Difference between revisions of "Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey"
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==Water Regime Information== | ==Water Regime Information== | ||
| − | To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. (Yale, 176) | + | To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. {{needs reference | comment=(Yale, 176)?}} |
Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this <ref name="KHRP">Kurdish Human Rights Project. (June 2007). “The Ilisu Dam Project: A Flawed Plan is Revived Unchanged”, KHRP Briefing Paper, published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project. Available at http://www.khrp.org/index.php. </ref> | Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this <ref name="KHRP">Kurdish Human Rights Project. (June 2007). “The Ilisu Dam Project: A Flawed Plan is Revived Unchanged”, KHRP Briefing Paper, published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project. Available at http://www.khrp.org/index.php. </ref> | ||
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==Major Economic Factors== | ==Major Economic Factors== | ||
| − | Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% | + | Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% <ref name="Ronayne 2005">Ronayne, Maggie. (February 2005). “The Cultural and Environmental Impact of Large Dams in Southeast Turkey”, Fact-Finding Mission Report, National University of Ireland, Galway, and the Kurdish Human Rights Project. </a>. |
| + | |||
| + | In 1997, the region’s per capita GDP was less than half the national average. In different provinces, between 21.8% and 44.7% of households fall below the poverty line <ref="unver 2001" > Unver, I.H. Olcay. (October 2001). “Southeastern Turkey, Sustainable Development and Foreign Investment”, Prepared by the GAP Regional Development Administration for the OECD-China Conference on FDI in China’s Regional Development.</ref>. For the residents of the region, there is a need for infrastructure development and the opening of economic opportunities. | ||
|Issues={{Issue | |Issues={{Issue | ||
|Issue=Decreased downstream flow will have ecological, human, and economic consequences | |Issue=Decreased downstream flow will have ecological, human, and economic consequences | ||
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Regarding water quality, the project will contribute to salinization and to an increase of pesticide concentration because it will reduce the Tigris capacity to auto purify. It is possible to have euthrophication of the reservoir water derived from the down flow of agricultural chemicals and organic matter. The degraded water quality will affect the growth of fish and water life; it will mean poor drinking water quality and affect the suitability of for consumption of fish coming from the reservoir. | Regarding water quality, the project will contribute to salinization and to an increase of pesticide concentration because it will reduce the Tigris capacity to auto purify. It is possible to have euthrophication of the reservoir water derived from the down flow of agricultural chemicals and organic matter. The degraded water quality will affect the growth of fish and water life; it will mean poor drinking water quality and affect the suitability of for consumption of fish coming from the reservoir. | ||
| − | Sedimentation will also affect the quantity of water stored at the reservoir and the capacity to generate energy. It will also increase “…flood levels, waterlogging, and increased channel migration along tributary rivers upstream.” | + | Sedimentation will also affect the quantity of water stored at the reservoir and the capacity to generate energy. It will also increase “…flood levels, waterlogging, and increased channel migration along tributary rivers upstream.” <ref="williams 2006">Williams, Philip B. and Setenay Bozkurt Frucht (2006). A review of the hydrologic and geomorphic impacts of the proposed Ilisu dam. Commissioned by World Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED). February 20, 2006. </ref> |
====ND-3 Ecosystems ==== | ====ND-3 Ecosystems ==== | ||
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====SD-1 Governance, Legal Framework and Institutions==== | ====SD-1 Governance, Legal Framework and Institutions==== | ||
Turkey is bound by the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Waterways, whose purpose is to prevent significant negative impacts of projects on international waterways on other riparian countries. With its attempt to find financing mechanisms internationally, Turkey also committed to the compliment of international standards. Nonetheless, Turkish national laws have conflicting points with such international legal framework. | Turkey is bound by the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Waterways, whose purpose is to prevent significant negative impacts of projects on international waterways on other riparian countries. With its attempt to find financing mechanisms internationally, Turkey also committed to the compliment of international standards. Nonetheless, Turkish national laws have conflicting points with such international legal framework. | ||
| − | * The national legal framework enables expropriation (Art, 27) even before the court cases are resolved. | + | * The national legal framework enables expropriation {{needs reference | comment=(Art, 27)?}} even before the court cases are resolved. |
