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E
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin +	The importance of water cooperation/economic development can supersede working with an oppressive regime. Even though Myanmar is controlled by a junta that is blamed for human rights violations, Thailand is still willing to cooperate with their government in order to promote regional management of the Salween River. For Thailand, the development of the Salween River and the benefits received from such development takes precedence over working with an oppressive regime. National sovereignty to protect water resources goes beyond international pressure.  +
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin +	Lack of inclusion of populations of a shared river basin in the decision-making processes may cause conflicts. The local populations in both Thailand and Myanmar have not been included in decision-making processes with regards to major hydroelectric projects. Whereas Thailand and Myanmar may work cooperatively to avoid conflict, large-scale projects may create or exacerbate intrastate conflicts.  +
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin +	Upstream nations with superior strength can hinder joint management of river basins. China, with far more military might and economic power than both Thailand and Myanmar combined, has little incentive to work jointly with them in the management of the Salween River. Thailand and Myanmar's water resources from the Salween may be at great risk depending on what China decides to do on the upper part of the river.  +
Efforts of Coordinating Joint Development of Hydropower Projects Within the Salween Basin +	Tensions are created when a country within a basin acts unilaterally without consulting other nations. Thailand and Myanmar have been working together for some time on the development of the Salween River basin, but China has been acting unilaterally, potentially constructing up to 13 dams on the upper stem of the river. Without working with the two downstream nations, China risks creating conflict with Thailand and Myanmar.  +
Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis +	A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states. The Central Asian Economic Community, now the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, played a key role in mediating between the Aral Sea Basin states when there were difficulties within the International Fund for the Aral Sea. Even though regional economic entities sometimes may be too narrow in their interests, they can provide a stability that basin states may otherwise not have.  +
Efforts to Resolve the Aral Sea Crisis +	Lack of trust and credibility can hinder the process of cooperation. It was apparent during the years of "dormancy" of the International Fund for the Aral Sea that issues of trust and credibility were having a severe effect on the functioning of the organization.  +
F
Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin +	Maritsa River is subject to great variations in its flow during flooding season, especially in the last 10-15 years. Flooding monitoring and early warning systems can be beneficial for all riparian states as flooding impacts agricultural and urban areas in all three parts of the basin. Yet, biggest beneficiaries will be downstream countries. There were initiatives funded by the EU in the past few years for technical expertise sharing through Bulgaria-Turkey cross border cooperation projects. Technical experts from DSI (Turkey) and NHMI (Bulgaria) met in several meetings, agreed on basic principles for sharing information and initiated plans to install monitoring stations on the Bulgarian side during 2006-2010 period. Subsequent to the completion of three separate EU projects during this period, Bulgaria started to share river flow and dam capacity data to Turkish government experts. However, fast paced developments for cooperation in the basin stalled after momentum in Turkey’s EU accession process is lost. Following three project conducted with EU cross-border funds, successive projects that were initially planned to complement and improve outcomes of previous projects were not executed. The primary reason is the inadequacy of EU cross-border cooperation funds that are allocated for a transboundary river basin shared with a non-EU country. After 2010, there are sporadic technical committee meetings organized by technical experts from Bulgaria and Turkey without an EU framework solely based on bilateral efforts. Under the current circumstances, steps to adopt good EU practices for flood prevention in other transboundary and trans-regional water basins of the EU can be taken. With EU’s political encouragement and financial support, a flexible tripartite plan between riparians for managing Maritsa River Basin can be enacted with regard to the EU Water Framework Directive. This plan can adopt good practices of river basin management and flood prevention plans in Elbe River Commission’s Flood Protection Action Plan, Ebro River Basin Plan and Rhine 2020 (for Rhine river basin). Also extending the scope of European Flood Alert System (EFAS) to Maritsa River basin can be suggested by the EU member states Greece and Bulgaria with support of candidate country Turkey. The limiting factor is Turkey’s reluctance to adopt EU WFD before acceding to the EU as a full member state and political hurdles to proceed with Environment Chapter in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.  +
