Difference between revisions of "ASI:Collaborative Adaptive Management, Joint Fact Finding, and Mutual Gains: Aplication to Indus River"
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'''Joint Fact Finding for the Indus River''' | '''Joint Fact Finding for the Indus River''' | ||
| − | The 1991 WAA recognizes a fixed quantity of approximately 40 MAF as environmental flows to be released in a consistent way each year. However, these quantities are not released consistently. The continuing inconsistency in maintain environmental flows below the Kotri barrage structure are often justified on the grounds that “there is an average over time (when flood flows even out the dry years)” . A regular, controlled, and monitored minimum flow each year, to be guaranteed through strict regulation has been difficult to achieve. | + | The 1991 WAA recognizes a fixed quantity of approximately 40 MAF as environmental flows to be released in a consistent way each year. However, these quantities are not released consistently. The continuing inconsistency in maintain environmental flows below the Kotri barrage structure are often justified on the grounds that “there is an average over time (when flood flows even out the dry years).”<ref name="Kugelman and Hathaway">Kugelman, M. and Hathaway R. M. (2009) ‘Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/running-empty-pakistans-water-crisis |
| + | </ref> A regular, controlled, and monitored minimum flow each year, to be guaranteed through strict regulation has been difficult to achieve. | ||
It was in the above scenario that the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) was eventually asked to convene the independent, third party mediation on combined analyses of the technical studies to make recommendations for a decision on environmental flow levels. This led to commissioning an Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) comprising of renowned, international water practitioners and experts. | It was in the above scenario that the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) was eventually asked to convene the independent, third party mediation on combined analyses of the technical studies to make recommendations for a decision on environmental flow levels. This led to commissioning an Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) comprising of renowned, international water practitioners and experts. | ||
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The IPOE evaluated the three specific technical studies which were undertaken to assess a rational level of minimum environmental flows: (i) to determine the minimum flow below Kotri barrage to control seawater intrusion into the delta; (ii) to address environmental impacts from river water and sediment flows and their seasonal distribution below the barrage; and (iii) to address environmental concerns about a wide range of issues related to the management of water resources upstream of Kotri barrage. The studies verified data on salinity levels from waters entering the downstream Sindh province. The IPOE comprised of three members namely Fernando Gonzalez, Thinus Basson and Baart Schultz. The IPOE was assigned the tasks of: (i) reviewing consultants’ work on the technical studies at three levels – inception, midterm and draft final reports; (ii) reviewing the recommendations provided in the technical studies against the respective terms of reference; and (iii) analyzing the recommendations and compile final recommendations on the required escapages levels below Kotri. | The IPOE evaluated the three specific technical studies which were undertaken to assess a rational level of minimum environmental flows: (i) to determine the minimum flow below Kotri barrage to control seawater intrusion into the delta; (ii) to address environmental impacts from river water and sediment flows and their seasonal distribution below the barrage; and (iii) to address environmental concerns about a wide range of issues related to the management of water resources upstream of Kotri barrage. The studies verified data on salinity levels from waters entering the downstream Sindh province. The IPOE comprised of three members namely Fernando Gonzalez, Thinus Basson and Baart Schultz. The IPOE was assigned the tasks of: (i) reviewing consultants’ work on the technical studies at three levels – inception, midterm and draft final reports; (ii) reviewing the recommendations provided in the technical studies against the respective terms of reference; and (iii) analyzing the recommendations and compile final recommendations on the required escapages levels below Kotri. | ||
| − | In essence, the IPOE served the purpose of meeting agreed demands from Sindh and Punjab for scientifically and objectively evaluating the three studies to inform the decision for the involved parties. Also, as part of its terms of reference, the IPOE was mandated to undertake a series of stakeholder consultations . | + | In essence, the IPOE served the purpose of meeting agreed demands from Sindh and Punjab for scientifically and objectively evaluating the three studies to inform the decision for the involved parties. Also, as part of its terms of reference, the IPOE was mandated to undertake a series of stakeholder consultations.<ref name="Gonzalez et all 2005">Gonzalez F. J; Basson. T; and Schultz B. (2005) ‘Final Report of IPOE for Review of Studies on Water Escapages below Kotri Barrage’</ref> |
'''Mutual Gains on the Indus''' | '''Mutual Gains on the Indus''' | ||
