View source for Ilisu Dam Project, Turkey

{{Case Study
|Geolocation=37.524167, 41.843056
|Population=.078
|Area=57,614
|Climate=Semi-arid/steppe (Köppen B-type)
|Land Use=agricultural- cropland and pasture, conservation lands, urban, religious/cultural sites
|Water Use=Agriculture or Irrigation, Fisheries - wild, Hydropower Generation, Livestock
|Water Feature={{Link Water Feature
|Water Feature=Upper Tigris Basin (Turkey)
}}{{Link Water Feature}}
|Water Project={{Link Water Project
|Water Project=South Eastern Anatolia (GAP) Project
}}{{Link Water Project
|Water Project=Ilisu Dam
}}
|Agreement=
|REP Framework===Historical, Social, and Political Factors==

It is impossible to understand water issues in this basin without paying due attention to the longstanding political and social factors that shape life in the region. One of the most important of these factors is the basin’s population itself.

===A Century of Ethnic Conflict===

Southeastern Turkey is primarily inhabited by Kurds, members of an Indo-European ethno-linguistic group that consider themselves distinct from the Turkish-speaking majority of Turkey. Currently, between 9% to 13% of Turkey’s residents self-identify as Kurds (Garfield, 23). As Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have long aspired to a nation state of their own, the Kurds’ inclusion in modern day Turkey has posed existential problems for both the minority and the state. 

The Turkish Republic, which was founded in 1923 after a long war of independence against major European states, rests upon an ideology of secular nationalism that emphasizes the geographic, ethnic, and linguistic unity of the Turkish State (Robbins, 660). Turkish politics is also dominated by an ideological tendency toward centralized government control and state led economic development for the benefit of the Turkish people. The Turkish Government until 2002 denied the existence of a Kurdish identity and banned the use of the Kurdish language in the media official contexts (Garfield, 23). 

In response to what many Kurds feel has been political, economic, and ideological disenfranchisement, Kurdish communities have waged a number of uprisings against the Turkish state. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) waged a bloody insurgency against the state; in the years of strife between the insurgents and the Turkish government, tens of thousands were killed. (Estimates are disputed, but go as high as 40,000) Although recent changes of government have produced policy changes more favorable to Kurdish communities, relations between the Kurdish periphery and the Turkish center are characterized by mistrust and resentment. At the same time, the region remains severely underdeveloped, as evidenced by poor development indicators in almost all sectors (see Economics section below).

===State Development===

For leaders in the Turkish government, development of the region has a number of significant advantages. Projects within the GAP may boost the standard of living in the region and may serve to quiet discontent and agitation while improving the standing of the government in the eyes of the Kurdish population. While creating jobs and economic opportunities, the government hopes to reduce support for armed groups, particularly the PKK. In addition, the completion of the GAP project can be seen as an issue of national pride for the government that represents centralized control of the periphery, continuity of a project across multiple administrations, and top down development and control. In addition to the economic benefits that the entire country will derive from the project, many Turkish leaders hope to gain electoral boosts from their constituents as the project is completed (Carkoglu, 42).

Kurdish and local government leaders in the provinces affected by the GAP Project have complained of feeling left out of the development process. For many in Southeast Anatolia, the government is another attempt by the central government to exercise its muscle in the region at the expense of local interests. 

===Membership aspirations: the European Union===

Many Turkish leaders hope to incorporate Turkey into the European Union in the near future, and so there is considerable pressure on the Turkish Government to conform to standards and norms of the EU community. While Turkish leadership remains nationalistic and protective of state sovereignty, it is eager to prove itself a responsible state and a good candidate for EU membership.  


==Water Regime Information==

To date, there is no formal international agreement between the riparian states governing the use of the Tigris waters. While the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers have long been sources of tension of relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Tigris has often been eclipsed by the Euphrates in terms of discussion and negotiations because of the Euphrates’ relatively large flow. Thus, it seems that the lack of standing agreement on the water’s use has been less problematic for the Tigris than it has been for the Euphrates. Turkey has not guaranteed any minimum flow out of the country, but as of now, informal arrangements for the basic provision of water seem to suffice. (Yale, 176)

Attempts to forge international agreements governing the use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been undertaken in the 1920s, 1940s, and 1980s, but none produced a lasting regime. Syria, which is only riparian to 32 km of the river at its border, has limited opportunities to extract water from the Tigris and so has not made competition for its water a high priority (FAO) On the other hand, distribution of the waters of the Tigris have been a significant source of tension for Iraqi-Turkish relations. Despite Turkey’s claims that it has obtained consent from Iraq regarding the GAP, the Iraqi government denies this (KHRP, 2007, 3).

