Difference between revisions of "ASI:Conflict Management in the Indus Basin: Insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database"

Revision as of 12:03, 25 January 2013

This article is linked to Conflict Management Strategies Among Riparians Within the Indus River Basin

The points below are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/

Lessons Learned

• Shifting political boundaries can turn intra-national disputes into international conflicts, exacerbating tensions over existing issues. ^[1]

Shifting borders and partition exacerbated what was, initially, an intra-national Indian issue. After partition, political tensions, particularly over Kashmir territory, contributed to tensions of this newly international conflict.

• Power inequities may delay the pace of negotiations. ^[1]

Power inequities may have delayed pace of negotiations. India had both a superior riparian position, as well as a relatively stronger central government, than Pakistan. The combination may have acted as disincentive to reach agreement.

• Positive, active, and continuous involvement of a third party is vital in helping to overcome conflict. ^[1]

The active participation of Eugene Black and the World Bank were crucial to the success of the Indus Water Treaty. The Bank offered not only their good offices, but a strong leadership role as well. The Bank provided support staff, funding, and, perhaps most important, its own proposals when negotiations reached a stalemate.

• Coming to the table with financial assistance can provide sufficient incentive for a breakthrough in agreement. ^[1]

The Bank helped raise almost 900 million from the international community, allowing for Pakistan’s final objections to be addressed.

• Some points may be agreed to more quickly, if it is explicitly agreed that a precedent is not being set.

In the 1948 agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India for water deliveries. This point was later used by India to argue that, by paying for the water, Pakistan recognized India’s water rights. Pakistan, in contrast, argued that they were paying only for operation and maintenance. In an early meeting (May 1952), both sides agreed that any data may be used without committing either side to its "relevance or materiality," thereby precluding delays over data discrepancies.

• Sensitivity to each party's particular hydrological concerns is crucial in determining the bargaining mix.

Early negotiations focused on quantity allocations, while one of Pakistan’s main concerns was storage-the timing of the delivery was seen to be as crucial as the amount.

• In particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override, a sub-optimal solution may be the best one can achieve.

The plan pointedly disregards the principle of integrated water management, recognizing that between these particular riparians, the most important issue was control by each state of its own resource. Structural division of the basin, while crucial for political reasons, effectively precludes the possibility of increased integrated management.

Creative outcomes resulting from resolution process

In a creative avoidance of a potential and common conflict, the parties agreed that any data requested by either side would be collected and verified when possible, but that the acceptance of the data, or the inclusion of any topic for study, would not commit either side to its "relevance or materiality."

Water was separated out from other contentious issues between India and Pakistan. This allowed negotiations to continue, even in light of tensions over other topics. Water problems were to be viewed as "functional" rather than political.

When both sides were unable to agree on a common development plan in 1953, the Bank suggested that each prepare its own plan, which the Bank would then inspect for commonalities. This active strategy to breaking impasses is currently being attempted with the riparians of the Jordan River watershed in conjunction with the multilateral working group on water.

1. ^ ^{1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3} Alam, U. (2002). Questioning the water wars rational: a case study of the Indus Waters Treaty. The Geographical Journal, 168 (4), pp. 354-64.