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The Indus Basin management over the years has been aspired for primarily capturing its flows by the riparian’s sharing its waters. The concept of striving for mutual gains by maximizing the benefits to all stakeholders has not been the sole driving force behind all agreements reached on the Indus River management. For instance, the 1991 WAA was primarily developed to reach an agreement over ongoing inter-provincial disputes between Punjab and Sindh provinces over water distributions and the high levels of distrust each had over the other accruing more benefits than the other party. As neither Sindh nor Punjab seem to give way in their positions over what constitutes the optimal levels of allocation, both are equally disadvantaged at receiving additional benefits from the system. This disadvantage has become an increasingly vocal debate not only amongst the two provincial authorities, but also by larger groups of stakeholders including research bodies, academic community and civil society who point to the ‘lost opportunity’ for the country by not addressing the growing need for augmenting storage capacity since 1970s as well as reaching an agreement for maintaining environmental flows downstream of Kotri Barrage (the last structure on the Indus). | The Indus Basin management over the years has been aspired for primarily capturing its flows by the riparian’s sharing its waters. The concept of striving for mutual gains by maximizing the benefits to all stakeholders has not been the sole driving force behind all agreements reached on the Indus River management. For instance, the 1991 WAA was primarily developed to reach an agreement over ongoing inter-provincial disputes between Punjab and Sindh provinces over water distributions and the high levels of distrust each had over the other accruing more benefits than the other party. As neither Sindh nor Punjab seem to give way in their positions over what constitutes the optimal levels of allocation, both are equally disadvantaged at receiving additional benefits from the system. This disadvantage has become an increasingly vocal debate not only amongst the two provincial authorities, but also by larger groups of stakeholders including research bodies, academic community and civil society who point to the ‘lost opportunity’ for the country by not addressing the growing need for augmenting storage capacity since 1970s as well as reaching an agreement for maintaining environmental flows downstream of Kotri Barrage (the last structure on the Indus). | ||
| − | Attempts are resolving this stalemate through simulated stakeholder consultations (e.g. Imam and Lohani, 2012) are suggested amongst others, as proposed means to demonstrate the application of mutual gains approach to address the inter-provincial distrust. The multi-stakeholder (government, civil society and technical experts) and multi-tier (national, sub-national, and local) consultations for conducting open debates for Kalabagh Dam project were also held between 2004 and 2006 under the administration of President General (R) Pervez Musharraf. However, the consultations did not result in any consensus and were rather abruptly abandoned due to rising agitation by popular political groups as well as growing stance from the Sindh and Khyber Pkhtunkhwa provinces. In 2008, the incoming government of Pakistan Peoples Party formally announced the cancellation of the Kalabagh Dam Project (KBD). However, after the devastating floods of 2010, the Prime Minister from the same ruling government made a public statement referring to missed opportunity from the absence of Kalabagh Dam and that the | + | Attempts are resolving this stalemate through simulated stakeholder consultations (e.g. Imam and Lohani, 2012) are suggested amongst others, as proposed means to demonstrate the application of mutual gains approach to address the inter-provincial distrust. The multi-stakeholder (government, civil society and technical experts) and multi-tier (national, sub-national, and local) consultations for conducting open debates for Kalabagh Dam project were also held between 2004 and 2006 under the administration of President General (R) Pervez Musharraf. However, the consultations did not result in any consensus and were rather abruptly abandoned due to rising agitation by popular political groups as well as growing stance from the Sindh and Khyber Pkhtunkhwa provinces. In 2008, the incoming government of Pakistan Peoples Party formally announced the cancellation of the Kalabagh Dam Project (KBD). However, after the devastating floods of 2010, the Prime Minister from the same ruling government made a public statement referring to missed opportunity from the absence of Kalabagh Dam and that the “the deaths and destruction in the floods could have been averted if the Kalabagh Dam had been built.”<ref name="Daily Times 2010"> "Kalabagh Dam could have averted destruction of floods, says Gilani" Daily Times (Pakistan) 10 August 2010. Archived at : http://archive.is/cJsgP </ref> |
'''Building Consensus''' | '''Building Consensus''' | ||
Consensus building on the Indus Basin management has been a slow process. While breakthrough agreements have been reached in the form of Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan and the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord between the provinces of Pakistan, the adaptive management of Indus Basin is yet to be fully operationalized by these accords. In particular, the 1991 WAA made several key provisions for inter-provincial distribution as well as for environmental flows and instituted IRSA as the key regulatory and decision making authority to oversee implementation of these provisions. However, the ensuing distrust between participating provinces has limited the effectiveness of the decision making process. | Consensus building on the Indus Basin management has been a slow process. While breakthrough agreements have been reached in the form of Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan and the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord between the provinces of Pakistan, the adaptive management of Indus Basin is yet to be fully operationalized by these accords. In particular, the 1991 WAA made several key provisions for inter-provincial distribution as well as for environmental flows and instituted IRSA as the key regulatory and decision making authority to oversee implementation of these provisions. However, the ensuing distrust between participating provinces has limited the effectiveness of the decision making process. | ||