==Major Economic Factors==

Southeastern Turkey, under emergency rule until only recently and still a hotbed for occasional insurgent attacks, is a region that is severely underdeveloped. Across the region, literacy rates are lower, unemployment and fertility rates are higher than in the rest of the country, making it the poorest region of Turkey. In all major cities in the area, unemployment is estimated to be around 50% (Ronayne, 20). In 1997, the region’s per capita GDP was less than half the national average. In different provinces, between 21.8% and 44.7% of households fall below the poverty line (Unver, 1).  For the residents of the region, there is a need for infrastructure development and the opening of economic opportunities.
|Key Questions=
|Issues=
|Analysis and Synthesis={{Analysis and Synthesis
|Analysis===Problem Definition: a complex problem==
The Turkish government has defined the problem according to its development priorities nationwide and specifically in the Southern Anatolian Region. Its concerns and objectives are the national sufficiency in the generation of electrical power; the economic growth of the poorest region in the country; as well as a greater central control of the Kurdish region, which has been immersed in several decades of ethnical conflict. Because of its effects on other areas such as the environment, cultural heritage, etc., opposition and new agendas have entered the definition of the project. 

As Cohen and Davidson point out, the asymmetries between three levels of analysis (space, time and jurisdiction) present challenges for decision-making and governance; asymmetries bring up the question of which boundary choice is the most appropriate.  For this analysis, we have defined the problem from the National Turkish perspective as a first step, since it is the path the project has followed so far.  Nonetheless, the problem might and should be seen from a broader perspective in order to make better planning decisions.  

We may choose among different scales of analysis for watershed, problem-shed and policy-shed: space, time, jurisdiction or institutions.  For example, if we only choose a short time scale of two years after the construction phase is finished, we may leave out of the evaluation of longer term effects, such as sedimentation, loss of endemic life, new economic activities for the displaced population.  If we take a strictly local perspective (e.g. the Hasankeyf cultural site), we would concentrate on the archeological and cultural costs of this project, but leave out concerns of other archeological sites, potential international conflicts with Iraq and Syria, among many other issues.  So, whether how the problem and scale is defined is of outmost importance. 

Therefore, we consider that the problem should be analyzed taking in consideration its different dimensions and, for that, it first must be defined as a complex one due to its characteristics: 

First, it involves the interaction of natural, societal and political forces, which will be explained in the following section. Second, the social, natural and economic variables and processes that conform the network interact in such ways that they render unpredictable outcomes.  This makes it difficult to plan according to the project’s objectives with a pure engineering thinking approach.  

Second, these objectives might be met from a technical point of view (although there are concerns about the correct engineering projection), but other issues such as the social and environmental impact could put at risk the accomplishment of such objectives and pose new challenges for the economic development of the region. Also, there is a conflicting order in the possible arrangement of preferences for the solution of this problem. For some actors, such as the government, an engineering approach and power generation is a top priority, while for others, the conservation of cultural heritage is the greatest concern. Conflicting priorities complicate the arrival to a “scientific”, widely accepted decision.

Third, the network is open and continuously changing. This means that, although the plan for the construction of the dam has been done taking into account the elements at hand, there are several issues changing, like unpredictable climate conditions and social interactions. The former lead to challenges such as drought, while the latter to the presence of new social groups that articulate demands for specific outcomes, both nationally and internationally. 

A changing network is complicated by dynamic and porous boundaries; in other words, the watershed boundaries do not result in a closed system. Regarding the natural domain, elements such as upstream flows, sedimentation or drought are interconnected with the outcomes the Dam will produce. The effect of the inundation of 313 km2 of reservoir involves native and endangered species.  In social terms, the area hosts around 300 archeological sites and affects directly somewhere between 12,000 and 78,000 people. The complex links between economic activities such as agriculture and tourism, inundation, displacement and reallocation or migration to big cities, are difficult to foresee. These connections with further areas beyond the predicted boundary will create unexpected effects such as the need for public services and jobs in these big cities. 


