajo sovereignty is limited by the United States government. The structure of the government is not set up to best serve the Navajo Nation. Thus there are at least two different ways the US government could be incentivized to offer an inclusive planning process:

First, build a joint committee between the US government and the Navajo Nation to oversee all uranium mining. This would enable greater transparency and encourage more conversations and understanding of the variety of positions.
Second, the US government needs to recognize the full cost of the uranium cleanup. They have already spent more than $100m on assessment and cleanup. That adds to the total cost of uranium mining and decreases the total value. That funding is still minimal in comparison with what the US government may be spending in the future to continue to remediate the impacts.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

The case study is an example of taking a precautionary approach in fish stock management as it learns from previous experiences (Bearing sea case in 1970s that resulted in over exploitation of fish stocks)

From: Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues

The current state of mismanagement and authority provides a strong basis for an inclusive planning process. Top-down authority is weak already, thus including many local and regional actors should be natural. This also would help to address the regional power structures that have been outside the national government structure. Furthermore, the current challenges are large and require buy-in from the entire population. The government is under-resourced in staff capacity and financially (El-Fadel) so there should be a sizable incentive to bring additional parties into the planning process for ideas but also investment options.

From: Urmia Lake: The Need for Water Diplomacy

Urmia Lake Restoration program initiated Iran Department of Environment (DOE) has prepared a 10-year plan to restore the Lake Urmia. The plan includes different solutions with a 10 year horizon will maintain the lakes condition. In addition to this, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) is also in collaboration with DOE have concluded the following solution to survive the lake (UNDP and DOE 2013):

Urgent Actions (to be implemented within 1-2 years)

Strengthen the institutional structure
Update the Integrated Management Plan
Establish a Lake Urmia Sustainability Fund
Reduce agricultural water use
Mobilize a public campaign to conserve water
Ecological restoration of (part of) the lake – “embayment”
Implement health-protection measures (especially related to salt/dust storms)
Develop a monitoring system on the condition of the basin and the lake

Recommended medium-term actions

Prepare a long-term development vision for the Basin
Continue with water conservation measures
Do not prioritize certain supply-side measures
Optimize the water allocation system

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How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When one riparian holds the most geographic and military power, equitable agreements are difficult to reach. With the large majority of water originating in Turkey and Turkey having the most advanced military power, it has less incentive to work cooperatively with Syria and Iraq and to approach negotiations with a "basket of benefits" outlook.

From: Drinking Water Supply in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Cambodia is a downstream country in the Mekong river Basin and has potentially much to lose from uncontrolled upstream development of the river. China, the most upstream country in the basin, and Lao PDR have ongoing construction or plans to construct hydropower dams in the mainstream of the Mekong River, which has raised concerns of potential environmental, economic, and social impacts to downstream countries. As an upstream country with vast economic resources, there is little incentive for China to cooperate with downstream countries.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts. The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

Because hydropower projects require large financial investments, groups that are unable to make financial contributions may be marginalized. This seems to be the case for the Columbia River Treaty, in which the traditional fishing grounds of a large number of Native American tribes were altered and fisheries destroyed to provide protection for cities in the United States and economic opportunities for Canada. Because of this tendency to undervalue stakeholders who are unable to invest in the project itself, it may be necessary for decision-makers to be especially vigilant and sensitive to stakeholder needs when dealing with hydropower projects.

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

The population size, poverty levels, dependence on river flow for agriculture, and electricity needs can make certain parts of a basin more compelling candidates for the benefits of hydropower. However, the issue is complicated at the transnational level when the hydropower electricity generation will benefit one marginalized population and disadvantage another marginalized population downstream.

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To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.

From: China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.

From: Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities

Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.

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What calculations and considerations should be investigated by countries looking to harness additional hydropower? Which potential outcomes should be investigated or identified?

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

The importance of water cooperation/economic development can supersede working with an oppressive regime. Even though Myanmar is controlled by a junta that is blamed for human rights violations, Thailand is still willing to cooperate with their government in order to promote regional management of the Salween River. For Thailand, the development of the Salween River and the benefits received from such development takes precedence over working with an oppressive regime. National sovereignty to protect water resources goes beyond international pressure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

Environmental impacts must be thoroughly assessed, lest the hydropower generation capacity be developed at the expense of water and ecosystem services that disadvantaged populations depend on, which can impact agricultural productivity and fishing on which these populations depend.

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What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?

From: 2008 Kosi Flood

The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure.

Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party.

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:

Clarity about rights and obligations
Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement

From: Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Maritsa River is subject to great variations in its flow during flooding season, especially in the last 10-15 years. Flooding monitoring and early warning systems can be beneficial for all riparian states as flooding impacts agricultural and urban areas in all three parts of the basin. Yet, biggest beneficiaries will be downstream countries. There were initiatives funded by the EU in the past few years for technical expertise sharing through Bulgaria-Turkey cross border cooperation projects. Technical experts from DSI (Turkey) and NHMI (Bulgaria) met in several meetings, agreed on basic principles for sharing information and initiated plans to install monitoring stations on the Bulgarian side during 2006-2010 period. Subsequent to the completion of three separate EU projects during this period, Bulgaria started to share river flow and dam capacity data to Turkish government experts. However, fast paced developments for cooperation in the basin stalled after momentum in Turkey’s EU accession process is lost. Following three project conducted with EU cross-border funds, successive projects that were initially planned to complement and improve outcomes of previous projects were not executed. The primary reason is the inadequacy of EU cross-border cooperation funds that are allocated for a transboundary river basin shared with a non-EU country. After 2010, there are sporadic technical committee meetings organized by technical experts from Bulgaria and Turkey without an EU framework solely based on bilateral efforts.

Under the current circumstances, steps to adopt good EU practices for flood prevention in other transboundary and trans-regional water basins of the EU can be taken. With EU’s political encouragement and financial support, a flexible tripartite plan between riparians for managing Maritsa River Basin can be enacted with regard to the EU Water Framework Directive. This plan can adopt good practices of river basin management and flood prevention plans in Elbe River Commission’s Flood Protection Action Plan, Ebro River Basin Plan and Rhine 2020 (for Rhine river basin). Also extending the scope of European Flood Alert System (EFAS) to Maritsa River basin can be suggested by the EU member states Greece and Bulgaria with support of candidate country Turkey. The limiting factor is Turkey’s reluctance to adopt EU WFD before acceding to the EU as a full member state and political hurdles to proceed with Environment Chapter in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

The parties defined some of the key aspects of their deal with relative vagueness. Some of this could have been intentional, so that both countries’ home governments would be able to interpret the agreement in different ways. This allowed negotiators to ‘sell’ the deal to their internal constituencies and also gave them the time they needed to conduct further studies that allowed them to adjust the details of the agreement during implementation.