| − | * The national law is not sufficiently paired with the World Bank’s General Principles on expropriation in issues such as “adequate” compensation to meet a similar income to the one they had before. Also, expropriation and resettlement are being dealt as two separate processes by national laws and, according the project Experts Committee, specifically former World Bank expert Prof. Michael Cernea, they must be implemented as part of the same process. ( | + | * The national law is not sufficiently paired with the World Bank’s General Principles on expropriation in issues such as “adequate” compensation to meet a similar income to the one they had before. Also, expropriation and resettlement are being dealt as two separate processes by national laws and, according the project Experts Committee, specifically former World Bank expert Prof. Michael Cernea, they must be implemented as part of the same process. <ref name="counter current">Counter Current .– GegenStroÅNmung (2011). Dam construction in Turkey and its impact on economic, cultural and social rights. Parallel report in response to the Initial Report by the Republic of Turkey on the Implementation of the International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Submission to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for its 46th Session, 20 March 1, 2011. p 11</ref>. |
* Basic principles and World Bank rules mandate the need for participation and consultation, something that gets in conflict with national law 2942, which enables expropriations without the participation of owners in several cases. | * Basic principles and World Bank rules mandate the need for participation and consultation, something that gets in conflict with national law 2942, which enables expropriations without the participation of owners in several cases. | ||
| − | * In general, environmental laws are being modified or ignored in favor of dam construction. The priority of the state is the development of the GAP project, an issue that puts at risks the richness of Turkey’s biodiversity | + | * In general, environmental laws are being modified or ignored in favor of dam construction. The priority of the state is the development of the GAP project, an issue that puts at risks the richness of Turkey’s biodiversity<ref="seker 2011"> Sekerciouglu, C. H., et al. (2011). Turkey’s globally important biodiversity in crisis. Biological conservation doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2011.06.025. in press. Available at www.elsavier.com/locate/biocon</ref> |
====SD-2 Economy==== | ====SD-2 Economy==== | ||
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The dam is planned to have a capacity of 1,200MW, and is expected to produce 3,800 GWh of hydroelectric power annually; it will also be used for irrigation. It is important to point out that Turkey’s demand increases 8% annually and sufficient energy is a concern for Turkey’s economic development. Nonetheless, the project will only cover 2% of the national electric power needs. | The dam is planned to have a capacity of 1,200MW, and is expected to produce 3,800 GWh of hydroelectric power annually; it will also be used for irrigation. It is important to point out that Turkey’s demand increases 8% annually and sufficient energy is a concern for Turkey’s economic development. Nonetheless, the project will only cover 2% of the national electric power needs. | ||
| − | It is important to say that the project is still based on data collected with technology 50 years ago. There are of course significant improvements in tools and technology for a better evaluation of the site, costs and conditions for building the dam. Ögür points out that the Ilisu Dam would not be as productive as others due to the specific location choice (for example, it will have a usage explotaition rate of 38% vs the Atatruk dam of 48% or the Karakaya dam 52%. | + | It is important to say that the project is still based on data collected with technology 50 years ago. There are of course significant improvements in tools and technology for a better evaluation of the site, costs and conditions for building the dam. Ögür points out that the Ilisu Dam would not be as productive as others due to the specific location choice (for example, it will have a usage explotaition rate of 38% vs the Atatruk dam of 48% or the Karakaya dam 52%. <ref name="Ogur"> Öngür, Tahir (n.a.). A defective project: Ilisu Dam. Available at http://www.hasankeyfgirisimi.com/en/index-Dateien/background.htm </ref> |
* Job creation | * Job creation | ||
| − | According to the Turkish government, GAP will create 3.8 million jobs for the poorest area in the country, where unemployment rates are high and literacy rates are low. The population still relay on traditional activities such as cotton production, subsistence farming dependent on the river, tourism and small-scale family industries. Still, the direct job creation by the dam construction is of less than 500 jobs | + | According to the Turkish government, GAP will create 3.8 million jobs for the poorest area in the country, where unemployment rates are high and literacy rates are low. The population still relay on traditional activities such as cotton production, subsistence farming dependent on the river, tourism and small-scale family industries. Still, the direct job creation by the dam construction is of less than 500 jobs <ref name="Ogur" />. After the construction is finished, displaced population will find it difficult to find other sources of income. For example, in the new settlement for Ilisu population, people were left without agricultural land to cultivate because there are no spare fields to occupy. Also, many were forced to sell their animals before moving out of their towns. Alternative means of subsistence will depend on the efficacy with which the government promotes other development projects in the region. |
* Loss of agricultural land | * Loss of agricultural land | ||