==Suggestions on how to analyze the problem==

* We consider to be of the utmost importance to keep in mind larger problem and policy shed implications. Specifically, we consider the following additions to the Governmental definition of problem-shed and policy-shed:

* The problem-shed can be seen in a much broader sense because the case has generated national and international social participation aware of negative impacts beyond the recognition of the project as it is stated today.  Environmental concerns, social and archeological negative impacts will guide to unexpected outcomes and further decision making to face such challenges. They should form part of the problem-shed analysis of the project.
 
* A better definition of the problem and consequently a more efficient array of possible solutions depend on better modeling and data analysis enhancement. The GAP project was conceived in the 1950’s, when large-scale infrastructure projects were considered an answer for development. It is important that the project, initially designed in 1954, is updated with a profound use of new technologies and tools for data collection (Öngür). The best scenario-based approach for joint data finding is particularly relevant in a context of rapid technological change and uncertainty in the natural and political domain.

Furthermore, in 1997 when the Ilisu dam was finally in its way for implementation and once the agreement with the ECAs was done, the Terms of Reference for the project were thought in accordance with international standards. Nonetheless, a revision of the Terms of Reference (ToR) by external parties (Berne Declaration, WEED, ECA-Watch) found that still the ToR remained vague and lacked enough objective data. In order to meet with the World Bank environmental and social Safeguard policies, the impact assessments and resettlement plans must have been prior to the appraisal stage, and they weren’t ready at the time. There were also concerns about the existence of baseline information. 

* Before the withdrawal of international funding in 2009, the policy-shed involved the interaction with rules and commitments with the other policy structures such as the ECA’s, World Bank and OECD. The policy shed might be more complex and broader if it attracts funds of international actors again or generate negative outcomes that bring in other stakeholders (e.g. international tribunal intervention due to Iraqi complaints, Chinese funding, UNESCO’s pronunciation, etc.).  Authorities responsible for the project should be prepared to face such issues.

==Variables, Issues and Stakeholders==

===Complex problem, complex interactions===
The Turkish government originally defined the system as a compound of dams for hydropower generation and irrigation purposes for the Southeastern Anatolia region (the GAP project). It has been under development since its conception in the 1950s and the Ilisu dam is seen by the authorities as one of the last elements to complete such system. Nonetheless, this system engineering approach assumes clearly defined boundaries, components that interact in predictable ways, and interactions that can be solved with an engineering toolkit. The aim is to find an optimal solution in terms of quality, reliability and cost effectiveness, according to the parameters defined. 

Since, the cause-effect relationships and their interactions are unpredictable, systems engineering provides a clear reductionist approach to the problem. It will lead to unpredictable and misleading results with unintended consequences because the approach in itself is full with subjective assumptions that fail to see the broader picture. By understanding the system at its component level, it is very likely that we will not understand the system as a whole. 

In practice, the network of variables, issues and stakeholders is very complex. In order to identify as clearly as possible these interactions, the variables analyzed are categorized in three different domains according to their main characteristics: natural (ND), social (SD) and political (PD). The variables are identified in italics and the main issues they pose are described as part of the text for each variable. Finally, Table 1 summarizes these elements and link them to the stakeholders already described.

===(ND) Natural domain ===
====ND-1  Water quantity ====
The Tigris dams are used mainly for power generation and reduce the average flow of the river by 10%. In the case of the Euphrates River, dams diminish the flow by half. It is expected that the Ilisu dam will significantly decrease stream flow.  

The dam will alter the seasonal flow pattern of water by saving the spring flows and releasing them during the fall. Since there are no commitments to maintain minimum flows downstream, Syria’s and Iraq’s flows will be significantly reduced below historical levels, specially with the construction of a complementary dam, Cizre, closer to the Syrian border. The flow will be diminished even more by calculated water use for irrigation.

====ND-2  Water quality====
Regarding water quality, the project will contribute to salinization and to an increase of pesticide concentration because it will reduce the Tigris capacity to auto purify. It is possible to have euthrophication of the reservoir water derived from the down flow of agricultural chemicals and organic matter. The degraded water quality will affect the growth of fish and water life; it will mean poor drinking water quality and affect the suitability of for consumption of fish coming from the reservoir.  

Sedimentation will also affect the quantity of water stored at the reservoir and the capacity to generate energy. It will also increase “…flood levels, waterlogging, and increased channel migration along tributary rivers upstream.” (Phillips Williams & Assoc.)