Yet, some ambiguity in the agreement was not helpful. For example, there was disagreement after the treaty was signed as to who should bear the cost of transferring Jordan’s water. According to Israel, Jordan was responsible for the additional cost since the water was for its benefit. Not surprisingly, Jordan did not agree. This highlights the two sides of the ‘ambiguity coin.’ On one side, ambiguity helped allow for some measure of adaptive management. At the same time, the tensions that were not resolved during the negotiations did not go away.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

a. The stakeholders in the case study recognize the changing climatic conditions in the Arctic ecosystem. They are building in CAM in the agreement by conducting scenario analysis and identifying conditions needed that might trigger a decision such as in the case of conditions that can trigger creation of an RFMA/O

b. The stakeholders in the case recognize the lack of understanding of the importance of scientific information of the Arctic ecosystem and are using science experts to inform the diplomatic process

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Northeast Regional Ocean Planning

Although parties have not yet adjusted their Northeast Ocean Plan to adaptive management needs, the Plan prioritizes this in future work. Adaptive management was a key principle for the planning process and central in the Ocean Plan. In prioritizing this, parties also focused on research needs and information gaps as priorities to inform future work. This will ideally help shape future adaptive management work. Integrating collaborative adaptive management into the planning process and future meetings for implementation are positive approaches for success.

From: The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

The parties have changed the primary focus of the Programs over time as the needs and obstacles have evolved. At first, the Programs focused on achieving certain flow regimes and developing habitat for the protected species, and as these problems have been addressed, the Programs have shifted their focus to control of nonnative species, the largest current threat.

From: Water Management, Environment and Self-determination in Catalonia, Spain

The Ebro faces huge seasonal and annual variations leaving hydroelectricity, agriculture and aquaculture and domestic users with a high degree of uncertainty. However, users all have capacity and knowledge to collect data and share data as well as specific needs at the different periods of the year. A CAM process gathering central and Catalan government, basin agency and stakeholders could add on the existing attention given in the PHE, which estimates ranges of quantities.

From: Water Quality and Pollution Control in the Rhine River Basin

Collaborative Adaptive Management was utilized in formulating the Rhine 2020 plan. Specifically, the Rhine 2020 and EU Water Framework Directive were adopted after the Rhine Action Program ended, and the goals of Rhine 2020 were formed through evaluating the (then) current state of the ecosystem and water quality, and adjusting the management plans as necessary to reflect the changing conditions (i.e. including flood management goals as part of the Rhine 2020).

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How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?

From: Addressing Declining Groundwater Supply in Umatilla County, Oregon, USA

Selection of Stakeholders: the Critical Groundwater Areas primarily are located within the western portion of Umatilla County and the Planning Commission recognized that basin-wide water use needed to be addressed before any plans were developed. The members of the Task Force were chosen based upon their respective geographic areas rather than vocational, urban, or Tribal designations. Members were selectively chosen by the Board of Commissioners based upon level of commitment to resolve the water management issue, not to represent vested interests or groups.

Task Force agreed upon a methodology: after the Task Force was created, they based their public involvement/outreach strategy loosely along the lines of the principles of Collaborative Learning, which was designed at Oregon State University.(Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. 2001). This methodology utilizes systems thinking processes to structure conflict management and foster alternative dispute resolution, which is useful in broad natural resource situations with a variety of stakeholder involvement.

From: Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley

Key Tools and Frameworks

The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. For example, during the assessment, mediators observed that the region had a high degree of distrust and was hesitant about issues of representation so the facilitation team recommended the large, open groundwater stakeholder forum as a tool to vet and recommend the proposals that would ultimately move forward.

Identifying stakeholders to participate in the process was also a critical tool or element of the process. Low trust and collaborative capacity among stakeholders emerged during the stakeholder assessment. The mediation team worked with interest groups to identify representatives that would have credibility to represent each interest in the smaller collaborative work group. The mediators met with representatives of agriculture to clarify different segments, such as berry growers and processors in addition to other agricultural interests. And, the mediators met several times with environmental organizations to help them understand the law and the negotiate representation. In addition, the mediators networked with different nongovernmental organizations and agencies to identify rural residential well owners and disadvantaged community representatives who might participate in the collaborative work group.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and stakeholders informing one another about their interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Lastly, professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and negotiate outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents.

Transparency was another important element of success. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. The project had a web site (www.salinasgroundwater.org, now www.svbgsa.com) that was updated regularly with all materials and process information.

From: Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County

Key Tools and Frameworks The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and agencies informing one another about their stakeholders' interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing agency stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and consider outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. Amongst other outcomes, this resulted in Advisory Boards for each GSA where agricultural, rural, and environmental interests are represented and can oversee the process of achieving long-run groundwater sustainability.

Transparency was another important element of success. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. A website (sonomacountygroundwater.org) continues to document ongoing progress by each GSA and provides notifications about prior and upcoming meetings.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

Without stakeholder participation in the management of water resources, efficiency and effectiveness are limited.

With little or no stakeholder participation in the management of the Lake Titicaca basin, ALT has only been minimally effective at producing results. It is clear that a more comprehensive system of inclusion of the public is needed to take place in order for the Authority to complete its goals. If three out of the four problems identified by the institution deal with the people's actions on the water and land in the basin, then they must be included for optimal functioning of the initiative. Otherwise, gaps and resentment are created by an organization acting above those who most use the lake.

From: Northeast Regional Ocean Planning

As the case overview outlines, the Northeast Regional Ocean Planning Process had a robust stakeholder engagement process. The process included different methods and meetings for stakeholders to get involved, different locations, and different levels of engagement.

Perhaps most notable in this case, the stakeholder engagement process was integrated into the ocean planning process from early on. It was not just a one stop check box for general input, but a thoughtful and coordinated approach throughout every phase of planning. This is a valuable lesson for other processes as it helped ensure stakeholders were engaged early on and had meaningful input throughout.

If the Northeast Regional Planning Body had not integrated such engagement throughout, it is unlikely that their final Plan would be as widely supported. Often times, in such circumstances, stakeholders instead feel they are asked to rubber stamp something that has already been decided. By engaging early on, incorporating feedback throughout, and continuing to dialogue, the Northeast ocean planning process was more effective in their stakeholder engagement.

In addition, the engagement process was facilitated by third-party neutrals which allowed for productive and meaningful conversations between decision-makers on the NE RPB and the broader community of ocean users. The third-party neutral team also provided neutral documentation of the meetings that allowed all parties to be on the same page with what feedback needed to be incorporated into the planning process.

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Stakeholder participation should be included at all levels of decision-making processes for optimal mutual gain. When local populations were not included on the decision-making processes within the Senegal River basin, there tended to be frustration, confusion and economic losses directly as a result of not participating. Participation by all stakeholders can only benefit all groups involved in making agreements more sustainable, mutually beneficial and efficient.

From: Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues

Involving all relevant stakeholders would go far beyond government ministries or local water districts to bring in representatives from agriculture, tourism, industry, conservation, and others. This will help with building trust and also transparency to the decisions, while ultimately achieving buy-in among the stakeholders.

Values Many stakeholders only acknowledge actions that have taken place or plan for a terminal output, such as a dam or irrigation diversion. This ‘conclusion thinking’ disregards the values and underlying principles that guide those wants. Ultimately, this limits creativity and drives a ‘winner and loser’ negotiation where one achieves the end goal, or they are unsatisfied with the result. By working to identify underlying values, more creativity can produce deeper and far reaching results for many more parties. This step supports the notion that the resources available could be much larger than, creating a ‘bigger pie.’ In a peri-developed country in the process of rebuilding, acknowledging common goals and understandings can have a far-reaching impact beyond the realm of water.

