Difference between revisions of "ASI:Reflection on Challenges and Lessons Learned in Negotiations over the Western Scheldt Estuary"

|First Contributor=Elizabeth Cooper

|First Contributor=Elizabeth Cooper

|Case Study=Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

|Case Study=Multilateral Negotiations over the Scheldt River Estuary: Transforming Centuries of Deadlock into Productive Multiparty Negotiations?

Though the negotiations did ultimately result in agreements between the parties, the agreements did not necessarily lead to improved relationships within or among the parties, at least in near term.  The Dutch’s misgivings about the deepening plans were exacerbated when they realized that the project ended up costing them significantly more than had been estimated (Warner and van Buuren 2009).  Additionally, internal disagreements among the stakeholders within the countries were a major issue.  Environmental stakeholders and the province of Zeeland were unhappy with the natural restoration that was mandated to occur alongside the deepening plan in the estuary (though for different reasons), as well as with the lex specialis that the Dutch enacted to allow a quick decision to be made without the expected levels of consultation.  While environmental organizations called for a more rigorous response to the demands of nature conservation, including depoldering to “make space for the river,” Zeeland was vehemently opposed to any such depoldering, because it increased its vulnerability to flooding.  In Belgium, the federalization process and the transfer of authority to regional governments created some bumps in the negotiations and underscored intra-national division on the development questions the negotiations covered.       

Though the negotiations did ultimately result in agreements between the parties, the agreements did not necessarily lead to improved relationships within or among the parties, at least in near term.  The Dutch’s misgivings about the deepening plans were exacerbated when they realized that the project ended up costing them significantly more than had been estimated (Warner and van Buuren 2009).  Additionally, internal disagreements among the stakeholders within the countries were a major issue.  Environmental stakeholders and the province of Zeeland were unhappy with the natural restoration that was mandated to occur alongside the deepening plan in the estuary (though for different reasons), as well as with the lex specialis that the Dutch enacted to allow a quick decision to be made without the expected levels of consultation.  While environmental organizations called for a more rigorous response to the demands of nature conservation, including depoldering to “make space for the river,” Zeeland was vehemently opposed to any such depoldering, because it increased its vulnerability to flooding.  In Belgium, the federalization process and the transfer of authority to regional governments created some bumps in the negotiations and underscored intra-national division on the development questions the negotiations covered.       

  “Because the resources needed for the implementation of international policies were distributed among national governments, lower level governments, and NGOs, the latter parties were able to exert influence on decision-making by national governments, and in some cases were able to make tactical linkages” (Meijerink 1999:354).  The local and regional actors were not cooperative with the national governments on the aspects of implementation for which they had not been able to have a say (which was the case for much of the negotiations), and their resistance created an implementation gap, as either their resources were needed to carry out the plans on which the countries had agreed (in the case of the local and regional authorities), or—in the case of environmental NGOs—their buy-in was needed in order to avoid delays brought on by legal obstruction.   

  “Because the resources needed for the implementation of international policies were distributed among national governments, lower level governments, and NGOs, the latter parties were able to exert influence on decision-making by national governments, and in some cases were able to make tactical linkages” (Meijerink 1999:354).  The local and regional actors were not cooperative with the national governments on the aspects of implementation for which they had not been able to have a say (which was the case for much of the negotiations), and their resistance created an implementation gap, as either their resources were needed to carry out the plans on which the countries had agreed (in the case of the local and regional authorities), or—in the case of environmental NGOs—their buy-in was needed in order to avoid delays brought on by legal obstruction.   

The LTV 2030 plan had several features that made it likely to succeed in creating a more cooperative and efficient structure for negotiations and planning going forward, as well as more durable solutions (Warner and van Buuren 2009):  The organization of the plan incentivized collaborative methods, because the advice that OAP provided on the implementation of negotiated agreements was required to be unanimous.  Particular attention was given to “dealing with uncertainties” and ongoing monitoring, especially vis-à-vis the adequateness of the nature compensation projects to counteract the environmental costs of the deepening development plans.  Stakeholders outside of the OAP were invited to participate via an Accompanying Council, which engaged in an exploratory process to unite stakeholders in developing mutually agreeable avenues for dealing with difficult and politically charged issues.  The project organization arranged informal meetings and pre-negotiation sessions around difficult issues with stakeholders.   

The LTV 2030 plan had several features that made it likely to succeed in creating a more cooperative and efficient structure for negotiations and planning going forward, as well as more durable solutions (Warner and van Buuren 2009):  The organization of the plan incentivized collaborative methods, because the advice that OAP provided on the implementation of negotiated agreements was required to be unanimous.  Particular attention was given to “dealing with uncertainties” and ongoing monitoring, especially vis-à-vis the adequateness of the nature compensation projects to counteract the environmental costs of the deepening development plans.  Stakeholders outside of the OAP were invited to participate via an Accompanying Council, which engaged in an exploratory process to unite stakeholders in developing mutually agreeable avenues for dealing with difficult and politically charged issues.  The project organization arranged informal meetings and pre-negotiation sessions around difficult issues with stakeholders.