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Summary

The Ilisu Dam Project on the Tigris River in Turkey is one of the world’s most controversial hydropower projects. As part of the Turkish Government’s Greater Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), the project is intended to reduce Turkey’s high dependency on energy imports while developing the country’s poorest region. The GAP includes the construction of a total of 22 dams, including 19 hydropower plants and 3 dams for irrigation, 15 of which have already been built.

This case exemplifies a project where there is a need to promote a more inclusive and integral planning to reach better outcomes, both regarding different scales (time and space) and domains (natural, societal and political). It is a complex water problem because social, natural and economic variables and processes that conform the network interact in ways that render unpredictable outcomes. Therefore, it is difficult to plan while only considering objectives with a pure engineering logic. Issues such as social and environmental impact will put at risk the accomplishment of objectives as seen by Turkey’s government (generation of electricity and water for irrigation) and pose new challenges for the economic development of the region.

Also, there is a conflicting order in the possible arrangement of preferences of the different actors involved. For some actors, power generation is a top priority, while for others, the conservation of cultural heritage is the greatest concern. Conflicting priorities make it difficult to arrive to a straightforward outcome that are easily approved by all actors.

Additionally, the case also presents an open and continuously changing network of processes and actors. There are several continuously changing issues, like unpredictable climate conditions as well as social interactions; the former lead to challenging contexts such as drought, while the latter lead to the articulation of new social pressure groups. The changing network is enforced by dynamic and porous boundaries; in other words, the watershed boundaries do not form a closed system.

Finally, understanding context-specific information implies the involvement of local actors. Without doing so, it would be difficult to figure out efficient and stable solutions. In the Ilisu Dam, local involvement has been left aside due to the lack of trust after a history of civil conflict in the Anatolian Region. Additionally, there was no initial involvement of social and local representatives of environmental, cultural or economic matters. Although it was not a foreseen outcome, the government has been obliged to face pressure from non-governmental groups. Now that they are part of the network of actors, both nationally and internationally, they have put at risk the financial viability of the project.

Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework

Historical, Social, and Political Factors

It is impossible to understand water issues in this basin without paying due attention to the longstanding political and social factors that shape life in the region. One of the most important of these factors is the basin’s population itself.

A Century of Ethnic Conflict

Southeastern Turkey is primarily inhabited by Kurds, members of an Indo-European ethno-linguistic group that consider themselves distinct from the Turkish-speaking majority of Turkey. Currently, between 9% to 13% of Turkey’s residents self-identify as Kurds ^[1]. As Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have long aspired to a nation state of their own, the Kurds’ inclusion in modern day Turkey has posed existential problems for both the minority and the state.

The Turkish Republic, which was founded in 1923 after a long war of independence against major European states, rests upon an ideology of secular nationalism that emphasizes the geographic, ethnic, and linguistic unity of the Turkish State ^[2]. Turkish politics is also dominated by an ideological tendency toward centralized government control and state led economic development for the benefit of the Turkish people. The Turkish Government until 2002 denied the existence of a Kurdish identity and banned the use of the Kurdish language in the media official contexts.^[1]

In response to what many Kurds feel has been political, economic, and ideological disenfranchisement, Kurdish communities have waged a number of uprisings against the Turkish state. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) waged a bloody insurgency against the state; in the years of strife between the insurgents and the Turkish government, tens of thousands were killed. (Estimates are disputed, but go as high as 40,000) Although recent changes of government have produced policy changes more favorable to Kurdish communities, relations between the Kurdish periphery and the Turkish center are characterized by mistrust and resentment. At the same time, the region remains severely underdeveloped, as evidenced by poor development indicators in almost all sectors (see Economics section below).

State Development

For leaders in the Turkish government, development of the region has a number of significant advantages. Projects within the GAP may boost the standard of living in the region and may serve to quiet discontent and agitation while improving the standing of the government in the eyes of the Kurdish population. While creating jobs and economic opportunities, the government hopes to reduce support for armed groups, particularly the PKK. In addition, the completion of the GAP project can be seen as an issue of national pride for the government that represents centralized control of the periphery, continuity of a project across multiple administrations, and top down development and control. In addition to the economic benefits that the entire country will derive from the project, many Turkish leaders hope to gain electoral boosts from their constituents as the project is completed ^[3]

Kurdish and local government leaders in the provinces affected by the GAP Project have complained of feeling left out of the development process. For many in Southeast Anatolia, the government is another attempt by the central government to exercise its muscle in the region at the expense of local interests.

Membership aspirations: the European Union

Many Turkish leaders hope to incorporate Turkey into the European Union in the near future, and so there is considerable pressure on the Turkish Government to conform to standards and norms of the EU community. While Turkish leadership remains nationalistic and protective of state sovereignty, it is eager to prove itself a responsible state and a good candidate for EU membership.