Accountability Accountability from within and outside the country is important to build trust in the process of any agreement. Being held to agreements and priorities is vital in a country where skepticism between stakeholders is rampant. A non-partisan third party with authority over all stakeholders is necessary to make this achievable. Establishing this outside party would prove difficult, as neutrality is scarce, especially within a single nation, but an outside party that is able to cut through local and national politics would be vital to the process.

From: River Basin Management and Environment Protection through a Conservation Trust Fund in Quito, Ecuador

Once information was gathered about the nature and location of threats to key ecological features in the Quito watershed, consultation among downstream stakeholders produced a mechanism to alleviate and mitigate the environmental threats. The creation of FONAG is an example of multiple knowledge frames harmonizing toward the common goal of ecological preservation that stand to benefit all stakeholders in the long-term. The governance structure of the fund demonstrates an effective way to incentivize stakeholder participation, which in context is monetary contribution. Without a harmonized knowledge framework, however, it is unlikely that incentives would lead to cooperation between stakeholders.

From: The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

This case demonstrates how the right negotiation conditions, transparency, time to develop trust, and other factors foster cooperation.

From: Urmia Lake: The Need for Water Diplomacy

The government of Islamic Republic of Iran established the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (ULRP) in 2013. This program is under auspices of the President and then has more power than of the former program initiated by DOE. After several meetings, this program produced a set of guidelines, including 19 potential solutions for the lake. One of these solutions was to rent the lands of the Zarrinehrud River (which provides roughly 40% of all inflow to the lake) from farmers who did not harvest during winter seasons of the preceding three years. However, this solution was rejected by members of the local parliament who claimed the plan would negatively impact employment and waste funding on farmers, who do not possess effective tools to invest. Another solution mentioned by the ULRP was reallocation of water among the lake's three neighboring provinces. When applied, however, this approach resulted in each province making greater demands, and ultimately claiming more water.

Consensus building among these stakeholders is vital to the survival of the lake. As the ULRP lacks the authority to enforce compliance among local provinces, agricultural and water ministries, and parliamentary units, the introduction of a "water parliament" is one solution in which all formal stakeholders can receive equitable consideration toward the development of a successful mandatory policy.

From: Water Competition & Cooperation in the Las Vegas Valley

In the Las Vegas Valley, municipalities competing for a limited water supply led to great inefficiencies. The formation of a cooperative water management utility created incentives for conservation and led to decreased water demands. Serious near-term shortages sparked interest in cooperation but good leadership was critical in navigating the transition.

,

How can consultation and cooperation among stakeholders and development partners be better facilitated/managed/fostered?

From: Addressing Declining Groundwater Supply in Umatilla County, Oregon, USA

Selection of Stakeholders: the Critical Groundwater Areas primarily are located within the western portion of Umatilla County and the Planning Commission recognized that basin-wide water use needed to be addressed before any plans were developed. The members of the Task Force were chosen based upon their respective geographic areas rather than vocational, urban, or Tribal designations. Members were selectively chosen by the Board of Commissioners based upon level of commitment to resolve the water management issue, not to represent vested interests or groups.

Task Force agreed upon a methodology: after the Task Force was created, they based their public involvement/outreach strategy loosely along the lines of the principles of Collaborative Learning, which was designed at Oregon State University.(Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. 2001). This methodology utilizes systems thinking processes to structure conflict management and foster alternative dispute resolution, which is useful in broad natural resource situations with a variety of stakeholder involvement.

From: Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley

Key Tools and Frameworks

The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. For example, during the assessment, mediators observed that the region had a high degree of distrust and was hesitant about issues of representation so the facilitation team recommended the large, open groundwater stakeholder forum as a tool to vet and recommend the proposals that would ultimately move forward.

Identifying stakeholders to participate in the process was also a critical tool or element of the process. Low trust and collaborative capacity among stakeholders emerged during the stakeholder assessment. The mediation team worked with interest groups to identify representatives that would have credibility to represent each interest in the smaller collaborative work group. The mediators met with representatives of agriculture to clarify different segments, such as berry growers and processors in addition to other agricultural interests. And, the mediators met several times with environmental organizations to help them understand the law and the negotiate representation. In addition, the mediators networked with different nongovernmental organizations and agencies to identify rural residential well owners and disadvantaged community representatives who might participate in the collaborative work group.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and stakeholders informing one another about their interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Lastly, professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and negotiate outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents.

Transparency was another important element of success. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. The project had a web site (www.salinasgroundwater.org, now www.svbgsa.com) that was updated regularly with all materials and process information.

From: Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County

Key Tools and Frameworks The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency.

The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward.

Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and agencies informing one another about their stakeholders' interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions.

Professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing agency stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and consider outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. Amongst other outcomes, this resulted in Advisory Boards for each GSA where agricultural, rural, and environmental interests are represented and can oversee the process of achieving long-run groundwater sustainability.

Transparency was another important element of success. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. A website (sonomacountygroundwater.org) continues to document ongoing progress by each GSA and provides notifications about prior and upcoming meetings.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

Without stakeholder participation in the management of water resources, efficiency and effectiveness are limited.

With little or no stakeholder participation in the management of the Lake Titicaca basin, ALT has only been minimally effective at producing results. It is clear that a more comprehensive system of inclusion of the public is needed to take place in order for the Authority to complete its goals. If three out of the four problems identified by the institution deal with the people's actions on the water and land in the basin, then they must be included for optimal functioning of the initiative. Otherwise, gaps and resentment are created by an organization acting above those who most use the lake.

From: Northeast Regional Ocean Planning

As the case overview outlines, the Northeast Regional Ocean Planning Process had a robust stakeholder engagement process. The process included different methods and meetings for stakeholders to get involved, different locations, and different levels of engagement.

Perhaps most notable in this case, the stakeholder engagement process was integrated into the ocean planning process from early on. It was not just a one stop check box for general input, but a thoughtful and coordinated approach throughout every phase of planning. This is a valuable lesson for other processes as it helped ensure stakeholders were engaged early on and had meaningful input throughout.

If the Northeast Regional Planning Body had not integrated such engagement throughout, it is unlikely that their final Plan would be as widely supported. Often times, in such circumstances, stakeholders instead feel they are asked to rubber stamp something that has already been decided. By engaging early on, incorporating feedback throughout, and continuing to dialogue, the Northeast ocean planning process was more effective in their stakeholder engagement.

In addition, the engagement process was facilitated by third-party neutrals which allowed for productive and meaningful conversations between decision-makers on the NE RPB and the broader community of ocean users. The third-party neutral team also provided neutral documentation of the meetings that allowed all parties to be on the same page with what feedback needed to be incorporated into the planning process.

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Stakeholder participation should be included at all levels of decision-making processes for optimal mutual gain. When local populations were not included on the decision-making processes within the Senegal River basin, there tended to be frustration, confusion and economic losses directly as a result of not participating. Participation by all stakeholders can only benefit all groups involved in making agreements more sustainable, mutually beneficial and efficient.

From: Regular Complexities: Lebanon's Water Issues

Involving all relevant stakeholders would go far beyond government ministries or local water districts to bring in representatives from agriculture, tourism, industry, conservation, and others. This will help with building trust and also transparency to the decisions, while ultimately achieving buy-in among the stakeholders.