| − | The reservoir will flood 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land, classified as type one and two | + | The reservoir will flood 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land, classified as type one and two <ref name="Ogur" />. The lost area is bigger than the area provided for irrigation by the Project. Although, we may assume that through productivity increase through irrigation the same or more yields will be available, land may not be enough for the resettlement of displaced population. Riparian and water rights in general will have to be figured out. Also, potential salinization and loss of fertility of agricultural areas could mean impoverishment in terms of productivity. |
* Diminished income | * Diminished income | ||
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====SD-4 Health concerns==== | ====SD-4 Health concerns==== | ||
| − | If water drops below the minimum level of operation (485 meters), the area exposed with humid areas and water pools is suitable for malaria and other water born diseases. It seems that this is a current problem in the dams already constructed by the GAP project: “at an average, 80% of diseases spread through water contagion in Turkey occur in the GAP region.” | + | If water drops below the minimum level of operation (485 meters), the area exposed with humid areas and water pools is suitable for malaria and other water born diseases. It seems that this is a current problem in the dams already constructed by the GAP project: “at an average, 80% of diseases spread through water contagion in Turkey occur in the GAP region.” <ref name="Ogur" />. |
===(PD) Political processes=== | ===(PD) Political processes=== | ||
Revision as of 13:15, 18 July 2012
| Total Population | .07878,000,000 millionmillion |
|---|---|
| Total Area | 57,61457,614 km² 22,244.765 mi² km2 |
| Climate Descriptors | Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type) |
| Predominent Land Use Descriptors | agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, urban, religious/cultural sites |
| Important Uses of Water | Agriculture or Irrigation, Fisheries - wild, Hydropower Generation, Livestock |
| Water Features: | Upper Tigris Basin (Turkey) |
| Water Projects: | South Eastern Anatolia (GAP) Project, Ilisu Dam |
Contents
Summary
Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework
Historical, Social, and Political Factors
It is impossible to understand water issues in this basin without paying due attention to the longstanding political and social factors that shape life in the region. One of the most important of these factors is the basin’s population itself.
A Century of Ethnic Conflict
Southeastern Turkey is primarily inhabited by Kurds, members of an Indo-European ethno-linguistic group that consider themselves distinct from the Turkish-speaking majority of Turkey. Currently, between 9% to 13% of Turkey’s residents self-identify as Kurds [1]. As Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have long aspired to a nation state of their own, the Kurds’ inclusion in modern day Turkey has posed existential problems for both the minority and the state.
The Turkish Republic, which was founded in 1923 after a long war of independence against major European states, rests upon an ideology of secular nationalism that emphasizes the geographic, ethnic, and linguistic unity of the Turkish State [2]. Turkish politics is also dominated by an ideological tendency toward centralized government control and state led economic development for the benefit of the Turkish people. The Turkish Government until 2002 denied the existence of a Kurdish identity and banned the use of the Kurdish language in the media official contexts.[1]
In response to what many Kurds feel has been political, economic, and ideological disenfranchisement, Kurdish communities have waged a number of uprisings against the Turkish state. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) waged a bloody insurgency against the state; in the years of strife between the insurgents and the Turkish government, tens of thousands were killed. (Estimates are disputed, but go as high as 40,000) Although recent changes of government have produced policy changes more favorable to Kurdish communities, relations between the Kurdish periphery and the Turkish center are characterized by mistrust and resentment. At the same time, the region remains severely underdeveloped, as evidenced by poor development indicators in almost all sectors (see Economics section below).
State Development
For leaders in the Turkish government, development of the region has a number of significant advantages. Projects within the GAP may boost the standard of living in the region and may serve to quiet discontent and agitation while improving the standing of the government in the eyes of the Kurdish population. While creating jobs and economic opportunities, the government hopes to reduce support for armed groups, particularly the PKK. In addition, the completion of the GAP project can be seen as an issue of national pride for the government that represents centralized control of the periphery, continuity of a project across multiple administrations, and top down development and control. In addition to the economic benefits that the entire country will derive from the project, many Turkish leaders hope to gain electoral boosts from their constituents as the project is completed [3]
Kurdish and local government leaders in the provinces affected by the GAP Project have complained of feeling left out of the development process. For many in Southeast Anatolia, the government is another attempt by the central government to exercise its muscle in the region at the expense of local interests.
Membership aspirations: the European Union
Many Turkish leaders hope to incorporate Turkey into the European Union in the near future, and so there is considerable pressure on the Turkish Government to conform to standards and norms of the EU community. While Turkish leadership remains nationalistic and protective of state sovereignty, it is eager to prove itself a responsible state and a good candidate for EU membership.
