Revision as of 08:55, 22 June 2012

Summary

Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework

Historical, Social, and Political Factors

It is impossible to understand water issues in this basin without paying due attention to the longstanding political and social factors that shape life in the region. One of the most important of these factors is the basin’s population itself.

A Century of Ethnic Conflict

Southeastern Turkey is primarily inhabited by Kurds, members of an Indo-European ethno-linguistic group that consider themselves distinct from the Turkish-speaking majority of Turkey. Currently, between 9% to 13% of Turkey’s residents self-identify as Kurds (Garfield, 23). As Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have long aspired to a nation state of their own, the Kurds’ inclusion in modern day Turkey has posed existential problems for both the minority and the state.

The Turkish Republic, which was founded in 1923 after a long war of independence against major European states, rests upon an ideology of secular nationalism that emphasizes the geographic, ethnic, and linguistic unity of the Turkish State (Robbins, 660). Turkish politics is also dominated by an ideological tendency toward centralized government control and state led economic development for the benefit of the Turkish people. The Turkish Government until 2002 denied the existence of a Kurdish identity and banned the use of the Kurdish language in the media official contexts (Garfield, 23).

In response to what many Kurds feel has been political, economic, and ideological disenfranchisement, Kurdish communities have waged a number of uprisings against the Turkish state. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) waged a bloody insurgency against the state; in the years of strife between the insurgents and the Turkish government, tens of thousands were killed. (Estimates are disputed, but go as high as 40,000) Although recent changes of government have produced policy changes more favorable to Kurdish communities, relations between the Kurdish periphery and the Turkish center are characterized by mistrust and resentment. At the same time, the region remains severely underdeveloped, as evidenced by poor development indicators in almost all sectors (see Economics section below).

State Development

For leaders in the Turkish government, development of the region has a number of significant advantages. Projects within the GAP may boost the standard of living in the region and may serve to quiet discontent and agitation while improving the standing of the government in the eyes of the Kurdish population. While creating jobs and economic opportunities, the government hopes to reduce support for armed groups, particularly the PKK. In addition, the completion of the GAP project can be seen as an issue of national pride for the government that represents centralized control of the periphery, continuity of a project across multiple administrations, and top down development and control. In addition to the economic benefits that the entire country will derive from the project, many Turkish leaders hope to gain electoral boosts from their constituents as the project is completed (Carkoglu, 42).

Kurdish and local government leaders in the provinces affected by the GAP Project have complained of feeling left out of the development process. For many in Southeast Anatolia, the government is another attempt by the central government to exercise its muscle in the region at the expense of local interests.

Membership aspirations: the European Union

Many Turkish leaders hope to incorporate Turkey into the European Union in the near future, and so there is considerable pressure on the Turkish Government to conform to standards and norms of the EU community. While Turkish leadership remains nationalistic and protective of state sovereignty, it is eager to prove itself a responsible state and a good candidate for EU membership.

Water Regime Information

To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. (Yale, 176)

Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this (KHRP, 2007, 3).

Major Economic Factors

Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% (Ronayne, 20). In 1997, the region’s per capita GDP was less than half the national average. In different provinces, between 21.8% and 44.7% of households fall below the poverty line (Unver, 1). For the residents of the region, there is a need for infrastructure development and the opening of economic opportunities.

Issues and Stakeholders

Decreased downstream flow will have ecological, human, and economic consequences

Sub-Issues:

1. Greater decreased downstream flow
2. No commitments on minimum flows downstream
3. Increased flood levels, channel migration upstream and diminished capacity for energy-generation due to sedimentation

Stakeholders for these issues:

1. Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
2. Iraq and Syria (National Government)
3. Turkey (National Government)
4. Upstream localities /river tributaries (Local Governments)
5. Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)

Water quality impacts from dam construction/implementation have not been addressed

There is a great possibility of poor drinking water quality and impacts to aquatic life due to: a) salinization; b) pesticide concentration increase; c) potential euthrophication of the reservoir water.

Stakeholders for this issue:

1. Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
2. Farmers, local settlers (Community)
3. Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
4. Turkey (National Government)

Both natural and agricultural ecosystems will be affected.

Sub-Issues:

1. Negative impact of 400 km of ecosystems along the river and its tributaries
2. Diminished fertility of land for production; prone to salinization

Stakeholders for these issues:

• Farmers (community/Corporate interest)
• Environmental NGO’s (Environmental interest)

No process was provided for input by affected populations

1. Inadequate protection of displaced population at dam/reservoir site
2. Lack of consultation processes for addressing the displacement of local population

Stakeholders for these issues:

• Displaced communities (Community)
• NGOs (Organized Citizens)
• ECAs, possible investors (Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest)

Economic benefits are limited and long-term impacts are likely negative

Sub-Issues: Low temporary job creation by dam project in a region with high unemployment and illiteracy rates. Potential increase of urban poverty and social conflict due to: a) lack of alternative subsistence means for displaced population; b) diminished income for displaced population; c) Loss of 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land; potential loss of productivity of irrigated land

Stakeholders for these issues: Big cities and muncipal governments (Local governments) Displaced communities (Community)

Archaeological and Cultural sites are slated for inundation.

The Ilisu dam will flood Hasankeyf and hundreds of historical/archaeological sites. There is uncertainty about reallocation plans for archeological patrimony.

Stakeholders for this issue:

• Municipal governments (Local governments)
• Current communities dependant on tourism (Community)
• NGOs (Cultural interests)

Potential increase of malaria and water born diseases

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Stakeholders for this issue: Local governments and communities (Community)

Political processes will be influenced not only after dam completion, but by the process of funding and building the Ilisu dam

Sub-issues:

1. Power shift in favor of Turkey vis à vis Iraq and Syria through control of water flow downstream
2. Social control over East Anatolia Kurdish region
3. Pressure from international actors (ECAs, NGOs) and social national movements to comply with international standards.

Stakeholders for these issues: Irak and Syria (National Government) Kurds (Community. Local Gov.) NGOs (cultural interests)

Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight

No ASI articles have been added yet for this case

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