Values Many stakeholders only acknowledge actions that have taken place or plan for a terminal output, such as a dam or irrigation diversion. This ‘conclusion thinking’ disregards the values and underlying principles that guide those wants. Ultimately, this limits creativity and drives a ‘winner and loser’ negotiation where one achieves the end goal, or they are unsatisfied with the result. By working to identify underlying values, more creativity can produce deeper and far reaching results for many more parties. This step supports the notion that the resources available could be much larger than, creating a ‘bigger pie.’ In a peri-developed country in the process of rebuilding, acknowledging common goals and understandings can have a far-reaching impact beyond the realm of water.

Accountability Accountability from within and outside the country is important to build trust in the process of any agreement. Being held to agreements and priorities is vital in a country where skepticism between stakeholders is rampant. A non-partisan third party with authority over all stakeholders is necessary to make this achievable. Establishing this outside party would prove difficult, as neutrality is scarce, especially within a single nation, but an outside party that is able to cut through local and national politics would be vital to the process.

From: River Basin Management and Environment Protection through a Conservation Trust Fund in Quito, Ecuador

Once information was gathered about the nature and location of threats to key ecological features in the Quito watershed, consultation among downstream stakeholders produced a mechanism to alleviate and mitigate the environmental threats. The creation of FONAG is an example of multiple knowledge frames harmonizing toward the common goal of ecological preservation that stand to benefit all stakeholders in the long-term. The governance structure of the fund demonstrates an effective way to incentivize stakeholder participation, which in context is monetary contribution. Without a harmonized knowledge framework, however, it is unlikely that incentives would lead to cooperation between stakeholders.

From: The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

This case demonstrates how the right negotiation conditions, transparency, time to develop trust, and other factors foster cooperation.

From: Urmia Lake: The Need for Water Diplomacy

The government of Islamic Republic of Iran established the Urmia Lake Restoration Program (ULRP) in 2013. This program is under auspices of the President and then has more power than of the former program initiated by DOE. After several meetings, this program produced a set of guidelines, including 19 potential solutions for the lake. One of these solutions was to rent the lands of the Zarrinehrud River (which provides roughly 40% of all inflow to the lake) from farmers who did not harvest during winter seasons of the preceding three years. However, this solution was rejected by members of the local parliament who claimed the plan would negatively impact employment and waste funding on farmers, who do not possess effective tools to invest. Another solution mentioned by the ULRP was reallocation of water among the lake's three neighboring provinces. When applied, however, this approach resulted in each province making greater demands, and ultimately claiming more water.

Consensus building among these stakeholders is vital to the survival of the lake. As the ULRP lacks the authority to enforce compliance among local provinces, agricultural and water ministries, and parliamentary units, the introduction of a "water parliament" is one solution in which all formal stakeholders can receive equitable consideration toward the development of a successful mandatory policy.

From: Water Competition & Cooperation in the Las Vegas Valley

In the Las Vegas Valley, municipalities competing for a limited water supply led to great inefficiencies. The formation of a cooperative water management utility created incentives for conservation and led to decreased water demands. Serious near-term shortages sparked interest in cooperation but good leadership was critical in navigating the transition.

,

What types of benefit sharing models can be used to make desalination more economically feasible and beneficial in water-scarce regions?

From: Gaza Strip Water Management

,

What roles can desalination play in a country's national water policy and what energy ecological and water quality considerations ought to go into making such a decision?

From: Gaza Strip Water Management

,

How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Mutual trust can be nurtured through

seamless sharing of data and information through the most efficient means of communications,
promotion of mutual exchanges to stake holders to build fraternal bonds (e.g experts, academia, farmers, intelligentia, opinion makers, politicians, civil society organizations etc) through conferences, sharing of knowledge, interactive engagements.

Specific situations to be avoided are:

misleading emotive and irresponsible statements
unilateral start of projects without resolution of issues upfront.
violations of provisions of treaties
tendencies to gain political mileage or media exposures.
non water actions (such as political, military, commercial, terrorism etc) which can vitiate the general feeling of mutual trust.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

China'a indisputable Nine-Dash Line claim has caused contentions among the stakeholders. The initiation of an arbitration process, thought to have equalized the situations has, on the contrary, created a serious zero-sum game and strained relations between the parties.

From: Red River of the North - Fargo-Moorhead Diversion

Case shows the results of extended negotiation that does not recognize needs of the other party

From: The Helmand River Basin Dispute

Throughout the dispute, trust has eroded between the two countries. Disagreement over the interpretation of the treaty and the measurement of the volume of water allocated has contributed. Continued drought and potential future droughts will likely further erode trust without agreement over how to manage the river in drought. Political actions, such as the alleged border skirmish to divert irrigation water across the border, and alliances with other nations, such as historical British and US involvement in the border and water dispute, and giving aid in development infrastructure, can reduce trust. Lack of quality and available data prevents a building of trust.

From: The Republican River Compact

Many actions can erode trust amongst riparians. In the Republican River Compact three key actions can be identified: (1) a riparian repeatedly voices concerns that are disregarded or ignored by the other compact parties, (2) a riparian violates the terms of the compact in a manner that is perceived to be intentional, (3) riparians engage in arbitration or litigation to resolve their disputes.

Recent efforts in the basin demonstrate how trust can be nurtured or rebuilt. In the Republican River Compact three key actions can be identified: (1) the compact administration committed to meeting more frequently to better understand the concerns and interests of each state, (2) Nebraska thoroughly explained the steps and mechanisms it had put in place to avoid overuse in water short years to ease Kansas’ concerns about future noncompliance, and (3) the recently negotiated agreements are temporary, allowing for time to test new options without a binding commitment and continue negotiating a long-term agreement that works for everyone.

From: The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

This case shows that time, transparency, and jointly developing science can developed trust among involved parties.

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

Data sharing and regular forums for communication and cooperation can foster mutual trust amongst riparians. Lack of transparency around infrastructure projects and data sharing can erode that trust.

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What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?

From: 2008 Kosi Flood

The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure.

Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party.

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:

Clarity about rights and obligations
Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement

From: Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?

From: Impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Downstream Countries

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Mutually beneficial projects and integrated investments create good neighbors. As a result of the OMVS and the design and implementation of joint projects, the relations between the countries has improved and economic development has increased thereby making cooperation rather than conflict a meeting point with regards to the Senegal River.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

It is more economically sound to begin impact studies before nations start to construct projects. It was shown through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project that if impact studies are started after the initiation of a major hydro-project, the costs for the project go up as necessary components for the project may not have been considered pre-study. For the Phase II of the LHWP, studies are being conducted to judge the feasibility of a project that was designed more than 15 years to ago to investigate in a more comprehensive manner the possible impacts of the project.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

While the benefits of electricity generation can create a positive impact at the regional or national level, the disadvantages of hydropower generation (such as reduced river flow) can impact those populations living closest or downstream of a hydropower project.

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To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.

From: China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.

From: Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities

Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.

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What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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What calculations and considerations should be investigated by countries looking to harness additional hydropower? Which potential outcomes should be investigated or identified?

