Difference between revisions of "Transboundary Dispute Resolution: U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers"
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|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Recreation or Tourism | |Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Recreation or Tourism | ||
|Water Feature= | |Water Feature= | ||
+ | |Riparian= | ||
|Water Project={{Link Water Project | |Water Project={{Link Water Project | ||
|Water Project=IBWC | |Water Project=IBWC | ||
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|Agreement={{Link Agreement | |Agreement={{Link Agreement | ||
|Agreement=1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty | |Agreement=1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty | ||
+ | }}{{Link Agreement | ||
+ | |Agreement=The Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act | ||
}} | }} | ||
|REP Framework=[[File:US_Mexico_Aquifers.jpg]] Image 1. Map of shared (transboundary) aquifers between Mexico and U.S<ref name = "TFDD 2012">Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/US_Mexico_Aquifer_New.htm </ref> | |REP Framework=[[File:US_Mexico_Aquifers.jpg]] Image 1. Map of shared (transboundary) aquifers between Mexico and U.S<ref name = "TFDD 2012">Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/US_Mexico_Aquifer_New.htm </ref> | ||
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Mumme states that there are three main reasons why Minute 242 has had trouble being advanced as its agreement intended.<ref name="Mumme 2004"/> First, and maybe most importantly, was that there was not the political support to carry out Minute 242. A rift between state and federal government over whose authority it was to control water rights played a key role and when there are 96 seats in the House of Representatives from the border region, this makes it difficult to pass any legislation going against those states. Secondly, it is possible that Minute 242 did not refer to groundwater quality in general, but more pointedly at salinity. This may have averted governments from pursuing appropriate studies. And third, the terms of reference of both Minute 242 and the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty|1944 Treaty]] are not very clear. The wording of the agreements does not have enough definition to promote decisive acts and leaves much to be questioned. | Mumme states that there are three main reasons why Minute 242 has had trouble being advanced as its agreement intended.<ref name="Mumme 2004"/> First, and maybe most importantly, was that there was not the political support to carry out Minute 242. A rift between state and federal government over whose authority it was to control water rights played a key role and when there are 96 seats in the House of Representatives from the border region, this makes it difficult to pass any legislation going against those states. Secondly, it is possible that Minute 242 did not refer to groundwater quality in general, but more pointedly at salinity. This may have averted governments from pursuing appropriate studies. And third, the terms of reference of both Minute 242 and the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty|1944 Treaty]] are not very clear. The wording of the agreements does not have enough definition to promote decisive acts and leaves much to be questioned. | ||
+ | |||
+ | In 2006, the [[U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Act |U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Act]] was passed, which mandated the creation of a scientific program to inventory, map, and create hydrological models for aquifers along the U.S.-Mexico border. The act allows the secretary of the interior to work with the [[IBWC]] and states bordering Mexico developing projects which focus on "priority transboundary aquifers". | ||
== Outcome == | == Outcome == | ||
Even after three decades of having problems with Minute 242 and groundwater issues, there does not appear to be a movement towards a new agreement referring to the United States-Mexican shared aquifers anytime soon, although Mumme states that it is likely that "some form of systematic cooperation will emerge" between stakeholders in more local areas along the border.<ref name="Mumme 2004" /> | Even after three decades of having problems with Minute 242 and groundwater issues, there does not appear to be a movement towards a new agreement referring to the United States-Mexican shared aquifers anytime soon, although Mumme states that it is likely that "some form of systematic cooperation will emerge" between stakeholders in more local areas along the border.<ref name="Mumme 2004" /> | ||
+ | |||
+ | The Arizona-Sonora Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Program is one of at least two programs started as a result of the [[U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Act |TAAA]]. It is based out of the University of Arizona, and coordinates with stakeholders in the U.S. and Mexico to monitor and assess the San Pedro and Santa Cruz aquifers. | ||
|Issues={{Issue | |Issues={{Issue | ||
|Issue=Developing an equitable apportionment of shared aquifers between the United States and Mexico. | |Issue=Developing an equitable apportionment of shared aquifers between the United States and Mexico. | ||