| + | |Reflection Text Summary=The Water Apportionment Act of 1991 includes aspects that both increase and hinder flexibility or adaptability over time. This article discusses these aspects and also addresses how development of technical information was addressed for this process and opportunities for mutual gains and consensus building. | ||
|Perspective=Practitioner, Observer | |Perspective=Practitioner, Observer | ||
|ASI Type=Personal Insights | |ASI Type=Personal Insights | ||
Latest revision as of 12:06, 27 January 2014
About this Article
Contributed by:Tahira Syed
Contributor Perspective(s): Practitioner, Observer
Article last edited 27 Jan 2014 by Amanda
Article originally added by Tahira
What is an ASI Article? Individuals may add their own Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight (ASI) to a case by linking a case to an ASI article. These ASI articles are protected, so that each person who creates a section retains control of their own content. Please use the discussion page for commenting on this article. Learn More
This article is linked to Pakistan: Inter-Provincial Relations on Indus Basin
Adaptive Management on Indus River
The key premises for the inter-provincial dispute over allocation of Indus flows dates back to the early 1990s when the ruling British Government of the then Indian Sub-continent started developing infrastructure to regulate Indus flows and introduced diversions through constructing barrages weirs and canals to irrigate largely arid areas for increasing agricultural production. The rapid infrastructure development gave rise to distrust in the Sindh province being the lower riparian on Indus. What started as a clear fear of losing out on its water share, the Sindh province openly blamed Punjab province (upper riparian) of water theft and usage in access to their allocations.
The 1991 Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) is therefore seen as a key agreement developed to address the deep rooted distrust between the Sindh and Punjab provinces. The WAA was a product of intense negotiations and remains as the key step taken by the provincial administrations for reaching consensus over equitable water distribution, planning for additional storage and water management infrastructure and maintenance of environmental flows. However, since the WAA formulation, no additional storage capacity has been added to the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) while other envisaged objectives of harvesting the potential of hydropower generation and effective and long term capacity for flood management have also remain underachieved.
To assess the adaptability of 1991 WAA, it is essential to look at the institutional arrangements and joint monitoring mechanisms agreed between the provinces in implementing the Accord. The key institutional mechanism established as a direct result of the WAA is the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) which was established in 1992. The perception amongst provinces – in particular Sindh – of the role of IRSA is also contested due to perceived influence of Punjab province given its size in terms of population, economy and representation in governing and policy making institutions.
On the other hand, and in presumed interest of retaining some flexibility, the WAA, like any other water agreement, contains broad definitions and guidelines for the participating provinces on various water management aspects. For instance, while the Para 7 of the WAA clearly stated the “….need for certain minimum escapages to the sea, below Kotri, to check sea intrusion…” the negotiations for reaching an agreement on the correct level of flows have not produced consensus amongst the two provinces. The matter of environmental flows (which refer to the amount of water needed in a watercourse to maintain a healthy, natural ecosystem) for the downstream and delta of the Indus is mentioned in the 1991 WAA at a proposed 10 MAF as per demand from the Sindh province. This volume however is contested by Punjab province and as a result a series of scientific studies and analyses have led to various additional proposals for setting the minimum flow levels.
However, the adaptability of the 1991 WAA just as the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan remains limited as it makes neither any provision for planning and/or responding to the variations in water flows as a result of climate change nor in addressing the water quality and pollution.
Another aspect of the lack of adaptability of the 1991 WAA can be assessed in the monitoring and data reporting provisions. Among the responsibilities of IRSA is to oversee the process of water allocation between provinces . However for fulfilling this responsibility, IRSA relies on the information provided by the provinces themselves on their predicted levels of water to be available each year. IRSA does not question the information provided by the provinces – partly limited by its own technical capacity. Instead, IRSA derives an average prediction based on the information received from the provinces and using its discretion proposes the final prediction of water availability in the system for the given season. While this process is monitored rigorously, the neutrality of the process is compromised as the provinces have to their discretion the data provided for this decision making process.
Joint Fact Finding for the Indus River
The 1991 WAA recognizes a fixed quantity of approximately 40 MAF as environmental flows to be released in a consistent way each year. However, these quantities are not released consistently. The continuing inconsistency in maintain environmental flows below the Kotri barrage structure are often justified on the grounds that “there is an average over time (when flood flows even out the dry years).”[1] A regular, controlled, and monitored minimum flow each year, to be guaranteed through strict regulation has been difficult to achieve.
