Difference between revisions of "ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary"
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* There was a history of mistrust between the parties, and thus no mutual faith or willingness to take risks to get agreements going | * There was a history of mistrust between the parties, and thus no mutual faith or willingness to take risks to get agreements going | ||
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* This mistrust was not ameliorated by any shared trust-building tasks (i.e., research or JFF processes) until the establishment of the LTV | * This mistrust was not ameliorated by any shared trust-building tasks (i.e., research or JFF processes) until the establishment of the LTV | ||
* Negotiations excluded relevant stakeholders, and were then either ultimately unable to lead to agreement, or faced significant obstacles to implementation even when the parties at the table did agree. | * Negotiations excluded relevant stakeholders, and were then either ultimately unable to lead to agreement, or faced significant obstacles to implementation even when the parties at the table did agree. | ||
| − | + | * The regional governments in Belgium had blocking power (as evident by Wallonia’s multiple vetoes of agreements made between the Belgian and Dutch national governments), but were not consulted. | |
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* Local and environmental stakeholders with necessary resources were completely denied participation – and later resisted implementation efforts. | * Local and environmental stakeholders with necessary resources were completely denied participation – and later resisted implementation efforts. | ||
* Internal conflicts within each of the countries at times stalled the negotiations (e.g., the Dutch parliament’s opposition to the further deepening agreed upon between the Dutch and Belgian ministers, Wallonia’s veto of agreements at multiple stages in the process.) | * Internal conflicts within each of the countries at times stalled the negotiations (e.g., the Dutch parliament’s opposition to the further deepening agreed upon between the Dutch and Belgian ministers, Wallonia’s veto of agreements at multiple stages in the process.) | ||
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== Remaining Questions == | == Remaining Questions == | ||
| − | Several | + | Several important questions remain that were outside the scope of the research of this case study: |
* How did negotiations on Scheldt basin issues interact with negotiations in other forums on broader water policies, such as the Habitat and Birds Directives (addressed briefly in this paper), the international river policies of the UN-ECE, and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands? | * How did negotiations on Scheldt basin issues interact with negotiations in other forums on broader water policies, such as the Habitat and Birds Directives (addressed briefly in this paper), the international river policies of the UN-ECE, and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands? | ||
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* Though the somewhat lurching nature of the negotiations over many years appears rather clumsy, was the incremental approach to negotiating perhaps the best strategy available? Could it even have helped make agreements possible by building small degrees of trust between the parties? | * Though the somewhat lurching nature of the negotiations over many years appears rather clumsy, was the incremental approach to negotiating perhaps the best strategy available? Could it even have helped make agreements possible by building small degrees of trust between the parties? | ||
* Will the LTV ultimately resolve the systemic negotiating problems for region? | * Will the LTV ultimately resolve the systemic negotiating problems for region? | ||
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* Will it succeed in incorporating other legitimate stakeholders that were excluded in previous iterations of the negotiations? | * Will it succeed in incorporating other legitimate stakeholders that were excluded in previous iterations of the negotiations? | ||
* What changed about the political and/or leadership context of the parties negotiating that caused them to decide to create the LTV? | * What changed about the political and/or leadership context of the parties negotiating that caused them to decide to create the LTV? | ||
Revision as of 19:20, 22 May 2014
About this Article
Contributed by:Elizabeth Cooper
Article last edited 22 May 2014 by Elizabeth
Article originally added by Elizabeth
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This article is linked to Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?