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|NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Governance; Assets | |NSPD=Water Quantity; Water Quality; Governance; Assets | ||
|Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union | |Stakeholder Type=Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union | ||
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|Key Questions={{Key Question | |Key Questions={{Key Question | ||
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|Key Question - Industries= | |Key Question - Industries= | ||
|Key Question Description=Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution. | |Key Question Description=Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements. | ||
}} | }} | ||
|Summary=The border region between the United States and Mexico has fostered its share of surface-water conflict, from the Colorado River to the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo River. It has also been a model for peaceful conflict resolution, notably the work of the [[IBWC|International Boundary and Water Commission]] ([[IBWC]]), the supra-legal body established to manage shared water resources as a consequence of the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty]]. Yet the difficulties encountered in managing shared surface-water pale in comparison to trying to allocate groundwater resources-each aquifer system is generally not understood as gathering information on aquifers is very costly and the science of groundwater is still inexact. This makes negotiations over a shared aquifer system very difficult. The complications of groundwater are exemplified in the border region between the United States and Mexico where, despite the presence of an active supra-legal authority since 1944, groundwater issues have yet to be resolved. Mentioned as vital in the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty|1944 Treaty]], and again in 1973, the difficulties in quantifying the ambiguities inherent in groundwater regimes has eluded legal and management experts ever since. Even after three decades of having problems with the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty|1944 Treaty]] and groundwater issues, there does not appear to be a movement towards a new agreement referring to the United States-Mexican shared aquifers anytime soon, although Mumme<ref name ="Mumme 2004">Mumme, S. (2004). Advancing binational cooperation in the transboundary aquifer management on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Paper presented at Groundwater in the West Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder.</ref> states that it is likely that "some form of systematic cooperation will emerge" between stakeholders in more local areas along the border. | |Summary=The border region between the United States and Mexico has fostered its share of surface-water conflict, from the Colorado River to the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo River. It has also been a model for peaceful conflict resolution, notably the work of the [[IBWC|International Boundary and Water Commission]] ([[IBWC]]), the supra-legal body established to manage shared water resources as a consequence of the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty]]. Yet the difficulties encountered in managing shared surface-water pale in comparison to trying to allocate groundwater resources-each aquifer system is generally not understood as gathering information on aquifers is very costly and the science of groundwater is still inexact. This makes negotiations over a shared aquifer system very difficult. The complications of groundwater are exemplified in the border region between the United States and Mexico where, despite the presence of an active supra-legal authority since 1944, groundwater issues have yet to be resolved. Mentioned as vital in the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty|1944 Treaty]], and again in 1973, the difficulties in quantifying the ambiguities inherent in groundwater regimes has eluded legal and management experts ever since. Even after three decades of having problems with the [[1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty|1944 Treaty]] and groundwater issues, there does not appear to be a movement towards a new agreement referring to the United States-Mexican shared aquifers anytime soon, although Mumme<ref name ="Mumme 2004">Mumme, S. (2004). Advancing binational cooperation in the transboundary aquifer management on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Paper presented at Groundwater in the West Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder.</ref> states that it is likely that "some form of systematic cooperation will emerge" between stakeholders in more local areas along the border. | ||
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|Wikify=No | |Wikify=No | ||
|connect to www=No | |connect to www=No | ||
+ | |Out of Date=No | ||
|Disputed=No | |Disputed=No | ||
+ | |MPOV=No | ||
|Mpov=No | |Mpov=No | ||
+ | }} | ||
+ | |ASI={{ASI | ||
+ | |Contributor=Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton, Matthew D. Pritchard | ||
+ | |||
+ | Primary Authors: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton | ||
+ | |||