====ND-3  Ecosystems  ====
The dam will impact 400 km of ecosystems developed along the Tigris and its tributaries (Botan, Batman and Salat), which will have further impacts downstream. Since, the material carried naturally by the river is useful for the productivity of the soil, without the natural flow, land will become less fertile for production and prone to salinization. Also, the dam’s storage capacity will be affected by the deposition of this material.  Data from previous dams in the GAP project reflect high numbers of land salinization in areas such as the Harran plains. Of course, these factors will have a negative impact in endemic species and wildlife. Anoxic conditions also generate greenhouse gas methane emissions. 

Ecological concerns are severe. Turkey has been affected by more of half a century of policies that disregard sustainability and prioritize the designed path for development. Challenges in this area are considerable and require a reconsideration of the institutional framework, policies, project quality standards and the involvement of local communities and non-governmental expertise.

 ===(SD) Societal domain===
====SD-1 Governance, Legal Framework and Institutions====
Turkey is bound by the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Waterways, whose purpose is to prevent significant negative impacts of projects on international waterways on other riparian countries. With its attempt to find financing mechanisms internationally, Turkey also committed to the compliment of international standards.  Nonetheless, Turkish national laws have conflicting points with such international legal framework.
* The national legal framework enables expropriation (Art, 27) even before the court cases are resolved. 
* The national law is not sufficiently paired with the World Bank’s General Principles on expropriation in issues such as “adequate” compensation to meet a similar income to the one they had before.  Also, expropriation and resettlement are being dealt as two separate processes by national laws and, according the project Experts Committee, specifically former World Bank expert Prof. Michael Cernea, they must be implemented as part of the same process. (CounterCurrent, 13).
* Basic principles and World Bank rules mandate the need for participation and consultation, something that gets in conflict with national law 2942, which enables expropriations without the participation of owners in several cases.   
* In general, environmental laws are being modified or ignored in favor of dam construction. The priority of the state is the development of the GAP project, an issue that puts at risks the richness of Turkey’s biodiversity (Sekercioglu et al)

====SD-2 Economy====
* Electricity production
The dam is planned to have a capacity of 1,200MW, and is expected to produce 3,800 GWh of hydroelectric power annually; it will also be used for irrigation. It is important to point out that Turkey’s demand increases 8% annually and sufficient energy is a concern for Turkey’s economic development. Nonetheless, the project will only cover 2% of the national electric power needs. 

It is important to say that the project is still based on data collected with technology 50 years ago. There are of course significant improvements in tools and technology for a better evaluation of the site, costs and conditions for building the dam. Ögür points out that the Ilisu Dam would not be as productive as others due to the specific location choice (for example, it will have a usage explotaition rate of 38% vs the Atatruk dam of 48% or the Karakaya dam 52%. (Ögür, 4)

* Job creation
According to the Turkish government, GAP will create 3.8 million jobs for the poorest area in the country, where unemployment rates are high and literacy rates are low. The population still relay on traditional activities such as cotton production, subsistence farming dependent on the river, tourism and small-scale family industries.  Still, the direct job creation by the dam construction is of less than 500 jobs (Ögür). After the construction is finished, displaced population will find it difficult to find other sources of income. For example, in the new settlement for Ilisu population, people were left without agricultural land to cultivate because there are no spare fields to occupy. Also, many were forced to sell their animals before moving out of their towns.  Alternative means of subsistence will depend on the efficacy with which the government promotes other development projects in the region. 

* Loss of agricultural land
The reservoir will flood 6,000 hectares of high quality agricultural land, classified as type one and two (Öngür). The lost area is bigger than the area provided for irrigation by the Project. Although, we may assume that through productivity increase through irrigation the same or more yields will be available, land may not be enough for the resettlement of displaced population.  Riparian and water rights in general will have to be figured out. Also, potential salinization and loss of fertility of agricultural areas could mean impoverishment in terms of productivity.  

* Diminished income
Compensation is not enough to buy a similar home and have a similar source of income after resettlement.  Many inhabitants will face a diminished income due to incurred debts in order to get a new property similar to the one left behind, since the resettlement programs are loan-based.  

====SD-3  Archeological / Cultural impact====
The Ilisu reservoir will flood Hasankeyf, a cultural site that could be part of Unesco’s World Heritage, as well as hundreds of other sites, including valuable remains of Neolithic civilization. Hasankeyf is a rich multicultural treasure lasting several centuries and has been protected by Turkish authorities as a conservation spot. An efficient plan for reallocation of Hasanleyf’s monuments is also a concern.  Furthermore, Hasankeyf is not the only site to be affected. 
   

