Short and Long Term Solutions for Water Problems in Gaza

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Contributed by:Christine Buesser

Article last edited 25 Jun 2014 by Christine.Buesser
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Even though a complete moratorium on groundwater extraction would be ideal, it is not realistic as long as there are no others solutions operational to at least address the loss in water supply from the aquifer. However, an immediate priority should be to dramatically reduce current groundwater abstraction rates in order to reverse the damage being done to the Coastal aquifer underlying Gaza. The PWA’s short-term strategy aims to reduce the total groundwater abstraction in Gaza to about 150 MCM/ year in order to bridge the gap between water supply and demand.This would allow the aquifer to gradually replenish itself predominantly through natural recharge. However, a complete replenishment of the aquifer can only be achieved if the total abstraction is further reduced to about 70 MCM/ year and if the agricultural needs can be met with treated wastewater.

Hence an affordable alternative water supply must be found to meet the water needs of Gaza’s residents. The options are limited as a result of Israel’s continuing blockade; however, in discussion with multiple stakeholders in Gaza, the following interventions are being considered:

• Water Demand Management
  • Upgrade of pipe work and repair of infrastructure to reduce system losses (leakage/ infiltration) and deliver high-quality water for domestic use by consumers
  • Development of wastewater reuse and higher water use efficiencies in the agricultural sector
  • Management of domestic and agricultural water consumption
• Collection and re-infiltration of rain and storm water
• Seawater desalination both in the short-term (to create relatively low water volumes for blending back to limited quantities of groundwater, for domestic use by residents of Gaza), and in the much longer term to assure a consistent supply of high-quality water for the expanding population
• Additional low-volume water imports from Israel or other countries; it is important to note that the PWA does not consider the additional water from Israel a reliable and major source of water for Gaza (because of political interference by the Israeli government).

As per the CSO-G report recommendations, a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) with the support of the Austrian government was established in September 2013 to seek funding for the water strategy work plan and monitor the implementation of the above-mentioned interventions. Four people (water supply, media, monitoring and water health experts) are working in the PCU and are supported by the PWA. A technical consultant was hired by the Austrian government to review the work plan and report on the activities and their respective performance.

In addition, a water and health monitoring project was started, integrating the various ongoing efforts of this type into a more coherent package and ensuring that reliable data are available to drive the interventions, and to monitor their success. The Terms of Reference (ToR) to make the base line water quality study was finalized to try to establish links between the water quality and the various diseases.

Finally, a comprehensive review should be completed of the use of water and the economic returns from water - in the agricultural sector in Gaza. This should seek to minimize water use and maximize economic returns.

Water Demand Side Options (Domestic and Agricultural Use)

Domestic Use Water Demand Management (WDM)

Water demand has to be managed by regulating demand at the domestic consumer level, through the use of diverse economic instruments and water-saving measures. However, not all of these general principles are relevant to the Gaza scenario. The possibilities for reducing water use in the domestic sector in Gaza are limited. .

Many of the Gaza population presently consume less than the recommended minimum volume of fresh water as established by the WHO, this being either 100 or 150 lpc/ day. Therefore, the focus should be on addressing the leakages in the system, the water thefts and inefficiencies to create some improvements because the domestic consumers cannot be expected to reduce their water consumption by a significant margin under the current circumstances. According to the PWA in Gaza, if the system efficiency is increased by 20%, then 20 to 30 MCM of water/ year could be saved. At the moment this is an ongoing activity with only small improvements hence more needs to be done. Major investments in the distribution networks (leakage detection, illegal connection detection, pressure management, pressure districts, etc.), improving the service providers’ performance and/or efficiency in technical, administrative and financial components and at the customer connection level are needed. The problems with leakage and infiltration are much less intractable in Gaza in relation to the agricultural use of groundwater, compared to domestic water supply. Where leakage occurs, the flows generally recycle into the groundwater and infiltration is of much less importance in the agricultural sector, as there are far less constraints on water quality at the point of use. Therefore, provision of pipe work in the agricultural sector in Gaza is secondary and should instead focus upon the accelerated introduction of the reuse of wastewater.

