Difference between revisions of "ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary"
From AquaPedia Case Study Database
| [unchecked revision] | [unchecked revision] |
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
=== Strained Relationships === | === Strained Relationships === | ||
| − | Though the negotiations did ultimately result in agreements between the parties, the agreements did not necessarily lead to improved relationships within or among the parties, at least in near term. The Dutch’s misgivings about the deepening plans were exacerbated when they realized that the project ended up costing them significantly more than had been estimated (Warner and van Buuren 2009). Additionally, internal disagreements among the stakeholders within the countries were a major issue. Environmental stakeholders and the province of Zeeland were unhappy with the natural restoration that was mandated to occur alongside the deepening plan in the estuary (though for different reasons), as well as with the lex specialis that the Dutch enacted to allow a quick decision to be made without the expected levels of consultation. While environmental organizations called for a more rigorous response to the demands of nature conservation, including depoldering to “make space for the river,” Zeeland was vehemently opposed to any such depoldering, because it increased its vulnerability to flooding. In Belgium, the federalization process and the transfer of authority to regional governments created some bumps in the negotiations and underscored intra-national division on the development questions the negotiations covered. | + | Though the negotiations did ultimately result in agreements between the parties, the agreements did not necessarily lead to improved relationships within or among the parties, at least in near term. The Dutch’s misgivings about the deepening plans were exacerbated when they realized that the project ended up costing them significantly more than had been estimated (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>. Additionally, internal disagreements among the stakeholders within the countries were a major issue. Environmental stakeholders and the province of Zeeland were unhappy with the natural restoration that was mandated to occur alongside the deepening plan in the estuary (though for different reasons), as well as with the lex specialis that the Dutch enacted to allow a quick decision to be made without the expected levels of consultation. While environmental organizations called for a more rigorous response to the demands of nature conservation, including depoldering to “make space for the river,” Zeeland was vehemently opposed to any such depoldering, because it increased its vulnerability to flooding. In Belgium, the federalization process and the transfer of authority to regional governments created some bumps in the negotiations and underscored intra-national division on the development questions the negotiations covered. |
=== Implementation Gap === | === Implementation Gap === | ||
| − | "Because the resources needed for the implementation of international policies were distributed among national governments, lower level governments, and NGOs, the latter parties were able to exert influence on decision-making by national governments, and in some cases were able to make tactical linkages” (Meijerink 1999, 354). The local and regional actors were not cooperative with the national governments on the aspects of implementation for which they had not been able to have a say (which was the case for much of the negotiations), and their resistance created an implementation gap, as either their resources were needed to carry out the plans on which the countries had agreed (in the case of the local and regional authorities), or—in the case of environmental NGOs—their buy-in was needed in order to avoid delays brought on by legal obstruction. | + | "Because the resources needed for the implementation of international policies were distributed among national governments, lower level governments, and NGOs, the latter parties were able to exert influence on decision-making by national governments, and in some cases were able to make tactical linkages” (Meijerink 1999, 354)<ref>Meijerink, Sander V. Conflict and Cooperation on the Scheldt River Basin. Environment & Policy 17. Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-9200-0_1.</ref>. The local and regional actors were not cooperative with the national governments on the aspects of implementation for which they had not been able to have a say (which was the case for much of the negotiations), and their resistance created an implementation gap, as either their resources were needed to carry out the plans on which the countries had agreed (in the case of the local and regional authorities), or—in the case of environmental NGOs—their buy-in was needed in order to avoid delays brought on by legal obstruction. |
=== Potential for Increased Effectiveness and Harmonization under the Long-Term Vision Plan for 2030 === | === Potential for Increased Effectiveness and Harmonization under the Long-Term Vision Plan for 2030 === | ||
| − | The LTV 2030 plan had several features that made it likely to succeed in creating a more cooperative and efficient structure for negotiations and planning going forward, as well as more durable solutions (Warner and van Buuren 2009): The organization of the plan incentivized collaborative methods, because the advice that OAP provided on the implementation of negotiated agreements was required to be unanimous. Particular attention was given to “dealing with uncertainties” and ongoing monitoring, especially vis-à-vis the adequateness of the nature compensation projects to counteract the environmental costs of the deepening development plans. Stakeholders outside of the OAP were invited to participate via an Accompanying Council, which engaged in an exploratory process to unite stakeholders in developing mutually agreeable avenues for dealing with difficult and politically charged issues. The project organization arranged informal meetings and pre-negotiation sessions around difficult issues with stakeholders. | + | The LTV 2030 plan had several features that made it likely to succeed in creating a more cooperative and efficient structure for negotiations and planning going forward, as well as more durable solutions (Warner and van Buuren 2009)<ref>Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.