The Helmand River Basin Dispute

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Case Description
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Geolocation: 31° 29' 40.614", 61° 45' 43.7256"
Important Uses of Water Agriculture or Irrigation, Domestic/Urban Supply, Other Ecological Services
Water Features: Helmand Basin
Riparians: Iran, Afghanistan
Agreements: Helmand River Delta Commission, Terms of reference of the Helmand River Delta Commission and an interpretive statement relative thereto, agreed by conferees of Afghanistan and Iran, 1973 Helmand River Water Treaty

Summary

The Helmand River is shared between Iran and Afghanistan. This basin has been identified as one of the few basins in the region with an agreement governing the sharing of the river’s waters. However, despite a treaty between the two countries signed in 1973, there has been a continuation of conflict. The dispute over the Helmand River has persisted for nearly the last two centuries and includes several attempts at resolution. The tensions in the basin are liable to increase given population growth, climate change, instability in the region, and the need for economic growth. If the status quo is maintained, the dispute has the potential to escalate and be exacerbated, particularly if the region experiences continued drought. Issues within the dispute include, but are not limited to, lack of trust between the two countries, particularly over the interpretation and implementation of the 1973 Treaty, environmental and social impacts within the Sistan Delta, and push for economic development in the lower and middle Helmand Basin, particularly for water infrastructure to increase irrigated agriculture.



Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework

Issues and Stakeholders

Maintain security of regional water supply and increase economic development.

NSPD: Water Quantity, Water Quality, Governance, Values and Norms
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government

State level, regional and local governments are interested in maintaining the water supply to communities in the Sistan Delta and the lower and middle reaches of the Helmand Basin. The general Afghan position is that more water is needed to maintain stability and encourage economic development within the country. Afghanistan could perceive Iran’s actions against Afghani water projects as limiting their potential for growth and development. The general Iranian position is that more water is required to meet the domestic and agricultural needs of the Sistan delta’s population. In addition, they also need more water in order maintain the hamoun ecosystem. Iran sees Afghan development as a threat to local livelihoods and agricultural production in the Sistan with the potential to impact the country at large. Most of the water consumed in the basin goes towards agriculture, the future construction of infrastructure in support of expanding irrigation and economic growth is both a risk and a benefit to users within the basin.

Lack of trust

NSPD: Water Quantity, Water Quality, Ecosystems, Governance, Assets, Values and Norms
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government

Both Iran and Afghanistan have a lack of trust in the other party. This mistrust stems from the belief that the other country is not upholding the terms of the 1973 Treaty. Iran claims that Afghanistan is not releasing the agreed upon water allocations; this belief was reinforced by the Taliban controlled Afghani government’s restriction of the lower Helmand’s flow into Iran. Iran views Afghanistan’s water infrastructure development as an expansion of the poppy production in the region. Iran views the decline of the hamoun lakes, the degradation of the wetland ecosystem, and the migration of people out of the region due to the loss of livelihood and sandstorms, as Afghanistan’s fault for not meeting the allocations of the treaty. Afghanistan perceives Iran as consuming more water than the 1973 Treaty allocates. Therefore, they believe that the water developments are within their right to use the excess flow that has been flowing unimpeded into Iran.

Degradation and loss of the hamoun ecosystem

NSPD: Water Quantity, Ecosystems, Values and Norms
Stakeholder Types: Federated state/territorial/provincial government, Sovereign state/national/federal government, Local Government, Environmental interest, Community or organized citizens

Drought, politics, increased demand, and climate change have impacted the amount of water flowing into the hamoun ecosystem. Iranian government, local governments and communities as well as environmental groups are arguing for increased flow to the ecosystem to support the wildlife and habitat, but also the people living within and dependent on the delta for their livelihoods. Many factors have contributed to the loss of the ecosystem with conflict over what factors are to blame.


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Key Questions

Power and Politics: How does asymmetry of power influence water negotiations and how can the negative effects be mitigated?

The asymmetry of power has influenced the history of the water negotiations in the Helmand River dispute. In addition, the power of international participants in the negotiation process could have contributed towards an agreement being formed or the level of trust placed in an agreement. Currently, Afghanistan has power geographically being the upstream country. Being the upstream riparian in conjunction with the position that Iran has violated the treaty and is inhibiting Afghanistan’s economic growth, provides the state with the incentive to push forward with potentially impactful water and agricultural developments. Iran has generally been more powerful in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Therefore, the state is likely more interested in pursuing future negotiations over the Helmand waters prior to any development in Afghanistan, as this could ensure that majority of the flow is allocated to Iran.



Transboundary Water Issues: How can mutual trust amongst riparians be nurtured? What actions erode that trust?

Throughout the dispute, trust has eroded between the two countries. Disagreement over the interpretation of the treaty and the measurement of the volume of water allocated has contributed. Continued drought and potential future droughts will likely further erode trust without agreement over how to manage the river in drought. Political actions, such as the alleged border skirmish to divert irrigation water across the border, and alliances with other nations, such as historical British and US involvement in the border and water dispute, and giving aid in development infrastructure, can reduce trust. Lack of quality and available data prevents a building of trust.



Tagged with: Sistan Delta Treaty

References

Abidi, A. H. H. (1977). Irano-Afghan Dispute over the Helmand Waters. International Studies, 16(3), 357–378. http://doi.org/10.1177/002088177701600304

Aman, F. (2013, January 7). Afghan Water Infrastructure Threatens Iran, Regional Stability - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East. Al Monitor - The Pulse of the Middle East. Retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/afghanwatershortageiranpakistan.html#

Dehgan, A., Palmer-Moloney, L. J., & Mirzaee, M. (2014). Water security and scarcity: Potential destabilization in western Afghanistan and Iranian Sistan and Baluchestan due to transboundary water conflicts. In E. Weinthal, J. Troell, & M. Nakayama (Eds.), Water and post-conflict peacebuilding (p. http://environmentalpeacebuilding.org/assets/Documents/LibraryItem_000_Doc_937.pdf). London: Earthscan.

Goes, B. J. M., Howarth, S. E., Wardlaw, R. B., Hancock, I. R., & Parajuli, U. N. (2015). Integrated water resources management in an insecure river basin: a case study of Helmand River Basin, Afghanistan. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 0(0), 1–23. http://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2015.1012661

Houk, A. (2011, March 22). Transboundary Water Sharing: Iran and Afghanistan. Retrieved October 27, 2015, from http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/transboundary-water-sharing-iran-and-afghanistan/ Ramsar Secretariat. (2005). Hamun-e-Saberi & Hamun-e-Helmand. Retrieved January 2, 2016, from https://rsis.ramsar.org/ris/42

van Beek, E., & Meijer, K. (2006). Integrated Water Resources Management for the Sistan Closed Inland Delta, Iran. Delft, Netherlands: Delft Hydraulics. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/iran/docs/News/2014/March%202014/Towards%20a%20solution%20for%20Iran’s%20dying%20wetlands/Hamoun%20Wetland/Hamoun%20Report.pdf

Vick, M. (2013, January 19). Sharing Central Asia’s Waters: The Case of Afghanistan. Retrieved from http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2013/01/19/sharing-central-asias-waters-the-case-of-afghanistan/