In addition, service providers are not big and financially sound enough to improve the capacity to increase collection efficiency and there are no regulations to force people to pay for water (A. Al Yaqoubi, personal communication, May 01, 2014). However, in order to make any significant infrastructure investments interesting enough for donors, the sustainability aspect has to be addressed. Hence the tariffs and the collection rates would have to be improved in order to cover the operational and maintenance costs of any such project into the future. The political climate is as such that Hamas is not involved in the business of water and/ or infrastructure and there is no pressure from the government to increase tariffs or make consumers pay. The use of higher tariffs to attempt to reduce water consumption would also be of little or no benefit, especially at the current levels of poverty in Gaza (no income with 40% of people below the poverty line). It costs roughly 200 ILS/ family/ month for water and taxes an amount, which is unaffordable to many Gazan families. However, PWA with support of the World Bank just finished the ToR to survey households in Gaza to see the capability and willingness to pay for services such as electricity, water, etc. (PWA, personal communication, May 01, 2014). The PWA and the World Bank hope to understand the underlying causes of this deficiency: Are customers not paying because of the bad services, sheer lack of willingness and/ or because they are simply too poor? Could the tariffs be increased for some parts of the population?

The survey will also help to see if the installation of prepaid meters could be an option for the water sector to increase the collection of bills. However, it should be based on a cross-subsidized model. This is currently being done in the power sector in Gaza and it seems to be working because it does not present a lot of money.

SWOT: Water Demand Management

Strengths/ Opportunities

Weaknesses/ Threats

Domestic water supplies: potential reduced system losses (renovated/ re-supplied distribution system) Agricultural water supplies: potential attention to irrigation techniques and cropping patterns Sector education possible where groundwater use is high: domestic users have been educated in the appropriate use of different types of water; and farmers have been encouraged to reduce their rates of groundwater abstraction and to commence the utilization of treated wastewaters

As a whole, the institutional system of service providers has to be improved, which has to be accompanied by a reform of the water sector whereby responsibilities are divided into many levels: strategic and policy level done by the PWA/ regulatory body (1st level), bulk water utility responsible for supply water to service providers (2nd level), service providers (3rd level) This proposal is currently in the Cabinet but has not been endorsed yet If the domestic water distribution system in Gaza is not adequately upgraded and maintained, most consumers will experience little change in the water quality (or quantity) available to them hence they are less likely to start paying for water If the improvements in the agricultural sector are not realized, further degradation of the groundwater will continue to erode agricultural productivities A 20% increase in system efficiency is not an easy task and they have to be met within twenty years (i.e. by 2032)

WDM - Wastewater treatment for Agricultural Use

Domestic flows would be treated and reused for agricultural needs. The reuse of treated wastewater is a very important component because approximately half of the current fresh water use in Gaza is allocated to the agricultural sector. While interventions pertaining to the domestic use of water will serve to reduce the abstraction pressure on the groundwater to some extent (especially when the regional desalination facilities come on-line), the introduction of wastewater reuse will be an exceptionally important component of any reduction in the present over-abstraction of groundwater. Nevertheless, according to Clemens Messerschmid, wastewater reuse cannot solve the drinking water crisis (due to the poor quality of effluents) and can only be an optimization of, and an addition to, existing agricultural supplies.

Over the last decade, a number of small-scale reuse schemes have been developed for experimentation and demonstration purposes (House of Water and Environment [HWE], no date). The results of these experiments (plus those of the regional experience) provide sufficient proof for the programs to evolve into the next stage: medium-sized pilot projects. In order to mobilize the farmers more rapidly, awareness-raising campaigns have to continue to be conducted to inform potential users of the benefits and safety of water reuse. For example, MoA and Ministry of Health (MoH) have to produce a limited list of crops for which irrigation with wastewater is permitted and considered safe and with efficient irrigation system.

There are already three large Wastewater Treatment Plants (WWTPS) in place in Gaza (Beit Lahiya, Gaza and Rafa) and additional high-quality capacities are under construction. All the existing WWTPS in Gaza Strip are function at moderate efficiency rates (45-70%); they also operate above their actual capacity and are in need of upgrade and maintenance. The biological treatment is not done in a proper way and they do not have facility to absorb the water for re-use.