</ref>: The organization of the plan incentivized collaborative methods, because the advice that OAP provided on the implementation of negotiated agreements was required to be unanimous. Particular attention was given to “dealing with uncertainties” and ongoing monitoring, especially vis-à-vis the adequateness of the nature compensation projects to counteract the environmental costs of the deepening development plans. Stakeholders outside of the OAP were invited to participate via an Accompanying Council, which engaged in an exploratory process to unite stakeholders in developing mutually agreeable avenues for dealing with difficult and politically charged issues. The project organization arranged informal meetings and pre-negotiation sessions around difficult issues with stakeholders. |
Despite obvious improvements in the negotiating context since the establishment of the LTV 2030, the organization has not been without challenges. The increased cost of time and effort in the more structured, collaborative venue of the LTV has meant that on some occasions parties have had to be persuaded to come to the table rather than rely on riskier but more expeditious legal avenues. The usual posturing and staking out of more extreme positions was also not absent from the negotiations. Agricultural interest groups, especially in Zeeland, continued to be left out of negotiations under the LTV structure, and the durability of the outcomes agreed upon suffered as a result. | Despite obvious improvements in the negotiating context since the establishment of the LTV 2030, the organization has not been without challenges. The increased cost of time and effort in the more structured, collaborative venue of the LTV has meant that on some occasions parties have had to be persuaded to come to the table rather than rely on riskier but more expeditious legal avenues. The usual posturing and staking out of more extreme positions was also not absent from the negotiations. Agricultural interest groups, especially in Zeeland, continued to be left out of negotiations under the LTV structure, and the durability of the outcomes agreed upon suffered as a result. | ||
| Line 26: | Line 26: | ||
* Local and environmental stakeholders with necessary resources were completely denied participation – and later resisted implementation efforts. | * Local and environmental stakeholders with necessary resources were completely denied participation – and later resisted implementation efforts. | ||
* Internal conflicts within each of the countries at times stalled the negotiations (e.g., the Dutch parliament’s opposition to the further deepening agreed upon between the Dutch and Belgian ministers, Wallonia’s veto of agreements at multiple stages in the process.) | * Internal conflicts within each of the countries at times stalled the negotiations (e.g., the Dutch parliament’s opposition to the further deepening agreed upon between the Dutch and Belgian ministers, Wallonia’s veto of agreements at multiple stages in the process.) | ||
| − | |||
* Both environmental organizations in the Netherlands and the province of Zeeland strongly opposed the plans as the Dutch government negotiated them. The fact that the Dutch signed agreements that in multiple instances were later rejected by their own internal stakeholders suggests that they did not anticipate the level of internal resistance they in fact encountered. | * Both environmental organizations in the Netherlands and the province of Zeeland strongly opposed the plans as the Dutch government negotiated them. The fact that the Dutch signed agreements that in multiple instances were later rejected by their own internal stakeholders suggests that they did not anticipate the level of internal resistance they in fact encountered. | ||
* The use of linkages and packaging cut both ways in terms of contributing to the negotiations. On one hand, they were a helpful strategy to get reluctant negotiators to the table (as was the case with the Dutch.) However, packaging tends to be a successful strategy when it allows parties negotiating to exploit differences between their priorities and interests. In the case of these negotiations, the linked items in some cases simply became another zero-sum issue to haggle over (as was the case for a period of time with the high-speed rail project in the negotiations between Flanders and the Netherlands.) | * The use of linkages and packaging cut both ways in terms of contributing to the negotiations. On one hand, they were a helpful strategy to get reluctant negotiators to the table (as was the case with the Dutch.) However, packaging tends to be a successful strategy when it allows parties negotiating to exploit differences between their priorities and interests. In the case of these negotiations, the linked items in some cases simply became another zero-sum issue to haggle over (as was the case for a period of time with the high-speed rail project in the negotiations between Flanders and the Netherlands.) | ||
Revision as of 19:40, 22 May 2014
About this Article
Contributed by:Elizabeth Cooper
Article last edited 22 May 2014 by Elizabeth
Article originally added by Elizabeth
What is an ASI Article? Individuals may add their own Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight (ASI) to a case by linking a case to an ASI article. These ASI articles are protected, so that each person who creates a section retains control of their own content. Please use the discussion page for commenting on this article. Learn More
This article is linked to Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?
The given value was not understood.
- ^ Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.
- ^ Meijerink, Sander V. Conflict and Cooperation on the Scheldt River Basin. Environment & Policy 17. Springer Netherlands, 1999. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-015-9200-0_1.
- ^ Warner, Jeroen, and Arwin van Buuren. “Multi-Stakeholder Learning and Fighting on the River Scheldt.” International Negotiation 14, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 419–40. doi:10.1163/157180609X432888.
