Difference between revisions of "Property:Reflection Text Summary"
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Pages using the property "Reflection Text Summary"
Showing 22 pages using this property.
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| A Way Forward: Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework + | A number of opportunities exist to improve the situation in this basin. Inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, the design and implementation of joint-fact finding, exploration of mutual gains (rather than zero-sum) negotiation, and opportunities to create additional value by exploring how to expand benefits from water through addressing irrigation inefficiencies in the basin are explored here. + |
| Additional Notes on Gaza Water Management + | This ASI is a note on the process of case development. Christine.Buesser contributed the original case and 2 other ASI articles linked to Gaza Water Management. + |
| Agricultural Subsidies + | Agricultural production has received far less attention than other water uses in the ACF, and agricultural management has been largely overlooked as a source of potential means of addressing the basin’s water issues. This is surprising, given that agriculture is generally a relatively inefficient user of water and may offer significant “low-hanging fruit” for water savings. Since agriculture is a dominant user of water in the ACF and the primary use of water in the Flint River sub-basin (Georgia Department of Natural Resources 2006), attention should be paid to how agricultural policies and management can be used to improve water management in the basin. Can agricultural policies, mainly rethinking subsidies, encourage water savings in the Flint River Basin, thereby helping to address basin-wide conflict in the ACF? + |
| Alternative Solutions to the Water Demand of Northern China + | Concerning the ultimate problem of imbalance water demand distribution in the Northern and Southern China, scholars suggest implementations that will further consider China's water sustainability other than water diversion. + |
| Applying the WDF to Oil Production in Ecuador: Lost Opportunities and Endless Litigation + | This ASI discusses some specific elements of the WDF (Stakeholder Identification, Joint Fact Finding, Value Creation) where opportunities were missed, and ignoring these aspects have contributed significantly to the ongoing litigation. + |
| Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework + | The Case of water management of the Ebro River Basin resources in Catalonia demonstrates the limit of a top-down process, as well as the limit of public consultation as a process. If stakeholders are consulted only, nothing says that they will be heard, and it does not mean that they will finally agree with the decision made. This is the main difference between consultation and consensus building, when the parties are ultimately bond by their position during the process. It does not mean that they are all happy with the final decision, but that being part of the negotiation and having been involved in trades, problem solving and joint analyzis, they understand the rationale behind the decision. They are “part” of the decision process. Having a real consensus building approach is even more relevant when the political context is as present and freezing as in Catalonia today. Decisions are mainly made upon political considerations, as water is included in an overall game between the Central government and the Autonomous Community. Water becomes a pretext for disagreement rather than a problem to solve. It would be therefore useful to include the stakeholders in a regional consensus building process, allowing the political interests to be represented together with technical, legal, economic and environmental frames at the same table. This negotiation process would allow to build a consensus around water rights, environmental risks, self-determination expression and national solidarity through packages and technical as well as institutional innovation. In addition, different parties expressing their interests at the same time could lead to coalitions between specific interests, rather than polarization of positions through the media. Confidentiality could be a rule for such an instance of negotiation. Finally, it will be interesting to see the position of the EU in a few weeks, as it may rise some further questions: how should the regulator react if a process that corresponds to the Directive theoretically (as the PHE elaboration process may well do), does not bring the expected outcomes as a result (PDE estimates that the environmental standard was not respected and that their position was not heard). Should the regulation (the Directive) be stricter? Should the EU support the capacity building of the organizations that are less heard so that they take ownership on their national process? Or should the EU support the existing PHE, for it is an actual improvement of water management in the Ebro compared to past policies? Giving time for opposing stakeholders to build more power for the next period, and hoping that the Delta ecology and other interests are not irremediably affected in the meantime? + |
| Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework to the Rhine River Basin on Water Pollution Control + | The water quality program for the Rhine River Basin has been successful because the stakeholders promote information exchange, cooperation and consensus, there is trust, and there is a stable budget/ funding to implement the goals. Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework to this case, we can see why the Rhine Action Program was successful + |
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| Collaborative Adaptive Management, Joint Fact Finding, and Mutual Gains: Aplication to Indus River + | The Water Apportionment Act of 1991 includes aspects that both increase and hinder flexibility or adaptability over time. This article discusses these aspects and also addresses how development of technical information was addressed for this process and opportunities for mutual gains and consensus building. + |
| Conflict Management in the Indus Basin: Insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database + | ''The points included here are summarized or excerpted from the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). Matthew Pritchard provided this and other summarized analysis or insights from the TFFD on behalf and with permission of the original authors. Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/'' This ASI discusses some lessons learned from the negotiations and creative outcomes in the agreement. + |