Hence, the reuse of treated wastewaters depends fundamentally on the completion of the following high-quality WWTPS.

• North Gaza WWTP (35,000 m3/ day) should have been put in operation by end of 2012. Delay due to restrictions on delivery of equipment and materials, access to site and the provision of a three MW power supply from Israel. Its reuse and recovery scheme is also delayed due to funding, land acquisition of small parts (affected by the internal division) and the very conservative environmental concerns of donors. Additional 7 MW power supply is needed as well.
• Gaza and Middle area WWTP (120,000 m3/ day) has been delayed since 2003 due to initial security concerns because it is situated close to the ‘Green Line’. There is an agreement between the PWA and its Israeli counterpart where Israel approved the location hence there should not be any security problems anymore. Recently engineering works have resumed to revise designs and can be put into operation by 2018 under optimistic scenarios. Additional Power supply of 6.5 MW will be needed.
• South Khan Younis WWTP (26,000 m3/ day) has been delayed since early 2000. Recently an agreement to bridge the fund deficit is furnished between Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to complement an available fund from Japan. It is anticipated that the project can be functional by 2017. Additional 1.8 MW of energy is needed. Reusing the treated effluent still lacks funding.

Even though the international community has invested in the building of three large regional sewage treatments facilities with the treatment plant for northern Gaza completed since September last year, no treatment plant is able to operate as long as Gaza has insufficient electricity supply to power them.

SWOT: Wastewater Treatment

Strengths/ Opportunities

Weaknesses/ Threats

Farmers in Gaza are willing to utilize treated wastewaters for irrigation, if flows of the relevant volume are made available Wherever large scale wastewater reuse is carried out, scientific monitoring will be conducted by an approved laboratory Instituting such monitoring will help minimize any potentially detrimental impacts on the environment and, more specifically, on the soil and underlying aquifers Opportunity for a strategic review to increase the economic water productivity (the economic return generated per cubic meter of water allocated to the sector in Gaza): Increase drip irrigation Conjunctive use of Green Water and Blue Water Production of high-value crops for export to generate income to support importation of staple foods Under the umbrella of the trilateral cooperation organized by the Middle East Desalination Research Center, Israelis are giving wastewater and desalination training to Palestinian professionals and technicians

Restrictions on delivery of materials and movement of people, which will delay any project Insufficient energy supply to operate WWTPS in Gaza; dependency of additional energy from Israel Sustainability of implementation is the main issue for donors (who covers the running costs/ maintenance?) For example, the North Gaza treatment plant is finished but there is no power and even if there is power, Gaza does not have the money to cover the running costs/ maintenance For the pilot wastewater reuse schemes to be augmented, the major wastewater treatment plants scattered throughout Gaza need to be completed, as reuse cannot be introduced at any significant scale in the absence of high-quality wastewater treatment If the wastewater treatment facilities cannot be completed in a short period of time, there will be no significant volumes of treated wastewater appropriate for reuse, and the farmers will simply continue to over-pump the groundwater (increasing the deficit of fresh water) Policy-level issues have not been addressed yet (coherent policy regarding wastewater use needs to be put in place) Environmental Limit Values (standards and guidelines) Right-of-use Tariff-setting mechanism

Domestic Use Supply Side Options

Desalination of seawater

For over 20 years, a major desalination plant for Gaza has been discussed, but nothing has been done mainly because of insecurity and political instability (for example, there was the withdrawal of an American obligation to fund the construction of a desalination plant)..

A 2011 CSO-G report concluded once more that regional desalination should be a priority for Gaza. Seawater desalination plants coupled with wastewater reuse in the agricultural sector are important as they reduce the present levels of over-abstraction of the groundwater. A big desalination project takes time and a significant amount of money hence short-term, low volume (STLV) desalination is relevant because relatively small volumes of desalinated water can be produced rapidly to address the drinking water problems. However, the STLV desalination cannot solve the existing problems of the over-abstraction of the aquifer.