Water Regime Information
To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. ( citation needed)
Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this [4]
Major Economic Factors
Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% Cite error: Closing </ref> missing for <ref> tag. For the residents of the region, there is a need for infrastructure development and the opening of economic opportunities.
Issues and Stakeholders
Decreased downstream flow will have ecological, human, and economic consequences
NSPD: Water Quantity
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest
Sub-Issues:
- Greater decreased downstream flow
- No commitments on minimum flows downstream
- Increased flood levels, channel migration upstream and diminished capacity for energy-generation due to sedimentation
Stakeholders for these issues:
- Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
- Iraq and Syria (National Government)
- Turkey (National Government)
- Upstream localities /river tributaries (Local Governments)
- Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
Water quality impacts from dam construction/implementation have not been addressed
NSPD: Water Quality
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
There is a great possibility of poor drinking water quality and impacts to aquatic life due to: a) salinization; b) pesticide concentration increase; c) potential euthrophication of the reservoir water.
Stakeholders for this issue:
- Environmental NGO’s (environmental interest)
- Farmers, local settlers (Community)
- Potential industrial investors (Industry/Corporate interest)
- Turkey (National Government)
Both natural and agricultural ecosystems will be affected.
NSPD: Ecosystems
Stakeholder Types: Environmental interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
Sub-Issues:
- Negative impact of 400 km of ecosystems along the river and its tributaries
- Diminished fertility of land for production; prone to salinization
Stakeholders for these issues:
- Farmers (community/Corporate interest)
- Environmental NGO’s (Environmental interest)
No process was provided for input by affected populations
NSPD: Governance
Stakeholder Types: Non-legislative governmental agency, Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
- Inadequate protection of displaced population at dam/reservoir site
- Lack of consultation processes for addressing the displacement of local population
Stakeholders for these issues:
- Displaced communities (Community)
- NGOs (Organized Citizens)
- ECAs, possible investors (Development/humanitarian interest, Industry/Corporate Interest)
Economic benefits are limited and long-term impacts are likely negative
NSPD: Assets
Stakeholder Types: Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
Sub-Issues: Low temporary job creation by dam project in a region with high unemployment and illiteracy rates. Potential increase of urban poverty and social conflict due to: a) lack of alternative subsistence means for displaced population; b) diminished income for displaced population; c) Loss of 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land; potential loss of productivity of irrigated land
Stakeholders for these issues: Big cities and muncipal governments (Local governments) Displaced communities (Community)
Farmers (Community/Corporate interest)Archaeological and Cultural sites are slated for inundation.
NSPD: Assets, Values and Norms
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Industry/Corporate Interest, Community or organized citizens
The Ilisu dam will flood Hasankeyf and hundreds of historical/archaeological sites. There is uncertainty about reallocation plans for archeological patrimony.
Stakeholders for this issue:
- Municipal governments (Local governments)
- Current communities dependant on tourism (Community)
- NGOs (Cultural interests)
Potential increase of malaria and water born diseases
NSPD: Water Quality, Ecosystems
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Community or organized citizens
Stakeholders for this issue: Local governments and communities (Community)
Turkey (National Government)Political processes will be influenced not only after dam completion, but by the process of funding and building the Ilisu dam
NSPD: Governance
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government
Sub-issues:
- Power shift in favor of Turkey vis à vis Iraq and Syria through control of water flow downstream
- Social control over East Anatolia Kurdish region
- Pressure from international actors (ECAs, NGOs) and social national movements to comply with international standards.
Stakeholders for these issues: Irak and Syria (National Government) Kurds (Community. Local Gov.) NGOs (cultural interests)
European governments (National governments)
Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight
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External Links
- Official GAP Project Website (English Language) — The official English version of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) governmental page describing the project, history, news, investments, etc.
- ^ 1.0 1.1 Garfield, Samuel Holden. (2010). “The Kurdish Struggle for Recognition in Turkey: Towards an Expanded Model of Recognition”, in Issues, the Jackson School Journal for International Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1. Accessible at https://depts.washington.edu/jsjweb/?page_id=17
- ^ Robbins, Philip. (1993). “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue”, in International Affairs, the Royal Institute of Internatonal Affairs, Vol. 69 No. 4.
- ^ Carkoglu, Ali, and Eder, Mine. (January 2001). “Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1.
- ^ Kurdish Human Rights Project. (June 2007). “The Ilisu Dam Project: A Flawed Plan is Revived Unchanged”, KHRP Briefing Paper, published by the Kurdish Human Rights Project. Available at http://www.khrp.org/index.php.