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

The importance of water cooperation/economic development can supersede working with an oppressive regime. Even though Myanmar is controlled by a junta that is blamed for human rights violations, Thailand is still willing to cooperate with their government in order to promote regional management of the Salween River. For Thailand, the development of the Salween River and the benefits received from such development takes precedence over working with an oppressive regime. National sovereignty to protect water resources goes beyond international pressure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

Environmental impacts must be thoroughly assessed, lest the hydropower generation capacity be developed at the expense of water and ecosystem services that disadvantaged populations depend on, which can impact agricultural productivity and fishing on which these populations depend.

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What role(s) can hydropower play in a nation's energy strategy?

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

As in the Columbia River Treaty, hydropower can be a form of added value in addition to other benefits like flood control and drought protection, enabling payments and exchange to occur between countries which may facilitate or fund the construction of projects that might otherwise not be feasible. As recent controversy over the treaty indicates, it is best to consider the effects of engineering projects of the scale of hydroelectric dams on a multitude of stakeholders, because of their far-reaching ecological and hydrological impacts. Hydropower is a powerful tool for a nation’s energy strategy, but one that must be used prudently and with attention to impacts on “outsider” groups like endangered species and indigenous people.

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

It can help a country supply “clean” energy without additional carbon emissions, which is particularly relevant in the case of China.

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What kinds of water treaties or agreements between countries can provide sufficient structure and stability to ensure enforceability but also be flexible and adaptable given future uncertainties?

From: 2008 Kosi Flood

The breach site for the 2008 flood was in Nepal, and most of the flood impacts there occurred in the Sunsari districts, with about 60,000 people affected. However, a few kilometers downstream, in India, about 3.3 million people were affected in Bihar (Supaul, Saharsa, Madhepura, Araria and Purnia districts). Neither the 1954 or 1966 Kosi Project Agreements addressed the issue of economic responsibility for disasters due to project failure. While flooding had been common along the river prior to the agreements, no mechanism was included to address future flood concerns, disaster response capacity, or economic outcomes or responsibility in case of infrastructure failure.

Additionally, the shifting path of the Kosi and powerful scouring and sedimentation patterns along the river have proved to be a greater challenge than originally envisioned by the engineers who developed the project. The flood control structures have altered the flood regime, but without constant monitoring and maintenance, they are likely to fail again. While the project altered the original flood risks in the region, it has had unintended outcomes that include high maintenance costs and increased risk of catastrophic flood due to structural failures. The Project Agreements address the need to provide maintenance for the structures, but did not identify or address specific needs or provide a mechanism for strong enforcement of the responsibilities of either party.

From: Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant - Issue between Pakistan and India

Attributes that support sufficient structure and stability while supporting flexibility and adaptation to future circumstances:

Clarity about rights and obligations
Time bound framework for settlement of disputes/ objections bilaterally and through party; if bilateral efforts fail in the given time, up front of construction works.
A comprehensive clause in the treatise regarding future cooperation on all matters including but not limited to lacunas in the treaty and future challenges in the interest of the most complete and satisfactory utilization of waters. This will provide flexibility and adaptability for future uncertainties.
Institutional mechanism , such as a joint commission, required to inter alia focus on thinking about and promoting cooperation and regularly preparing a report (say annually) for the governments involved with concrete suggestions to promote cooperations for matters such as elucidated in the question.
Compulsory collection and sharing of data requested by parties, in real time where possible, except for reasons of military defense.
A suitable balance between water sharing and benefit sharing.
Binding nature of Third Party decisions, provided that the Third Party comprises of a panel of 5 to 7 persons instead of a single man.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

Framing a new agreement to include specific water allocations to parties under a variety of scenarios can ensure resilience of an agreement through uncertain futures. One expert described a “new era” of the Colorado River in which the future hydrology “cannot be reasonably estimated by simply using the available gauge record.” Basin States “acknowledged the potential for impacts due to climate change and increased hydrologic variability” and collaborated on scenario planning in response. The 2007 Interim Guidelines defined specific deliveries to each Basin at stepped storage elevations of the reservoirs. Cognizant of the highly uncertain water supply in the Basin, the Guidelines defined allocations which addressed surplus, normal, and shortage conditions. The Guidelines included further protection from shortage by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authority to take additional necessary actions at critical elevations to avoid Lower Basin shortage as the conditions approach thresholds.

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.

From: Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal

There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

The case study is about creation of a legally binding treaty with joint fact finding built into it. This component can help in long term suitability for the agreement

From: Multi-State Approaches to Environmental Restoration in the Chesapeake Bay and Water Diplomacy Framework Opportunities

This case provides examples of interstate voluntary agreements and regulatory approaches in seeking to restore an ecosystem.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

The Pecos River Compact was designed using a hydrological model based on yearly inflows and outflows rather than fixed quantities, allowing it to continue to apply as environmental conditions changed. Also (though it was a matter of significant contention for Texas) the Compact also allowed room for that model to be improved/updated in later years to make the accounting as accurate as possible.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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Where does the benefit “flow” from a hydropower project and how does that affect implementation and sustainability of the project?

From: Impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Downstream Countries

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Mutually beneficial projects and integrated investments create good neighbors. As a result of the OMVS and the design and implementation of joint projects, the relations between the countries has improved and economic development has increased thereby making cooperation rather than conflict a meeting point with regards to the Senegal River.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

It is more economically sound to begin impact studies before nations start to construct projects. It was shown through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project that if impact studies are started after the initiation of a major hydro-project, the costs for the project go up as necessary components for the project may not have been considered pre-study. For the Phase II of the LHWP, studies are being conducted to judge the feasibility of a project that was designed more than 15 years to ago to investigate in a more comprehensive manner the possible impacts of the project.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

While the benefits of electricity generation can create a positive impact at the regional or national level, the disadvantages of hydropower generation (such as reduced river flow) can impact those populations living closest or downstream of a hydropower project.

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How do issues of equity and development impact the identification of stakeholders in cases involving hydropower or other revenue generating water infrastructure?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When one riparian holds the most geographic and military power, equitable agreements are difficult to reach. With the large majority of water originating in Turkey and Turkey having the most advanced military power, it has less incentive to work cooperatively with Syria and Iraq and to approach negotiations with a "basket of benefits" outlook.

From: Drinking Water Supply in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Cambodia is a downstream country in the Mekong river Basin and has potentially much to lose from uncontrolled upstream development of the river. China, the most upstream country in the basin, and Lao PDR have ongoing construction or plans to construct hydropower dams in the mainstream of the Mekong River, which has raised concerns of potential environmental, economic, and social impacts to downstream countries. As an upstream country with vast economic resources, there is little incentive for China to cooperate with downstream countries.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts. The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

Because hydropower projects require large financial investments, groups that are unable to make financial contributions may be marginalized. This seems to be the case for the Columbia River Treaty, in which the traditional fishing grounds of a large number of Native American tribes were altered and fisheries destroyed to provide protection for cities in the United States and economic opportunities for Canada. Because of this tendency to undervalue stakeholders who are unable to invest in the project itself, it may be necessary for decision-makers to be especially vigilant and sensitive to stakeholder needs when dealing with hydropower projects.