Flood Management in Maritsa River Basin +	Until this date all agreements between riparians are bilateral and parties did not get involved in an effort to agree on a tripartite treaty or plan to manage and monitor water quantity or quality on Maritsa River basin. Treaties that will include mechanisms to address flood prevention, mitigating flooding risks, setting up early warning systems and concrete rules for data sharing is obligatory. However given the irregularity and unpredictability of the river flows in the basin in the last decade, these mechanisms must not be static and parties must embed follow-up efforts in treaties or agreements to assess the effectiveness of the provisions in the prospective tripartite agreement. First, experts from three riparian states for assessing and resolving technical issues related to flood forecasting, prevention and response must be meet in regular and ad hoc meetings. European Commission technocrats and technical experts from other multiparty European basins authorities facing flooding problems must join these meetings. These meetings must be supported by EU funds under cross-border cooperation programs in order to ensure stability and structure of the agreements. Second, non-governmental and non-technocratic stakeholders from the basin, such as local government representatives of cities with different sizes or farmers unions/cooperatives cultivating lands in the basin must be invited to both intergovernmental and technical meetings. Their inclusion would help decision makers to assess the reliability and effectiveness of any potential tripartite basin-wide flood risk management plans. With including this incentive to evaluate technical decisions with the input of different stakeholders, agreements and treaties retain a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability.  +
Forming A Groundwater Sustainability Agency for Salinas Valley +	'''Key Tools and Frameworks'''<br /> The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency. The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. For example, during the assessment, mediators observed that the region had a high degree of distrust and was hesitant about issues of representation so the facilitation team recommended the large, open groundwater stakeholder forum as a tool to vet and recommend the proposals that would ultimately move forward. Identifying stakeholders to participate in the process was also a critical tool or element of the process. Low trust and collaborative capacity among stakeholders emerged during the stakeholder assessment. The mediation team worked with interest groups to identify representatives that would have credibility to represent each interest in the smaller collaborative work group. The mediators met with representatives of agriculture to clarify different segments, such as berry growers and processors in addition to other agricultural interests. And, the mediators met several times with environmental organizations to help them understand the law and the negotiate representation. In addition, the mediators networked with different nongovernmental organizations and agencies to identify rural residential well owners and disadvantaged community representatives who might participate in the collaborative work group. Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and stakeholders informing one another about their interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions. Lastly, professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and negotiate outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. Transparency was another important element of success. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. The project had a web site (www.salinasgroundwater.org, now www.svbgsa.com) that was updated regularly with all materials and process information.  +
Forming Groundwater Sustainability Agencies for Sonoma County +	'''Key Tools and Frameworks''' The key tools that were essential to success in this process were the stakeholder issue assessment, stakeholder identification, collaborative problem solving, interest-based negotiation, professional mediation, and transparency. The stakeholder issue assessment was critical for defining the issues and concerns, identifying stakeholders to represent the key interests, and designing a process that was responsive to political dynamics and the task at hand. The impartial mediation and facilitation team was able to make recommendations on the process for going forward. Collaborative problem solving framework including interest-based negotiation were critical to this process. The process design focused on educating participants about the law and its requirements, and agencies informing one another about their stakeholders' interests. Understanding each other's’ interests was necessary so participants could craft solutions that were responsive to the range of interests engaged in the process. The participants used interest-based negotiation to identify and evaluate solutions. Professional mediators played an instrumental role in bringing agency stakeholders together and assisting with negotiations. The mediators created a process structure in which the parties were able to engage productively and consider outcomes that considered all the perspectives being shared. Amongst other outcomes, this resulted in Advisory Boards for each GSA where agricultural, rural, and environmental interests are represented and can oversee the process of achieving long-run groundwater sustainability. Transparency was another important element of success. The mediators also worked to engage the broader public along the way, scheduling groundwater stakeholder forum meetings for the public and preparing communication materials on the web site and for work group members to share with constituents. The communication tools helped to engage the broader community, raising awareness and creating widespread support. All meetings were open to the public. A website ([http://sonomacountygroundwater.org/ sonomacountygroundwater.org]) continues to document ongoing progress by each GSA and provides notifications about prior and upcoming meetings.  +
G
Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal +	China'a indisputable Nine-Dash Line claim has caused contentions among the stakeholders. The initiation of an arbitration process, thought to have equalized the situations has, on the contrary, created a serious zero-sum game and strained relations between the parties.  +
Geopolitics of South China Sea: The Arbitral Tribunal +	There are existing agreements in place which do necessarily provide useful mobilization for equitable share and development of the South China Sea region due to its rigid and formal structure.  +