It was in the above scenario that the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) was eventually asked to convene the independent, third party mediation on combined analyses of the technical studies to make recommendations for a decision on environmental flow levels. This led to commissioning an Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) comprising of renowned, international water practitioners and experts.
Through IRSA, the provincial representatives and water practitioners participated in the various consultations with the IPOE. The IPOE was given a detailed terms of reference which included review of the technical studies at relevant stages, in depth discussions with federal and provincial government officials and consultants, and analysis from international experiences and practices. The credibility for the recommendations provided by the IPOE was not contested by the provinces given their non-partisan and independent expert status.
The IPOE evaluated the three specific technical studies which were undertaken to assess a rational level of minimum environmental flows: (i) to determine the minimum flow below Kotri barrage to control seawater intrusion into the delta; (ii) to address environmental impacts from river water and sediment flows and their seasonal distribution below the barrage; and (iii) to address environmental concerns about a wide range of issues related to the management of water resources upstream of Kotri barrage. The studies verified data on salinity levels from waters entering the downstream Sindh province. The IPOE comprised of three members namely Fernando Gonzalez, Thinus Basson and Baart Schultz. The IPOE was assigned the tasks of: (i) reviewing consultants’ work on the technical studies at three levels – inception, midterm and draft final reports; (ii) reviewing the recommendations provided in the technical studies against the respective terms of reference; and (iii) analyzing the recommendations and compile final recommendations on the required escapages levels below Kotri.
In essence, the IPOE served the purpose of meeting agreed demands from Sindh and Punjab for scientifically and objectively evaluating the three studies to inform the decision for the involved parties. Also, as part of its terms of reference, the IPOE was mandated to undertake a series of stakeholder consultations.[2]
Mutual Gains on the Indus
The Indus Basin management over the years has been aspired for primarily capturing its flows by the riparian’s sharing its waters. The concept of striving for mutual gains by maximizing the benefits to all stakeholders has not been the sole driving force behind all agreements reached on the Indus River management. For instance, the 1991 WAA was primarily developed to reach an agreement over ongoing inter-provincial disputes between Punjab and Sindh provinces over water distributions and the high levels of distrust each had over the other accruing more benefits than the other party. As neither Sindh nor Punjab seem to give way in their positions over what constitutes the optimal levels of allocation, both are equally disadvantaged at receiving additional benefits from the system. This disadvantage has become an increasingly vocal debate not only amongst the two provincial authorities, but also by larger groups of stakeholders including research bodies, academic community and civil society who point to the ‘lost opportunity’ for the country by not addressing the growing need for augmenting storage capacity since 1970s as well as reaching an agreement for maintaining environmental flows downstream of Kotri Barrage (the last structure on the Indus).
Attempts are resolving this stalemate through simulated stakeholder consultations (e.g. Imam and Lohani, 2012) are suggested amongst others, as proposed means to demonstrate the application of mutual gains approach to address the inter-provincial distrust. The multi-stakeholder (government, civil society and technical experts) and multi-tier (national, sub-national, and local) consultations for conducting open debates for Kalabagh Dam project were also held between 2004 and 2006 under the administration of President General (R) Pervez Musharraf. However, the consultations did not result in any consensus and were rather abruptly abandoned due to rising agitation by popular political groups as well as growing stance from the Sindh and Khyber Pkhtunkhwa provinces. In 2008, the incoming government of Pakistan Peoples Party formally announced the cancellation of the Kalabagh Dam Project (KBD). However, after the devastating floods of 2010, the Prime Minister from the same ruling government made a public statement referring to missed opportunity from the absence of Kalabagh Dam and that the “the deaths and destruction in the floods could have been averted if the Kalabagh Dam had been built.”[3]
Building Consensus
Consensus building on the Indus Basin management has been a slow process. While breakthrough agreements have been reached in the form of Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan and the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord between the provinces of Pakistan, the adaptive management of Indus Basin is yet to be fully operationalized by these accords. In particular, the 1991 WAA made several key provisions for inter-provincial distribution as well as for environmental flows and instituted IRSA as the key regulatory and decision making authority to oversee implementation of these provisions. However, the ensuing distrust between participating provinces has limited the effectiveness of the decision making process.
- ^ Kugelman, M. and Hathaway R. M. (2009) ‘Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/running-empty-pakistans-water-crisis
- ^ Gonzalez F. J; Basson. T; and Schultz B. (2005) ‘Final Report of IPOE for Review of Studies on Water Escapages below Kotri Barrage’
- ^ "Kalabagh Dam could have averted destruction of floods, says Gilani" Daily Times (Pakistan) 10 August 2010. Archived at : http://archive.is/cJsgP