+ | Primary Database: Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Available on-line at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/ | ||
+ | |||
+ | Editor/Data Transcriber: Matthew D. Pritchard - Institute for Water and Watersheds | ||
+ | |ASI=== Lessons Learned == | ||
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+ | * Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. | ||
+ | |||
+ | It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Difference of opinion of federal and state governments can impede cooperation. | ||
+ | |||
+ | After Minute 242 was agreed upon by both Mexico and the United States, the differences between the United States federal government and the government of the States bordering Mexico most likely played a role in the lack of cooperation between the two nations with regards to groundwater resources. | ||
+ | |User=Mpritchard | ||
}} | }} | ||
}} | }} |
Revision as of 08:29, 22 March 2013
Geolocation: | 31° 46' 12.7463", -106° 29' 45.497" |
---|---|
Total Population | 22,874,80022,874,800,000,000 millionmillion |
Total Area | 1,310,6301,310,630 km² 506,034.243 mi² km2 |
Climate Descriptors | Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type), Arid/desert (Köppen B-type), Humid mid-latitude (Köppen C-type), Dry-summer, Dry-winter |
Predominent Land Use Descriptors | agricultural- cropland and pasture, rangeland, urban |
Important Uses of Water | Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Recreation or Tourism |
Water Projects: | IBWC |
Agreements: | 1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty, The Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act |
Contents
Summary
The border region between the United States and Mexico has fostered its share of surface-water conflict, from the Colorado River to the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo River. It has also been a model for peaceful conflict resolution, notably the work of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), the supra-legal body established to manage shared water resources as a consequence of the 1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty. Yet the difficulties encountered in managing shared surface-water pale in comparison to trying to allocate groundwater resources-each aquifer system is generally not understood as gathering information on aquifers is very costly and the science of groundwater is still inexact. This makes negotiations over a shared aquifer system very difficult. The complications of groundwater are exemplified in the border region between the United States and Mexico where, despite the presence of an active supra-legal authority since 1944, groundwater issues have yet to be resolved. Mentioned as vital in the 1944 Treaty, and again in 1973, the difficulties in quantifying the ambiguities inherent in groundwater regimes has eluded legal and management experts ever since. Even after three decades of having problems with the 1944 Treaty and groundwater issues, there does not appear to be a movement towards a new agreement referring to the United States-Mexican shared aquifers anytime soon, although Mumme[1] states that it is likely that "some form of systematic cooperation will emerge" between stakeholders in more local areas along the border.
Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework
Image 1. Map of shared (transboundary) aquifers between Mexico and U.S[2]
Background
The border region between the United States and Mexico has fostered its share of surface-water conflict, from the Colorado River to the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo River. It has also been a model for peaceful conflict resolution, notably the work of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), the supra-legal body established to manage shared water resources as a consequence of the 1944 US-Mexico Water Treaty. Yet the difficulties encountered in managing shared surface-water pale in comparison to trying to allocate groundwater resources-each aquifer system is generally not understood as gathering information on aquifers is very costly and the science of groundwater is still inexact. This makes negotiations over a shared aquifer system very difficult.
In a 1988 Center for U.S. - Mexican Studies Report, Mumme identified 23 sites in contention in six different hydrogeologic regions along the 3,300 kilometers of shared boundary.[3] While the 1944 Treaty mentions the importance of resolving the allocations of groundwater between the two states, it does not do so. In fact, shared surface-water resources were the focus of the IBWC until the early 1960s, when a U.S. irrigation district began draining saline groundwater into the Colorado River and deducting the quantity of saline water from Mexico 's share of freshwater. In response, Mexico began a "crash program" of groundwater development in the border region, to make up the losses.
The Problem
The complications of groundwater are exemplified in the border region between the United States and Mexico where, despite the presence of an active supra-legal authority since 1944, groundwater issues have yet to be resolved. Mentioned as vital in the 1944 Treaty, and again in 1973, the difficulties in quantifying the ambiguities inherent in groundwater regimes has eluded legal and management experts ever since.