From: Yarlung Zangbo / Brahmaputra River: Competing Priorities of Hydropower and Agriculture

The population size, poverty levels, dependence on river flow for agriculture, and electricity needs can make certain parts of a basin more compelling candidates for the benefits of hydropower. However, the issue is complicated at the transnational level when the hydropower electricity generation will benefit one marginalized population and disadvantage another marginalized population downstream.

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How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Mexico could have brought the case brought to the International Court of Justice. It had arguments to held the United States responsible under customary international law for the damages caused by the high salinity levels in the Colorado River.

From: Addressing the Transboundary Water Conflict Between the Blue Nile Riparian States

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: the Tigris-Euphrates Basin

When mostly bilateral talks are used to attempt to resolve issues, the most powerful country typically maintains their power. In bilateral talks, Turkey has succeeded in maintaining its power in the water dispute. Syria lost one of its "playing cards" in overall negotiations when it signed the Adana Agreement.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement. In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve. The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states agree to equal access to transboundary water resources, equal and joint management, investment and distribution of that resource is feasible. In the water resources sector, neither Brazil nor Argentina has used their economic or military superiority to maintain greater control over water resources or hydroelectric potential.

From: Limited Sovereignty: The Lasting Effects of Uranium Mining on the Navajo Nation

There is limited shared cooperation and consultation. The Navajo Nation is technically a sovereign nation and thus, should work directly with the United States government. In practice, the Navajo Nation is sovereign to the extent allowed by the United States government.

This makes for an awkward asymmetry of power as the Navajo Nation and the United States government interests may not always align. The Navajo are in a complex place to negotiate. They must negotiate at the state level (for example, with New Mexico) and at the federal level (for example, with the EPA). Often times, the Bureau of Indian Affairs may also step in, adding another layer of complexity. The complexity of the number of players needs to be simplified.

The best-case scenario would involve the Navajo Nation to be respected and treated as a sovereign nation. The varied history between the US government and the Navajo Nation make this complicated in practice, as the US government financially supports some of the operations of the Navajo Nation.

In leaning towards full sovereignty, a structure needs to be developed that would enable the Navajo an equal voice alongside the United States federal government. The Navajo Nation should be able to have the final say on how their lands are used and be able to hold parties accountable for any damage caused.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

The five littoral states differ greatly in their political and economical power. For the new states, projects which will enhance their economy are very attractive, and so they are welcoming foreign energy players to start cooperating as soon as possible. Russia and Iran, which are much more advanced in the field of energy, and have reserves outside the Caspian Region, are much more causious about the involvement of foreign players.

From: The Helmand River Basin Dispute

The asymmetry of power has influenced the history of the water negotiations in the Helmand River dispute. In addition, the power of international participants in the negotiation process could have contributed towards an agreement being formed or the level of trust placed in an agreement. Currently, Afghanistan has power geographically being the upstream country. Being the upstream riparian in conjunction with the position that Iran has violated the treaty and is inhibiting Afghanistan’s economic growth, provides the state with the incentive to push forward with potentially impactful water and agricultural developments. Iran has generally been more powerful in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, the state is likely more interested in pursuing future negotiations over the Helmand waters prior to any development in Afghanistan, as this could ensure that majority of the flow is allocated to Iran.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Even with power disparity, there is possibility for agreement over water resources through economic benefits. South Africa is a much more powerful nation than Lesotho, but Lesotho has abundant water resources, which, through the Highlands Project, will benefit both nations economically and through the provision of water to South Africa. It is possible even when there is such a wide gap between nations in terms of power, to collaborate for the mutual gain of both countries.

From: The Role of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project for Regional Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin

Water sharing and transfer is an important mechanism that the three states are using to address asymmetry of geopolitical power in the basin. For example, Jordan receives 35 million cubic meters of water from Israel every year, according to the peace treaty signed between the two countries. In the Red Sea to Dead Sea Conveyance project the desalination plant that will be built by Jordan and will run through Jordanian territory will provide freshwater from the port of Aqaba to Israel’s southern Arava region as a water swap. Similarly. Jordan will buy Israeli water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to provide drinking water to Amman, the capital of Jordan, instead of building extraneous infrastructure to pump water to the city from the south (Reed, 2017). Identification of such mutual gains and competitive advantages is one way to address asymmetries in power and access to resources. Nonetheless, Palestine’s access to water remains a key question that is unresolved and may require repeated negotiations through the Joint Water Committee.

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What approaches are most beneficial for rapidly growing cities in the developing world to link water management to sustainable urban growth strategy?

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface- and groundwater, ignores hydrological reality. Groundwater was not explicitly dealt with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely.

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What considerations can be given to incorporating collaborative adaptive management (CAM)? What efforts have the parties made to review and adjust a solution or decision over time in light of changing conditions?

From: Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin

Maritsa River is subject to great variations in its flow during flooding season, especially in the last 10-15 years. Flooding monitoring and early warning systems can be beneficial for all riparian states as flooding impacts agricultural and urban areas in all three parts of the basin. Yet, biggest beneficiaries will be downstream countries. There were initiatives funded by the EU in the past few years for technical expertise sharing through Bulgaria-Turkey cross border cooperation projects. Technical experts from DSI (Turkey) and NHMI (Bulgaria) met in several meetings, agreed on basic principles for sharing information and initiated plans to install monitoring stations on the Bulgarian side during 2006-2010 period. Subsequent to the completion of three separate EU projects during this period, Bulgaria started to share river flow and dam capacity data to Turkish government experts. However, fast paced developments for cooperation in the basin stalled after momentum in Turkey’s EU accession process is lost. Following three project conducted with EU cross-border funds, successive projects that were initially planned to complement and improve outcomes of previous projects were not executed. The primary reason is the inadequacy of EU cross-border cooperation funds that are allocated for a transboundary river basin shared with a non-EU country. After 2010, there are sporadic technical committee meetings organized by technical experts from Bulgaria and Turkey without an EU framework solely based on bilateral efforts.

Under the current circumstances, steps to adopt good EU practices for flood prevention in other transboundary and trans-regional water basins of the EU can be taken. With EU’s political encouragement and financial support, a flexible tripartite plan between riparians for managing Maritsa River Basin can be enacted with regard to the EU Water Framework Directive. This plan can adopt good practices of river basin management and flood prevention plans in Elbe River Commission’s Flood Protection Action Plan, Ebro River Basin Plan and Rhine 2020 (for Rhine river basin). Also extending the scope of European Flood Alert System (EFAS) to Maritsa River basin can be suggested by the EU member states Greece and Bulgaria with support of candidate country Turkey. The limiting factor is Turkey’s reluctance to adopt EU WFD before acceding to the EU as a full member state and political hurdles to proceed with Environment Chapter in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

The parties defined some of the key aspects of their deal with relative vagueness. Some of this could have been intentional, so that both countries’ home governments would be able to interpret the agreement in different ways. This allowed negotiators to ‘sell’ the deal to their internal constituencies and also gave them the time they needed to conduct further studies that allowed them to adjust the details of the agreement during implementation.

Yet, some ambiguity in the agreement was not helpful. For example, there was disagreement after the treaty was signed as to who should bear the cost of transferring Jordan’s water. According to Israel, Jordan was responsible for the additional cost since the water was for its benefit. Not surprisingly, Jordan did not agree. This highlights the two sides of the ‘ambiguity coin.’ On one side, ambiguity helped allow for some measure of adaptive management. At the same time, the tensions that were not resolved during the negotiations did not go away.