Therefore, the current water strategy includes building three STLV desalination plants with a total of 13 MCM/ year for emergency needs to improve quality of water and a regional high-volume desalination plant with a total of 55 MCM/ year (that can be expanded later on) to be completed by 2017.

The location and capacity of the STLV desalination plants were defined in conjunction with the central desalination plant. As of May 2014, the EU has given the funding (10 million euros) to start building one of the three plants with a capacity of 2 MCM/ year; if more money can be made available, the capacity could be increased. The project is currently in the design phase and the idea is to blend the reservoir with the groundwater and then the water is redistributed to consumers. This plant will be serving 75,000 inhabitants (5% of Gaza) and the costs for consumers will increase from 1.5 ILS - in that area the price is already higher in comparison to Gaza city where the current price is 1 ILS - to 2 ILS. System losses should be improved (40% of losses are not acceptable) and PWA hopes to get 75% of system efficiency.

The US$ 450 million regional project has support from Israel and the major donor countries. The plant site has been secured (along the coast) and preliminary negotiations are under way with development banks: IDB has committed 50% of the total costs but the bank wants other countries (e.g. EU) to commit the other 50% as they consider this project a priority. As of May 2014, there is still a funding gap with only the French government having committed an additional 10 million euros.

Due to the current political (Gaza blockage) and economic environment (no income), there are many valid concerns of the feasibility and sustainability of such a big project. Hence a project implementation consultant (PIC) was contracted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in January 2014 for 24 months to conduct additional studies and surveys (including energy options) in addition to the preparation of design-build tender documents. Power is a very big issue and a real concern of all the donors given the 40% energy deficit in Gaza with only eight hours of energy/ day. Without electricity, water facilities/ wells cannot pump hence fuel is needed, which is too expensive. The consultant was specifically asked to look into the options of covering the additional power needs of 35 MW. As energy cannot be delinked from any desalination project, PWA is asking donors to also include money for energy. Another PIC will be recruited through the World Bank support on the associated projects side including the North South main water carrier, the reduction of Non-Revenue water and the Energy Supply.

According to multiple Gazan stakeholders, the regional desalination plant is a very difficult project. Just getting the EU-funded STLV plant into the design phase was a huge challenge given the donor’s skepticism. However, once this plant is operational, it will give an idea of the performance in terms of operations, maintenance, recovering the costs, etc. One of the staff of the PWA in Gaza said the following: “If we do not succeed with this small plant, then everything else will be a big problem hence it is like a test case at the very small scale.”

As far as Clemens Messerschmid is concerned, the desalination solution is misleading, not only because it is entirely unecological and unaffordable for Gaza’s impoverished population but also because it is expensive. Israel advertises desalination as the solution for the chronic water conflict also out of its interest not to share any of its existing fresh water use with the Palestinian co-riparians. Unfortunately, for pragmatic-political reasons more and more donor states start advocating this unfair and wasteful option, because they consider the simple alternative as politically not "enforceable" or "unrealistic": to pressure Israel to at least partly sell some of its surplus in the south to Gaza.

The question becomes what the alternative to a regional desalination plant would be in order to have the same positive effects on the aquifer. According to one person at the PWA in Gaza, there is a solution for delaying the problem, which is far from ideal: increase the number of the wells to redistribute the abstraction to many wells and to minimize the water level decline and the seawater intrusion by some extent. However, it will be expensive to add wells and to re-configure the system.

SWOT: Desalination

Strengths/ Opportunities

Weaknesses/ Threats

Historical reticence of the Palestinian authorities to introduce desalination in Gaza has softened in recent years Adds ‘new water’ to the equation in Gaza, which is highly desirable (unlike desalination from brackish groundwater) Gaza Strip borders the Mediterranean Sea, a nearly unlimited source of saltwater Seawater desalination technologies are mature and there are competing manufacturers of reliable equipment on the market (many of them with good track records of producing desalination plants of the same category as those planned in Gaza) Economies of scale and improvements in reverse-osmosis technology have reduced the price of desalinated water significantly STLV are a rapid response till LTHV plant is operational (at least 6 years) There are several small pilot plants already operating, most sponsored by international agencies, but they can meet only a fraction of present demand Good political security of supply (desalinator and pipelines) as under Palestinian control; infighting would need control High likelihood of external capital financing assistance as seen as humanitarian assistance Under the umbrella of the trilateral cooperation organized by the Middle East Desalination Research Center, Israelis are giving wastewater and desalination training to Palestinian professionals and technicians