Attempts at Conflict Management
Ten years of negotiations resulted in a 1973 addendum to the 1944 Treaty-Minute 242 of the IBWC, which limited groundwater withdrawals on both sides of the border, and committed each nation to consult the other regarding any future groundwater development. In all of the Minutes added to the 1944 Treaty since its inception, Minute 242 is still the only agreement between the two nations with regards to groundwater pumping.
Mumme states that there are three main reasons why Minute 242 has had trouble being advanced as its agreement intended.[1] First, and maybe most importantly, was that there was not the political support to carry out Minute 242. A rift between state and federal government over whose authority it was to control water rights played a key role and when there are 96 seats in the House of Representatives from the border region, this makes it difficult to pass any legislation going against those states. Secondly, it is possible that Minute 242 did not refer to groundwater quality in general, but more pointedly at salinity. This may have averted governments from pursuing appropriate studies. And third, the terms of reference of both Minute 242 and the 1944 Treaty are not very clear. The wording of the agreements does not have enough definition to promote decisive acts and leaves much to be questioned.
In 2006, the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Act was passed, which mandated the creation of a scientific program to inventory, map, and create hydrological models for aquifers along the U.S.-Mexico border. The act allows the secretary of the interior to work with the IBWC and states bordering Mexico developing projects which focus on "priority transboundary aquifers".
Outcome
Even after three decades of having problems with Minute 242 and groundwater issues, there does not appear to be a movement towards a new agreement referring to the United States-Mexican shared aquifers anytime soon, although Mumme states that it is likely that "some form of systematic cooperation will emerge" between stakeholders in more local areas along the border.[1]
The Arizona-Sonora Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Program is one of at least two programs started as a result of the TAAA. It is based out of the University of Arizona, and coordinates with stakeholders in the U.S. and Mexico to monitor and assess the San Pedro and Santa Cruz aquifers.
Issues and Stakeholders
Developing an equitable apportionment of shared aquifers between the United States and Mexico.
NSPD: Water Quantity, Water Quality, Governance, Assets
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Supranational union
The complications of groundwater are exemplified in the border region between the United States and Mexico where, despite the presence of an active supra-legal authority since 1944, groundwater issues have yet to be resolved.
Stakeholders:
- United States of America
- Mexico
- International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWCInternational Boundary and Water Commission)
Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight
Individuals may add their own Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight (ASI) to a case. ASI sub-articles are protected, so that each contributor retains authorship and control of their own content. Edit the case to add your own ASI.
Learn moreContributed by: Aaron T. Wolf, Joshua T. Newton, Matthew Pritchard (last edit: 12 February 2013)
Key Questions
Transboundary Water Issues: What mechanisms beyond simple allocation can be incorporated into transboundary water agreements to add value and facilitate resolution?
Even if conditions for agreement are good, this does not guarantee that issues will be resolved. It is testimony to the complexity of international groundwater regimes that despite the presence of an active authority for cooperative management, and despite relatively warm political relations and few riparians, negotiations have continued since 1973 without resolution.
Because uncertainty has played such a large role in influencing user behavior and thus the overexploitation of these transboundary aquifers, it is clear that institutions capable of collecting bias-free data on hydrologic parameters of water resources, and distributing this information to stakeholder on boh sides of the border, should be an integral part of future transboundary water agreements.
External Links
- Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (2012). Oregon State University. U.S./Mexico Shared Aquifers — The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) This website is used to aid in the assessment of the process of water conflict prevention and resolution. Over the years we have developed this Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, a project of the Oregon State University Department of Geosciences, in collaboration with the Northwest Alliance for Computational Science and Engineering.
- ^ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Mumme, S. (2004). Advancing binational cooperation in the transboundary aquifer management on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Paper presented at Groundwater in the West Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder.
- ^ Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found at: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/US_Mexico_Aquifer_New.htm
- ^ Mumme, S. 1988. "Apportioning Groundwater Beneath the U.S.- Mexico Border: Obstacles and Alternatives." Center for U.S.- Mexican Studies Report Series 45.