From: Management of Fisheries in the High Seas of the Central Arctic Ocean

a. The stakeholders in the case study recognize the changing climatic conditions in the Arctic ecosystem. They are building in CAM in the agreement by conducting scenario analysis and identifying conditions needed that might trigger a decision such as in the case of conditions that can trigger creation of an RFMA/O

b. The stakeholders in the case recognize the lack of understanding of the importance of scientific information of the Arctic ecosystem and are using science experts to inform the diplomatic process

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Northeast Regional Ocean Planning

Although parties have not yet adjusted their Northeast Ocean Plan to adaptive management needs, the Plan prioritizes this in future work. Adaptive management was a key principle for the planning process and central in the Ocean Plan. In prioritizing this, parties also focused on research needs and information gaps as priorities to inform future work. This will ideally help shape future adaptive management work. Integrating collaborative adaptive management into the planning process and future meetings for implementation are positive approaches for success.

From: The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery and San Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Programs

The parties have changed the primary focus of the Programs over time as the needs and obstacles have evolved. At first, the Programs focused on achieving certain flow regimes and developing habitat for the protected species, and as these problems have been addressed, the Programs have shifted their focus to control of nonnative species, the largest current threat.

From: Water Management, Environment and Self-determination in Catalonia, Spain

The Ebro faces huge seasonal and annual variations leaving hydroelectricity, agriculture and aquaculture and domestic users with a high degree of uncertainty. However, users all have capacity and knowledge to collect data and share data as well as specific needs at the different periods of the year. A CAM process gathering central and Catalan government, basin agency and stakeholders could add on the existing attention given in the PHE, which estimates ranges of quantities.

From: Water Quality and Pollution Control in the Rhine River Basin

Collaborative Adaptive Management was utilized in formulating the Rhine 2020 plan. Specifically, the Rhine 2020 and EU Water Framework Directive were adopted after the Rhine Action Program ended, and the goals of Rhine 2020 were formed through evaluating the (then) current state of the ecosystem and water quality, and adjusting the management plans as necessary to reflect the changing conditions (i.e. including flood management goals as part of the Rhine 2020).

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What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?

From: A Salty Affair: An Analysis of U.S. – Mexico Water Diplomacy in the Colorado River

Minute No. 241- Recommendations to Improve Immediately the Quality of Colorado River Waters going to Mexico determined the substitution of 118,000 acre-feet with equal volumes of other waters. Moreover, Minute No. 242 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River - recognizes the United States obligation to deliver water under certain salinity level. No more than 115 ppm ± 30 ppm measured against the waters which feed the Imperial Dam salinity levels.

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

Successful negotiations might include an eventual simultaneous narrowing and broadening of focus, to move from the neutral topics necessary in early stages of negotiation, to dealing with the contentious issues at the heart of a water conflict. Concepts of integrated water management may also be included. While relatively neutral topics were vital in the early stages of the negotiations, some shift may be in order to be able to handle watershed-wide problems such as water rights and allocations. This narrowing of focus might be accompanied by a simultaneous broadening, to include all issues of water rights, quantity and quality relevant to a basin within one framework.

From: Colorado River Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead

The Interim Guidelines looked beyond allocation and provided additional mechanisms for the storage and delivery of water in Lake Mead to increase flexibility of meeting its water needs. Specifically, it incentivized conservation efforts and storage of unused allocations in Lake Mead to maintain its elevation via creation of a legal construct called “Intentionally Created Surplus” (ICS) water.

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political. Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set. In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

From: Creative Options and Value Creation to Address Water Security in the Eastern Nile Basin

Creating and packaging options

The first research question is about how options or strategies, that address water issues creatively and/or build on possible technology innovations, can be packaged and employed to create non-zero sum choices within negotiations. Options need to be creatively generated and then packaged in such a way that the value of the whole is larger than the sum of the individual parts. This is the key of the value creation principle in negotiation. In the arena of the water resources management, competing interests can be met simultaneously if stakeholders find ingenious ways of using the same water in a variety of ways. This means “tearing apart” the traditional view that water is a fixed resource and introducing the concept of “water as a pie” that can be enlarged. Islam and Susskind (2012) argue that successful value creation requires time investment to “make the pie as large as possible” before distributing gains and losses. This is very much linked with the need of understanding each other’s interests, for which information sharing is crucial. Even though the theory is quite clear and tempting, applications of this approach help the reader better understand its virtues in context. L. E. Susskind and Rumore (2015) tested the application of “devising seminars”, originally developed by Fisher and others in the 70s, on Artic fisheries. The rationale behind this tool is bringing together stakeholders for an off-the-record, facilitated event were stakeholders brainstorm around the collective problems. The authors believe this tool helps overcome the barrier of lack of good and widely-supported ideas typically present in the public policy arena. The CALFED Delta-Bay case in California (USA) is one of the best-documented instances of water-negotiation. Multiple stakeholders participated, shifting their mission from a battle over who would make sacrifices to a search for new ways of managing the resource. Open information was a key element in the success of this case, as the availability of real-time information on water allowed stakeholders to better foresee and plan accordingly (Islam & Susskind, 2012). This model emerged after several years of frustrated negotiations under the traditional governance system, giving place to a new one where collaboration and adaptive management are central (Innes, Connick, Kaplan, & Booher, 2006) Gryzbowski, McCaffrey, and Paisley (2009) analyzed several water treaties, particularly focusing on scenarios of and approaches for negotiations. Scenarios might be either “narrow” or “open”, depending on whether parties get stuck on mere definitions or they recognize their pros and cons and use the time to mutual gains developments. The approach to negotiate might be either positional or interest-geared. Provided most negotiations involve parties with more than one problem or concern, this is an opportunity for value creation. The treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994 is an example of value creation and trust enhancement. Parties included within the agreement elements such as desalination, water banking and transfer in water rights, showing that the combination of technological innovation and a collaborative administration can facilitate problem solving and enhance the chances for win-win sustainable solutions (L. Susskind & Islam, 2012). Conversely, the Danube River negotiation case in 1994 was wrongly addressed, as the two concerns for the riparian countries, economic development and environment, were addressed separately, missing the opportunity of value creation. “The results of the two negotiations cancelled each other out”, yielding winners and losers (Islam & Susskind, 2012) Value creation in TBW disputes happens when parties engage in joint-fact finding, formulate contingent agreements and emphasize adaptive management (Islam & Susskind, 2012). In addition, sustainable solutions are a consequence of well-designed problem-solving or negotiation process (Innes and Booher, 2010 in Islam and Susskind, 2012). Since 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been working on these lines. Primarily funded by the World Bank, NBI has generated a significant critical mass of projects through its two Subsidiary Actions Programs. One example of this is the Eastern Nile Multi-Sectoral Investment Opportunity Analysis (EN-MSIOA), one of a set of specific studies being carried out to facilitate cooperative water resource management and development in the Nile Basin (ENTRO, 2014). This study intends to support strategic planning decisions at the scale of the ENB, through different scenario simulations. Another recent study examined benefit sharing opportunities among the riparian countries in terms of water resources management. The authors explored the potential shared benefits steaming from the development and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under construction in Ethiopia, and its impact to downstream countries and the High Aswan Dam. They found there is possibility for Ethiopia to be better off without any country being worse off if these two dams are managed in coordination (Habteyes, El-bardisy, Amer, Schneider, & Ward, 2015) I can affirm there are institutions in place, a portfolio of projects, and the urgent need for sustainable long-standing solutions. What is then keeping the Nile River Basin from taking off? It is time to put options together, package and deliver. For this to happen, however, enabling conditions are needed as discussed later on.

