The Rogun Dam Controversy
| Geolocation: | 38° 41' 3.0098", 69° 46' 25.7801" |
|---|---|
| Important Uses of Water | Hydropower Generation |
Contents
Summary
Tajikistan is planning to resume construction and complete the Rogun dam on the Vakhsh River as part of the Vakhsh cascade of hydropower plants. The Vakhsh River is one of Tajikistan’s great rivers and is a major tributary of the Amu Darya River that supplies down stream countries (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) ending up in the dying Aral Sea.
Tajikistan, is the poorest of the ex Soviet Central Asian Republics, Located in the Southern part of the region and dominated by the Pamir and Alay Mountains. Tajikistan lacks Natural resources except the abundance of water which it intends to utilize extensively for hydroelectricity.[1]
Natural, Historic, Economic, Regional, and Political Framework
Central Asia is a vast region in the heart of the continent made up of six independent Muslim states (The “stans”, five of which were ex-soviet republics (Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The sixth being Afghanistan). The region is land locked and made up of Mountains (The Pamir and Tien-Shan ranges), deserts and huge grassy steppes. Much of the area is considered too dry or rugged for farming (a reality contested by the USSR who introduced massive cotton growing to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – thus leading to massive use of water, and the eventual ecologic tragedy of the disappearance of the Aral Sea). Water for the region is collected mostly in the mountain ranges, where one can find some of the biggest glacier concentrations in the world. The water then forms two massive rivers the Amu Darya and Syr Darya that supply water to the rest of the region.[2]
Tajikistan, is the poorest of the ex Soviet Central Asian Republics, Located in the Southern part of the region and dominated by the Pamir and Alay Mountains. Tajikistan lacks Natural resources except the abundance of water which it intends to utilize extensively for hydroelectricity.[1]
The largest system of Hydropower plants in Tajikistan is centered on the Vakhsh River. Currently the largest dam in the Vakhsh Cascade is the Nurek Dam. The Rogun Dam when completed will be the most upstream and largest dam in the cascade.
Uzbekistan, is the second richest and most powerful of the ex Soviet Central Asian republics. It is made up of mostly mid altitude desert and semiarid grassland. 11% of the land is heavily cultivated, mostly Cotton (Uzbekistan is currently the 5th largest world exporter of Cotton). Irrigation is totally dependent on an intricate system of canals from the two main rivers (Sir and Amu Darya). Uzbekistan is also a large exporter of Natural gas.[3]
The Controversy
Tajikistan is planning to resume construction and complete the Rogun dam on the Vakhsh River as part of the Vakhsh cascade of hydropower plants. The Vakhsh River is one of Tajikistan’s great rivers and is a major tributary of the Amu Darya River that supplies down stream countries (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) ending up in the dying Aral Sea.
The Rogun Dam was initiated in 1976 under the USSR as part of its overall management of energy affairs in Central Asia at the time. In 1991 as a consequence of the USSR breakup, construction was stopped. Further attempts to resuscitate the project failed until 2008 when the government of Tajikistan revived the project, signed agreements with partners and potential clients for the access electricity (Pakistan). The project is still uncompleted and not in operation.
When finalized the Rogun Dam is expected to be the highest embankment dam in the world, rising to between 280 to 335 meters. The plant’s planned installed capacity will be 3600MW with water capacity of 13.3 Km3.
Hydropower is considered by Tajikistan to be its main natural resource to be utilized and monetized. Tajikistan has no other independent energy resources and is heavily depended on neighboring countries ever since the days of the USSR. Currently it suffers from chronic electricity shortages and dismal record of development (deficit of about 2 Billion Kwh yearly[4]). It views the Rogun Dam as a game changer, fulfilling the countries energy needs (it is expected to produce 13.3 Billion Kwh yearly[4]) and allowing for substantial income through energy exports (mostly to Afghanistan and Pakistan). Moreover it views the utilization of this natural resource as an equalizing geopolitical tool in its regional relations, mostly with Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan which is by far the largest and strongest of Tajikistan’s neighbors, has used previously the supply of Natural gas and Visa requirements to strong arm Tajikistan in several disputes.