Difficulties in attracting investors: Conflict and risks of Israel targeting the installation as it previously did with the Gaza power station Sustainability concerns (no money to pay for operation and maintenance costs in the long run) Significant delays of project approval by the Israeli Civil Administration (on average a project is on hold for 9 months) Restrictions on delivery of materials and movement of people cause additional project delays Do not make Gazans independent from Israel; desalination plants with their sophisticated and sensitive technology are far more vulnerable and dependent on steady, reliable supplies of spare parts and raw materials (chemicals) for their operation Desalination plants require large amounts of electricity, which is in short supply in Gaza, where much of the power is still provided by Israel’s utility company Leaves Palestinians even more dependent on uninterrupted energy supplies or fuel imports than ever before More energy efficient to sell additional water than having desalination in Gaza Expensive: a cubic meter of normal drinking water from Mekorot in Israel costs 2, 86 ILS (including VAT) pumped as bulk supply to the entrance of Gaza; the cheapest desalinated sea water is to be had for approximately 4 ILS Supply to consumers of high-quality (and relatively expensive) water arising from desalination will only be successful if the current leakage/ infiltration rates are minimized Physical security of pipelines and desalinator is challenged: effects of Israeli incursions; possibly also effects from Palestinian infighting Civil society concerned that Palestinian loose water rights in the negotiations if they become self-sufficient Environmental impact of brine; potential negative impact on livelihood of fishermen

Desalination of brackish groundwater

Even though desalination from brackish groundwater is cheaper and requires less energy than desalination from seawater, it is not a feasible option in the current context. Water managers in Gaza feel strongly that the groundwater abstraction rates must be reduced as a first priority.

Using surface water

Collection and re-infiltration of rain and storm water can contribute to increase the recharge of the aquifer as well as grey water availability during the winter months outside of the agricultural season. However, given the limited amount of rainfall this option cannot be expected to have a large impact; nevertheless, is worth looking into how much money and time would have to be invested to upgrade or expand the existing infrastructure. After the last big storm in Gaza in December 2013 (storm Alexa), the PWA and other stakeholders started to react and have come up with a plan for rain and storm water collection and re-infiltration. Many stakeholder meetings were held to understand the different possibilities and the optimal locations for additional rain and storm water collection have been identified Smaller-scale rain and storm water collection and re-infiltration projects are already being implemented. There is also a plan for a big-scale project to be implemented, which includes the upgrading of the current re-infiltration basins and the construction of a new infiltration basin. The two existing re-infiltration basins that are there to avoid flooding of Gaza city need to be upgraded to make them more effective in terms of the rain and storm water being infiltrated to the groundwater (to recharge the Coastal aquifer). During storm Alexa, the basins could not absorb the high rainfall quantity hence Gaza city was flooded.

Water Transfer for Domestic Use

One report suggests considering towing icebergs from the Antarctic to provide fresh water to Gaza, which cannot be serious.

Under normal circumstances, importing and exporting water (and using transboundary water) is the normal way to address unequal water resources among regions and countries. This is not the case for the State of Palestine. Agreements can only be sought with neighbors on importing and exporting water in order to meet the customer demand with the most cost effective options only after obtaining the rights on groundwater and surface water resources, according to international law. The principles of customary international water law, which binds all States, whether or not they have signed specific conventions, support a case that the Gaza population should receive a much higher volume of fresh water from the resources shared with Israel to date.

In the absence of a peace agreement with Israel, buying water from Israel and its allies cannot be a very reliable and major source of water for Gaza because of the political landscape. Moreover, some of the solutions to buy water for example from Turkey (via ‘medusa bags’ or tankers) are not feasible from a financial/ economic point of view.