I
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians +	The greater the international involvement in conflict resolution, the greater the political and financial incentives to cooperate. The pace of development and cooperation in the Mekong River watershed over the years has been commensurate with the level of involvement of the international community. Early accomplishments were impressive, impelled in part by strong UN support and a "Mekong Spirit" on the part of the "Mekong Club" of donors. By the 1970s, the pace of cooperative development began to slacken, partly the result of decreasing involvement by an international community daunted by political obstacles and the size of planned projects.  +
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians +	Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.  +
Integrated Joint Management Agreements of Mekong River Basin Riparians +	Emphasizing data collection in advance of any construction projects, one both sets the hydrographic stage for more efficient planning, and also may establish a pattern of cooperation through relatively emotion-free issues. The insistence of the Wheeler Mission that extensive data-gathering precede any construction made both management and political sense.  +
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States +	The parties defined some of the key aspects of their deal with relative vagueness. Some of this could have been intentional, so that both countries’ home governments would be able to interpret the agreement in different ways. This allowed negotiators to ‘sell’ the deal to their internal constituencies and also gave them the time they needed to conduct further studies that allowed them to adjust the details of the agreement during implementation. Yet, some ambiguity in the agreement was not helpful. For example, there was disagreement after the treaty was signed as to who should bear the cost of transferring Jordan’s water. According to Israel, Jordan was responsible for the additional cost since the water was for its benefit. Not surprisingly, Jordan did not agree. This highlights the two sides of the ‘ambiguity coin.’ On one side, ambiguity helped allow for some measure of adaptive management. At the same time, the tensions that were not resolved during the negotiations did not go away.  +
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States +	'''Lessons Learned from the Johnston Plan''' Separating resource issues from political interests may not be a productive strategy when the parties have a history of conflict. Eric Johnston took the approach that the process of reaching a rational watershed management plan: # May, itself, act as a confidence-building catalyst for increased cooperation in the political realm, and # May help alleviate the burning political issues of refugees and land rights. By approaching peace through water, however, several overriding interests remained unmet in the process. The plan finally remained unratified mainly for political reasons. Issues of national sovereignty which were unmet during the process included: * The Arab states saw a final agreement with Israel as recognition of Israel, a step they were not willing to make at the time. * Some Arabs may have felt that the plan was devised by Israel for its own benefit and was 'put over' on the U.S. The plan allowed the countries to use their allotted water for whatever purpose they saw fit. The Arabs worried that if Israel used their water to irrigate the Negev (outside the Jordan Valley), that the increased amount of agriculture would allow more food production, which would allow for increased immigration, which might encourage greater territorial desires on the part of Israel. '''Lessons Learned from the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty''' The 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty includes a number of useful trades, as the two parties were able to use water storage technology to “enlarge the pie”. Israel was allowed to pump an extra 20 MCM/yr during the winter from the Yarmouk (in addition to the 25 MCM/yr it was allocated each year), in return for a promise to transfer the same amount to Jordan from Lake Tiberias during the summer. The package offered to Jordan two additional value creating opportunities: the first was the building of two storage dams, while the second was a commitment on the behalf of Israel to jointly seek new sources of water for Jordan up to 50 MCM.  +
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States +	Issues of national sovereignty can manifest itself through the need for each state to control its own water source and/or storage facilities. The Johnston Plan provided that some winter flood waters be stored in the Sea of Galilee, which is entirely in Israeli territory. The Arab side was reluctant to relinquish too much control of the main storage facility. Likewise, Israel had the same kinds of reservations about the creation of a "water master" with international-level control of resources within their territory.  +
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States +	Including key non-riparian parties can be useful to reaching agreement; excluding them can be harmful. Egypt was included in the Johnston plan era negotiations because of its preeminence in the Arab world, and despite its non-riparian status. Some attribute the accomplishments made during the course in part to President Nasser's support. In contrast, pressure after the negotiations from other Arab states not directly involved in the water conflict may have had an impact on its eventual demise. Iraq and Saudi Arabia strongly urged Lebanon, Syria and Jordan not to accept the Plan. Perhaps partially as a result, Lebanon said they would not enter any agreement that split the waters of the Hasbani River or any other river. Along with political entities, many interests affected by river management were not included in the process. These included NGO's, public interest groups, and environmental groups. Perhaps as a consequence, the entire river was allocated, without consideration of in-stream usage.  +