Water Regime Information

To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. ^{( citation needed)}

Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this ^[4]

Major Economic Factors

Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% ^[5].

In 1997, the region’s per capita GDP was less than half the national average. In different provinces, between 21.8% and 44.7% of households fall below the poverty line <ref="unver 2001" > Unver, I.H. Olcay. (October 2001). “Southeastern Turkey, Sustainable Development and Foreign Investment”, Prepared by the GAP Regional Development Administration for the OECD-China Conference on FDI in China’s Regional Development.</ref>. For the residents of the region, there is a need for infrastructure development and the opening of economic opportunities.

Issues and Stakeholders

Decreased downstream flow will have ecological, human, and economic consequences

Sub-Issues:

1. Greater decreased downstream flow
2. No commitments on minimum flows downstream
3. Increased flood levels, channel migration upstream and diminished capacity for energy-generation due to sedimentation

Stakeholders for these issues:

1. Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
2. Iraq and Syria (National Government)
3. Turkey (National Government)
4. Upstream localities /river tributaries (Local Governments)
5. Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)

Water quality impacts from dam construction/implementation have not been addressed

There is a great possibility of poor drinking water quality and impacts to aquatic life due to: a) salinization; b) pesticide concentration increase; c) potential euthrophication of the reservoir water.

Stakeholders for this issue:

1. Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
2. Farmers, local settlers (Community)
3. Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
4. Turkey (National Government)

Both natural and agricultural ecosystems will be affected.

Sub-Issues:

1. Negative impact of 400 km of ecosystems along the river and its tributaries
2. Diminished fertility of land for production; prone to salinization

Stakeholders for these issues:

• Farmers (community/Corporate interest)
• Environmental NGO’s (Environmental interest)

No process was provided for input by affected populations

1. Inadequate protection of displaced population at dam/reservoir site
2. Lack of consultation processes for addressing the displacement of local population

Stakeholders for these issues:

• Displaced communities (Community)
• NGOs (Organized Citizens)
• ECAs, possible investors (Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest)

Economic benefits are limited and long-term impacts are likely negative

Sub-Issues: Low temporary job creation by dam project in a region with high unemployment and illiteracy rates. Potential increase of urban poverty and social conflict due to: a) lack of alternative subsistence means for displaced population; b) diminished income for displaced population; c) Loss of 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land; potential loss of productivity of irrigated land

Stakeholders for these issues: Big cities and muncipal governments (Local governments) Displaced communities (Community)

Archaeological and Cultural sites are slated for inundation.

The Ilisu dam will flood Hasankeyf and hundreds of historical/archaeological sites. There is uncertainty about reallocation plans for archeological patrimony.

Stakeholders for this issue:

• Municipal governments (Local governments)
• Current communities dependant on tourism (Community)
• NGOs (Cultural interests)

Potential increase of malaria and water born diseases

Stakeholders for this issue: Local governments and communities (Community)

Political processes will be influenced not only after dam completion, but by the process of funding and building the Ilisu dam

Sub-issues:

1. Power shift in favor of Turkey vis à vis Iraq and Syria through control of water flow downstream
2. Social control over East Anatolia Kurdish region
3. Pressure from international actors (ECAs, NGOs) and social national movements to comply with international standards.

Stakeholders for these issues: Irak and Syria (National Government) Kurds (Community. Local Gov.) NGOs (cultural interests)

Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight

No ASI articles have been added yet for this case

External Links

• Official GAP Project Website (English Language) — The official English version of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) governmental page describing the project, history, news, investments, etc.

1. ^ ^{1.0 1.1} Garfield, Samuel Holden. (2010). “The Kurdish Struggle for Recognition in Turkey: Towards an Expanded Model of Recognition”, in Issues, the Jackson School Journal for International Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1. Accessible at https://depts.washington.edu/jsjweb/?page_id=17
2. ^ Robbins, Philip. (1993). “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue”, in International Affairs, the Royal Institute of Internatonal Affairs, Vol. 69 No. 4.
3. ^ Carkoglu, Ali, and Eder, Mine. (January 2001). “Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1.
4. ^ Kurdish Human Rights Project. (June 2007). “The Ilisu Dam Project: A Flawed Plan is Revived Unchanged”, KHRP Briefing Paper, published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project. Available at http://www.khrp.org/index.php.
5. ^ Ronayne, Maggie. (February 2005). “The Cultural and Environmental Impact of Large Dams in Southeast Turkey”, Fact-Finding Mission Report, National University of Ireland, Galway, and the Kurdish Human Rights Project.