Transfer from Israel

Gaza currently imports and pays for some of its water (5 MCM/ year) from the Israeli water utility (Mekorot), which is stipulated in Oslo II. This represents only 3% of the region’s water consumption. Israel is under an obligation to supply an additional 5 MCM/ year but this has been under negotiations for many years and blocked due mostly political reasons. However, a financial protocol was signed in 2013 whereby both countries agreed on upon a price. Moreover, in 2013, one of the INGOs working in Gaza agreed to fund the installation of the pipeline 130 meters in length at the 1967 border between Gaza and Israel) to secure the additional water flow, which was completed in January 2014. However, as of May 2014, the additional water is still not flowing from the Israeli side. Different sources state that Israel makes the additional 5 MCM/ year conditional upon the Palestinians reactivating the JWC, which has not been properly functioning for more than two years, and reviving the project approval discussions in the JWC. However only the West Bank and not Gaza is part of the JWC. Palestinians do not want to reactivate the JWC because they do not agree with the JWC’s concept, purpose and objectives. Israel wants the State of Palestine to approve WATSAN projects in the settlements situated in the West Bank, which the Palestinians cannot approve as it would legitimize the settlements.. The United States asserts that it will do its best to encourage Israel to provide Gaza water, but then nothing happens.

Given the fact that even low volume transfers - such as the additional 5 MCM/ year - from Israel to Gaza keeps falling due to the politics, the PWA does not anticipate any significant increase in water import from Israel. Moreover, Mekorot itself is becoming increasingly reliant on expensive desalination water. Israel has expressed willingness to increase water sales to Gaza, but the price could be rather high. Moreover, negotiations with Mekorot are tainted by the complex political relationship between the two countries. Hence the Mekorot water resource is an option that needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis through a commercial agreement, but not as a general source of water for the State of Palestine.

SWOT: Fresh Water Transfer from Israel

Strengths/ Opportunities

Weaknesses/ Threats

Low-volume transfer from Israel/ increased supply from the Israeli National Water Carrier might be possible in the medium to longer-term (from nearby Ashkelon desalination plant?) Data and conclusions from Permanent Status negotiations show that Palestine as a whole has significant rights in the region extending to all of the 6 watercourses shared with Israel (4 aquifers including the Coastal Aquifer Basin and the surface waters of both Wadi Gaza and the Jordan River) All three existing points where Gaza can receive flows from Israel could be expanded to receive additional flow Possibility of an internationally brokered and sponsored interim agreement with Israel, which will not be easy for Israel to one-sidedly cancel or violate as long as Palestinians do not violate it by not paying the bills

High volume transfers are very questionable on political grounds; no progress has been made in the negotiation arena on this matter Water transfer from Israel is dependent on difficult negotiations with Mekorot, which is controlled by Tel Aviv Gaza dependent on Israeli supply ‘Positive-Sum-Outcome’ whereby Israel could sell more of its desalinated water to the State of Palestine as its own water volumes are not predicted to decrease over time; however Israel has refused to discuss this either during the Permanent Status negotiations or outside of these Mekorot selling price is high and will probably increase in the future as more water is produced through very expensive desalination plants Supply to consumers of high-quality (and relatively expensive) water arising from Israel will only be successful if the current leakage/ infiltration rates are minimized Due to poor political security, Israel could decide to prefer to allocate flows elsewhere Physical security of pipelines is challenged: Israeli incursions could affect the parts of the system inside Gaza

Transfer from Egypt

Fresh Water Transfer

A natural waters transfer from Egypt to Gaza is technically possible, as surface water flows derived from the Nile River estuary are potentially available to Gaza from a possible extension of the Salaam Canal, which flows into the Sinai. According to different stakeholders working in the State of Palestine, this is politically unattainable because of the ongoing debate between the eleven riparians of the Nile reflecting the tensions over allocations of those flows.