From: Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis

A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan

Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan:

May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and
May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights.

By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons.

Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included:

The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time.
Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S.

The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel.

Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty

The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input:

International: among the basin countries
National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans.
Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin
Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented.

Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.

From: International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin

If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

Political tensions between countries do not necessarily prevent governments from coming to the table to talk about issues such as management of their transboundary water resources. As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been cold and neither have been willing to discuss the Kura-Araks problems to a great degree until the land issue has been resolved. With Georgia acting as a mediator between the two nations, this has slowed down the negotiation process to talks concerning the Kura-Araks, but they have moved forward nonetheless.

From: Management, Protection, and Control of Lake Titicaca

By viewing the basin as a joint body of water shared equally between countries, much conflict is avoided.

By signing an agreement in 1957, Peru and Bolivia bound themselves into considering Lake Titicaca as a shared body of water, owned by neither country, but both. As a result, there are few, if any, "upstream versus downstream" issues (even though the Desaguadero River does flow into Bolivia from the lake). The countries have worked very well in a cooperative way to manage the lake, both doing their parts. This can largely be attributed to the lake being "owned" by both nations.

From: Negotiations and Agreements Between Ganges River Basin Riparians

The answer is twofold:

Agreeing early on the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations is an important step in the pre-negotiation phase. Much of the negotiations between India and Pakistan and, later, India and Bangladesh, were spent trying to resolve the question of what was the appropriate diplomatic level for negotiations.
Short-term agreements which stipulate that the terms are not permanent can be useful steps in long-term solutions. However, a mechanism for continuation of the temporary agreement in the absence of a long-term agreement is crucial. Agreements on the distribution of Ganges waters have been short in duration, providing initial impetus for signing, but providing difficulties when they lapse.

From: Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin

The emphasis of addressing inter-state disputes over water allocations on the Indus Basion has more than often focused on allocation formula to be proposed and agreed in instruments such as the 1991 WAA. There is a need to identify a few additional mechanisms that can contribute to the desiging or adapting the water agreements and can also reflect levels of emerging conditions in view of climatic variations and impact on water management for agricultural productivity.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

Groundwater management needs to be integrated into regional water management strategies and programs. Most of the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) program in the region had been devoted to surface waters, largely ignoring one of the largest underground freshwater resources in the world.

From: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project

Renegotiation clauses in an agreement can prevent issues from arising for the nations involved. The LHWP treaty also exemplifies the importance of providing for renegotiation of project terms. In the absence of such a provision, the additional phases of the project might have been implemented without adequate consideration of their feasibility.

From: The Pecos River Compact and Texas - New Mexico Dispute

Removal of unwanted invasive species (in this case, salt cedars) can be used to liberate additional water for the use of all parties in the negotiation.

From: Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers

Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.

Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.

From: U.S.-Canada Transboundary Water Management

The IJC is a near-perfect example of the type of organization which provides the basis the powerful fact-finding practices that lead to value creation in water negotiation. Not only does the IJC employ expertise and technical knowledge in providing information on a given issue, but it operates in a well-maintained state of political neutrality, and maintains a high degree of legitimacy. It has been suggested by other authors that, in addition to legitimacy, it may in fact need more authority to direct the governments it serves or act on its own accord without waiting for the full consent of both parties.

From: US-Canada Columbia River Management

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To what extent can international actors and movements from civil society influence water management? How and when is this beneficial/detrimental and how can these effects be supported/mitigated?

From: Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (Middle East)

In attempts at resolving particularly contentious disputes, solving problems of politics and resource use is best accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks. The most useful lesson of the multilateral working group on water resources is the handling of water and political tensions simultaneously, in the bilateral and multilateral working groups respectively, each track helping to reinforce the other. This lesson has been learned after a long history of failing to solve water problems outside of their political context.

From: China: The Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Project

From: Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate. Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

From: Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin

Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.

From: Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians

The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.

From: Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States

Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support.

In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river.

Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.

From: International Management for Water Quality Within The Kura-Araks Basin

The principle of "parallel unilateralism" was developed here, allowing each collaborating pair of countries to work together, while coordinating the work of the countries which do not. Due to lack of movement from the three primary governments of the Kura-Araks River basin (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) towards working together in the management of the river, fifty NGOs came together to form the NGO Coalition of the Kura-Araks in order to start activities between the three countries by cleaning up pollution and educating the public about the current situation.

From: Mineral and Petroleum Resource Extraction in the Arctic Ocean – Conflicting Oversight, Governance and Rights

From: Organization for the Development of the Senegal River

Lack of participation of all basin nations weakens the overall negotiations and creates opportunity losses for those not participating. Guinea, not party to the OMVS organization, has not experienced the development benefits of the other three countries in the basin. As a result, they are lacking water resource management infrastructure, a reliable energy source and water supplies.

From: Pollution in the Pilcomayo: Mining and Indigenous Communities

Several important donors have been active in the Pilcomayo Basin. Also, there are budding initiatives by indigenous groups to organize. The question is, to what extent these forces from above and below are effective in asserting tighter control over pollution.

From: Preserving and Monitoring the Guarani Aquifer for Current and Future Use

In order to manage a transboundary aquifer effectively, it requires coordinated collaboration, cooperation and communication between national and sub-national governments, as well as the private sector, international organizations and local civil society. With an integrated management strategy that affects international politics, economics, the environment and social well-being, it is necessary to include all stakeholders in the process from design to implementation to maintenance, in order for the program to be effective and sustainable. There needs to be a broad understanding of a common goal and a clear strategy and methodology to achieve that goal.

From: The Caspian- a Sea or a Lake?

In this case, some internaitonal actors are allowing for more pressure on the littoral states, as they try to push their own agenda regarding the energy reserves. This is contributing to the parties hestiance in reaching an agreement.

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How can costs for water quality projects be distributed between polluters and beneficiaries?

From: Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality

The degree of cooperation among representatives of participating governments, and the importance given to public participation in developing the SAP, mark significant achievements in promoting regional cooperation in water resources management. Ultimately, the success of this process will be revealed by the degree to which the goals, strategies, and targets set in the agreement are implemented "on the ground." It is one thing to agree to goals and targets in timeframes; it is another thing to, for example, agree to shut down a polluting factory, or to create and enforce industrial wastewater pretreatment standards, or to develop rigorous monitoring and enforcement regimes. Additionally, because agreement signatories are at the Ministerial level in the water sector (vs. at the level of the Foreign Minister), it is not clear if the agreement has the force of an international treaty behind it.

From: Water Quality Control of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD) Middle Route Project (MRP)

A Payment for Water Quality Services (PWQS) scheme could provide a method for investigating ways that the Water Source Area and Water Receiving Area might share the costs associated with the project.

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