D | |
| Danube River Basin: Insights from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database + | ''This information was excerpted or paraphrased from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) by Matthew Pritchard on behalf of the original authors. This resource is available: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/'' + |
| Determining Fair Payment for Ecosystem Services + | Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), a voluntary exchange of a defined environmental service for a fee, has been previously implemented in China there is no consensus on criteria for fair compensation. Planned water quality control actions require capital investments and restrict development options for the water source area. For this reason, the receiving area is expected to compensate the source area for their conservation efforts. How should PES payments be determined? + |
| Discussion: Ongoing Challenges After the Major Flooding in 2011 + | As a result, the basin needs to cope with additional dimensions of the challenges: * City management to mitigate risks of extreme events, eg, severe flooding, salinity incursion * Balance of upstream and downstream resources, considering technical, societal & political aspects * Industrial area protection to minimise risks from direct impact and manage investor’s confidence * Trust in the management of the administration + |
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| Formation of the SNWA: Cooperation in Demand Management + | The formation of the Southern Nevada Water Authority stems from the stakeholders recognition of their interdependence. This case demonstrates that stakeholders need for cooperation, and therefore their willingness to cooperate, increases in proportion to the stresses on the system. It also demonstrates that good leadership was instrumental to the success of the Authority in controlling water demands and acquiring water supplies. + |
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| Lessons From the Baglihar Case + | Apparently intractable transboundary issues can be resolved by referral to a third party. Upfront resolution of issues before the start of construction of projects is a win-win situation for parties involved. + |
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| Seperating foriegn interests from the main dispute + | How can an agreement overcome energy reserves interests. + |
| Shared ownership, limited participation in the Lake Titicaca basin + | This contribution details some of the lessons learned and creative outcomes that emerged from the resolution process. + |
| Short and Long Term Solutions for Water Problems in Gaza + | An immediate priority should be to dramatically reduce current groundwater abstraction rates in order to reverse the damage being done to the Coastal aquifer underlying Gaza. The PWA’s short-term strategy aims to reduce the total groundwater abstraction in Gaza to about 150 MCM/ year in order to bridge the gap between water supply and demand. This would allow the aquifer to gradually replenish itself predominantly through natural recharge. However, a complete replenishment of the aquifer can only be achieved if the total abstraction is further reduced to about 70 MCM/ year and if the agricultural needs can be met with treated wastewater. A number of options exist spanning water demand management for both agricultural and domestic use to supply side options utilizing technology (desalination) or water transfer. These options are described here, including SWOT analysis of major options. + |
| Suggested Negotiation Approaches for Mitigating the Ongoing Blue Nile Conflict + | The key to mitigating the negative effects of power asymmetry in water negotiations is to expand the proverbial pie by creating additional value and diversifying the menu of negotiating agenda items. This should include efforts to move away from viewing the Nile as a fixed resource towards the efficient and effective use, reuse, and repurposing of the Nile waters. + |
T | |
| The Importance of Trust in the Republican River Compact + | The history of the Republican River basin is characterized by periodic conflict. The presence and absence of mutual trust plays an essential role in both the successes and failings of the Republican River Compact to address this conflict. What role does trust play in transboundary water agreements and what actions can nurture or erode this trust? + |
| The Pecos River Compact - Good decisions can still lead to bad outcomes + | The history of the Pecos River negotiations between Texas and New Mexico are full of contention and dissatisfaction. Yet, it is clear that they still took many important steps in the Water Diplomacy Framework. What went wrong and how can we learn from this case? + |
| Threats to Addressing a Water Strategy for Gaza + | The task faced in improving the water sector in Gaza is thus of significant scale and difficulty. No ‘magic bullets’ exist, at least in the absence of an equitable and reasonable reallocation of shared fresh water between Israel and the State of Palestine, and there will be a need for a major overhaul of the sector as a whole in Gaza. In the event of not being able to settle a final agreement with Israel on the final status, there will be no possibilities to implement the long-term water strategy objectives and it will have a very negative impact on the water situation in the territories, which will give right to announce these territories as water disaster areas. Practical difficulties even for the short-term solutions can only be addressed if [a] the blockade is dealt with; [b] water is ‘kept out of politics’ and [c] there is the formation of an interim government decided upon by Fatah and Hamas. Current challenges are just too manifold for any technical solution to work effectively and efficiently. These challenges are presented and discussed here. + |
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| Water Diplomacy Development in the Chao Phraya River Basin + | Diplomacy Development Cornerstones: * Define long-term engagement objectives: people * Recognise the challenges: management of uncertainties * Focus on consensus building & adaptive learning * Strike a balance between preserving natural resources and managing the short-term practicality + |