Desalination Plant in Sinai, Egypt

There have also been discussions on desalinating water in Egypt and supplying fresh water to Gaza. This option remains highly controversial as it will be a protracted affair (CSO-G, 2011). However, fresh water supply to El-Arish and other parts of the Sinai in Egypt is very poor, with highly saline groundwater being present in many areas (Geriesh et al., 2004; Ghodeif & Geriesh, 2004). This would suggest that the Egyptian authorities may be amenable to a trans-boundary project pertaining to desalination, with shared benefits. However, for that option to materialize, the political landscape in Egypt or Gaza would have to change .

SWOT: Water Transfer from Egypt

Strengths/ Opportunities	Weaknesses/ Threats
Fresh Water: Technically feasible Israelis are pushing for a pipeline from the Nile to Gaza	Fresh Water: Politically unattainable: ongoing debate between the eleven riparians of the Nile reflects the tensions over allocations of those flows
Desalinated water Good political security of supply (desalinator and pipelines) as protected under Palestine-Egypt agreement Physical security of desalinator is good although the pipeline would need protecting as far as possible Moderate to high likelihood of external capital financing assistance	Desalinated water: If Egyptians give energy, desalination plant can also be constructed in Gaza (will make them independent) Politically unattainable; talked to Egyptians and they did not show much interest and are concerned about interfering in outstanding ‘water rights’ Physical security of pipelines is challenging: Israeli incursions could affect the parts of the system inside Gaza Low likelihood of external financing for operation and maintenance costs in the longer-term

Transfer from Jordan

Transfers of fresh water of any significant volume from Jordan to the State of Palestine are feasible, but there are greater political and hydrological considerations than with the Egyptian option (CSO-G, 2011). Given the recent Red Sea-Dead Sea agreement, there is a remote possibility that the three countries involved in the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit studies could agree on a ‘wheeling’ arrangement where flows available at one point could be forgone, and replaced by flows elsewhere. This might result in a possibility for additional flows from Israel to Gaza in the future (M. Milner, personal communication, April 24, 2014).

SWOT: Water Transfer from Jordan

Strengths/ Opportunities	Weaknesses/ Threats
‘Wheeling arrangement’ from the Red Sea-Dead Sea agreement but additional flows for Gaza remain uncertain	Politically unacceptable given Jordan’s own water shortage Hydrological considerations dictate that any such flows would be very expensive after delivery to Gaza due to high pumping costs Degree to which the West Bank would be willing to use the flows from the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit for Gaza remains questionable; any such flows would be most likely to be utilized in the western Jordan Valley

Transfer from Turkey

It is noted in this respect that Turkey has negotiated for some time with Israel and other countries for possible exports of fresh water, and while certain parties in Turkey consider this to be shortsighted, the possibility of such transfers still exists at the current time (Israeli/Palestinian Center for Research & Information [IPCRI], 2010). Previous efforts involving ‘medusa bags’ and tankers transfers between Turkey, Israel and Cyprus were utilized in part as the basis for this analysis.

However, transfer of significant volumes of fresh water from Turkey to Gaza using bags or tankers is considered not to be feasible or cost-effective (UNICEF, personal communication, unknown date).

By contrast, the Mini-Peace Pipeline might be worthwhile to look at as a possible long-term solution; while its original route proposed was over land, a subsea route has also been discussed. This would be most likely dependent on oil and electricity transport also. It is obvious that such a major engineering program could only be realized in the long-term. Nevertheless, the restricted range of options for realizing ‘new water’ that are available to the State of Palestine and Jordan in particular, suggest that this option should be reconsidered. It would appear likely that there is a restricted political window of opportunity to realize such a major inter-basin transfer from Turkey. The completion of a full-scale Feasibility Study would be the preferred first step.

SWOT: Water Transfer from Turkey

Strengths/ Opportunities

Weaknesses/ Threats

Mini-Peace Pipeline option in the long-term?

Questionable on political grounds; as long as Gaza is under blockage, cannot receive the water directly (current port is only for small fishing boats and Israel does not allow any imports of materials/ equipment by sea or air) Use of bags towed in seawater for such transfers does not represent proven technology Costs for the use of ‘medusa bags’ are estimated to be unacceptably high Use of tanker transport would also be prohibitively expensive