====SD-4  Health concerns====
If water drops below the minimum level of operation (485 meters), the area exposed with humid areas and water pools is suitable for malaria and other water born diseases. It seems that this is a current problem in the dams already constructed by the GAP project: “at an average, 80% of diseases spread through water contagion in Turkey occur in the GAP region.” (Öngür, 4). 

===(PD) Political processes===
====PD-1 Power shift in favor of Turkey vis à vis its neighbors ====
The project will have enough spare capacity as to block water going downstream to Iraq and Syria, for several months. This will mean a possible political pressure in hands of Turkey and a strengthening of its bargaining position in the region.

====PD-2 Social control over East Anatolia Kurdish region.====
The armed conflicts between the Kurdish Workers’ Party PKK and the military forces of Turkey has created two processes: one, the perpetuation of lack of trust, fear and lack of participation of directly affected population; another, the government promotion of a centrally driven project that diminishes the power of conflicting Kurdish groups. The displacement of population and the potential development of other industries and economic projects in the region, enable the central government to get a tighter control over a conflicting and unruly area.
  
====PD-3 Alliances and pressures from international actors====
The Turkish government has been subject to pressures from European Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), European NGOs and social movements inside the country to redefine the project and comply with international standards. This was something outside the project’s foreseen course of action.  

==Stakeholders==
Regarding stakeholders, it is important to point out the role that groups from civil society have played in this case. NGOs and independent experts have influenced the course of events in the Ilisu Dam project. NGOs played a decisive role for ECAs to require the compliment with international standards and for the implementation of the Committee of Experts. Have the recommendations been followed by the Turkish parties, the project would have benefited from an adjustment process and better results.  Civil organizations have also been effective in the transmission of valuable up-to date information in the site. This provided a way to keep the decisions more appealing to reality and flexible, and link them at an international level with other organizations and institutions (NGOs, World Bank, etc.).  They also managed to institutionalize their action in an organized and plural way (for example, “Keep Hasankeyf Alive”).

The players involved have exercised a crucial role, although some of them were not considered at the beginning.  They all have helped to formulate a more consistent project and to avoid the implementation of a project with considerable negative effects.  The most relevant player that has been left out is the directly affected population: subsistence farmers and local workers that are dispersed and fear participation or opposition due to political reasons. 
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|User=Mark Rafferty
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|Abstract=The Ilisu Dam Project on the Tigris River in Turkey is one of the world’s most controversial hydropower projects. As part of the Turkish Government’s Greater Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), the project is intended to reduce Turkey’s high dependency on energy imports while developing the country’s poorest region. 

This case exemplifies a project where there is a need to promote a more inclusive and integral planning to reach better outcomes, both regarding different scales (time and space) and domains (natural, societal and political). Issues such as social and environmental impact will put at risk the accomplishment of objectives as seen by Turkey’s government (generation of electricity and water for irrigation) and pose new challenges for the economic development of the region. There is a conflicting order in the possible arrangement of preferences of the different actors involved. For some actors, power generation is a top priority, while for others, the conservation of cultural heritage is the greatest concern. 

There are several continuously changing issues, like unpredictable climate conditions as well as social interactions; the former lead to challenging contexts such as drought, while the latter lead to the articulation of new social pressure groups. The changing network is enforced by dynamic and porous boundaries; in other words, the watershed boundaries do not form a closed system. 
Finally, understanding context-specific information implies the involvement of local actors. Without doing so, it would be difficult to figure out efficient and stable solutions. In the Ilisu Dam, local involvement has been left aside due to the lack of trust after a history of civil conflict in the Anatolian Region. Additionally, there was no initial involvement of social and local representatives of environmental, cultural or economic matters. Although it was not a foreseen outcome, the government has been obliged to face pressure from non-governmental groups.  Now that they are part of the network of actors, both nationally and internationally, they have put at risk the financial viability of the project.

The present documentation of this case will identify the key processes taking place, as well as the actors involved.  It will highlight the elements of a Water Diplomacy Framework that are missing in the current management of the project.  Finally, it will identify some recommended intervention points for avoiding costly pitfalls in the development of the Basin.  

|Questions and Wisdom={{empty section box}}
}}