Integrated Management and Negotiations for Equitable Allocation of Flow of the Jordan River Among Riparian States +	All of the water resources in the basin ought to be included in the planning process. Ignoring the relationship between quality and quantity, and between surface- and groundwater, ignores hydrological reality. Groundwater was not explicitly dealt with in the Plan, and is currently the most pressing issue between Israel and Palestinians. Likewise, tensions have flared over the years between Israel and Jordan over Israel’s diverting saline springs into the lower Jordan, increasing the salinity of water on which Jordanian farmers rely.  +
Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality +	In 2003, the ICPDR set out to define the Danube River Basin Strategy for Public Participation in accordance with the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). This move is a breakthrough in cooperation over international river basins. The importance of public participation in river basin development decisions is well understood by water resource management bodies, but the ICPDR's attempt at formulating a detailed strategy is the first of its kind. The strategy emphasized that public participation must to start immediately (2003), so that future management plans could be based on commonly supported initiatives. This meant that it was a work in progress, but a good model on which other large, diverse river basins' management teams could base their own public participation strategies. It is structured according to the Water Framework Directive requirement of four levels of public participation that are necessary to obtain valuable comprehensive input: # International: among the basin countries # National Level: deals with the implementation strategies and management plans. # Sub-Basin Level: various pilot projects at different parts of the basin # Local Level: where the WFD is actually implemented. Each phase of the strategy contains activities at each level of participation. For example, in the Preparatory Phase (2003-2004), activities at the international level concentrate on cooperation and organizational analysis of ICPDR with regard to public participation. Activities at the national level focus on the establishment of government structures to coordinate public participation. At each level potential stakeholders are defined by sub-basin, village and/or economic group, and trainings on the theory, implementation and responsibility for engaging in public participation will be held for management officials from high level, ministerial conferences to trainings for local water providers. At the international level, Phase One (2004-onwards) of the strategy emphasizes the dissemination of information about public participation to all stakeholders through the improvement of web pages dealing with the Danube, the organization of hearings for all interested parties and the declaration of June 29 as "Danube Day," as well as the creation of a structure with in the ICPDR to facilitate public participation. Activities at the national, regional and local levels in Phase One involve analysis of the local environmental situation, development of action plans and the creation of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Phase Two (2004-onwards) is designed to assess activities in Phase One and make adjustments to the original strategy. Phase Three (2004-onward) activities will focus on implementing the adjustments needed (as defined in Phase Two) such as developing regional frameworks for water councils, the integration of key stakeholders into discussions on program objectives. In Phase Four (2005-onwards), the revision of dissemination materials will continue, evaluations of public participation will be made and feedback mechanisms created.  +
Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality +	The degree of cooperation among representatives of participating governments, and the importance given to public participation in developing the SAP, mark significant achievements in promoting regional cooperation in water resources management. Ultimately, the success of this process will be revealed by the degree to which the goals, strategies, and targets set in the agreement are implemented "on the ground." It is one thing to agree to goals and targets in timeframes; it is another thing to, for example, agree to shut down a polluting factory, or to create and enforce industrial wastewater pretreatment standards, or to develop rigorous monitoring and enforcement regimes. Additionally, because agreement signatories are at the Ministerial level in the water sector (vs. at the level of the Foreign Minister), it is not clear if the agreement has the force of an international treaty behind it.  +
Integration of a Basin-Wide Framework for Protecting Danube Water Quality +	The use of public participation within the Strategic Action Plan of the [http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/531ENG.pdf International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR)] since its inception in 1994 has permitted the basin states of the Danube to move forward rather quickly with several initiatives.  +
International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin +	If riparian states start cooperation from the outset of a conflict, instead of letting it create stronger positions, the economic and joint management prospects are much greater. Since 1969, the quantity of joint economic ventures in the La Plata Basin has allowed for increased cooperation between the riparian nations when many times conflict could have arisen and defeated the benefits the states are receiving today.  +
International Joint Development of The La Plata River Basin +	If riparian states agree to equal access to transboundary water resources, equal and joint management, investment and distribution of that resource is feasible. In the water resources sector, neither Brazil nor Argentina has used their economic or military superiority to maintain greater control over water resources or hydroelectric potential.  +

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