Uzbekistan strongly opposes the construction of the Rogun Dam based on several issues. First, the worry that overall amount of water reaching the Amu Darya River and thus its vast agricultural regions will decrease substantially. Second, the expected pattern of use of the dam will create periodical flooding in parts of the year (September to May) and insufficient supply of water in the other (May to September). Third, the dam plan is outdated and involves questionable engineering (as exemplified by the collapse of some of the already constructed parts of the project in 1993 due to flooding) that does not meet current standards and requirements. Fourth is the issue of environmental impact and fifth is the issue of Seismic activity in the region; possible effect of the huge water reservoir on the seismic activity and the catastrophic results of a possible breach of the dam due to such activity.
The relations between the two countries are strained and Uzbekistan had declared previously its willingness to intervene with force, if necessary, in order to prevent the completion of the project. Moreover, Uzbekistan claims that Tajikistan is covertly moving forward with planning and construction of the project, in contradiction to international commitments it made in 2010 to wait for a comprehensive impact assessment study made by a an unaffiliated international firms and institutions.
Timeline of Events
- Initial planning of the Rogun dam by Soviet engineers 1965-1972
- Formal endorsement of the plan – GOSPLAN USSR No. 21, - 1974
- Beginning of construction – 1980
- Construction halted following the break up of the USSR – 1991
- The five Central Asian countries sign an agreement to continue with the Water/Energy framework of the USSR, creating the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) (The agreement proved to be insufficient as it set water allocations with out energy sharing requirements – 1992
- A severe flood at the Rogun site washes and destroys previously constructed infrastructure for the dam, further delaying restart of the project – May 8, 1993
- Another Multilateral/regional water/energy agreement was signed. The NUKUS agreement proved to fail in the endeavor for a comprehensive agreement. Another agreement was signed on 1998 with no visible progress – 1995, 1998
- General framework fails – The countries follow bilateral agreements instead of a comprehensive regional one. - 2002
- President Rahmon of Tajikistan restarted the project. Awarded construction to Russian Aluminum manufacturer RusAl.- 2004
- Construction stopped over disagreement over the final height of the dam, ownership rights and technical issues - 2006
- Contract with RusAl cancelled – 2007
- Tajik government asks for World Bank involvement in the project. The World Bank agrees to conduct a thorough impact assessment study. Both the Tajik side and the Uzbek one agree to refrain from unilateral steps during the time of the assessment – late 2007
- Two severe winters, with extensive energy shortages convince Tajikistan it must move forward with completion of the project – 2008-2009, 2011-2012[4]
Governmental, Political and Geopolitical Context
Management of the total resources of the Central Asian region during the Soviet days was simpler then it is today. All resources were managed by a single unified entity and thus upstream countries; current states Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, supplied downstream countries with sufficient amounts of water to develop a massive agricultural sector centered around Cotton and Rice (both crops use copious amounts of water) and in return received enough energy from down stream states to go through the freezing winters without shortages.
The reality on the ground allowed for massive usage by Uzbekistan of water generated in Tajikistan in order to support the Cotton and Rice sectors. The water is being transferred to wasteful irrigation canals where about 60% of the water is wasted even before the actual irrigation. [5]
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the pre existing arrangement did not last. Every country sought to achieve independence in resource usage and economic gains.
- “With independence, as each country began to redefine its own economic priorities, it became evident that their respective goals conflicted regarding for what purposes water should be used. All the basin states except Kazakhstan intended to increase their amount of irrigated land to meet the mounting food requirements of their growing populations. …Because of the asymmetries of capabilities and interests between the upstream and downstream states in Central Asia following the Soviet Union’s collapse, it was expected that acute conflict over water would ignite among the newly independent states in the immediate years after independence.”[6]
Numerous attempts to reach regional agreements for the regulation of water and energy transfers failed.
Tajikistan who is the poorest of the Central Asian countries faces continuing Energy Shortages that hurt the population and its potential for economic growth. The one resource it has in abundance is water (Tajikistan holds many massive glaciers and immense hydropower potential).[7] Tajikistan has already built an extensive infrastructure of Hydroelectric power plants, most notably the a system of dams on the Vakhsh River – named the Vakhsh Cascade. Out of these dams the largest operational one is the Nurek Dam, 300 meters high and generating 2.745 gigawatts in total.[8] It is however, still short of its domestic needs. The completion of the Rogun Dam will add another 3.6 Gigawatts which will answer all of Tajikistan’s energy needs and open the way for export of energy to Afghanistan and Pakistan through the CASA-1000 transmission infrastructure.
Uzbekistan opposes the project vehemently. The following are the main issues Uzbekistan has with the project:
- Fear that the overall volume of water to reach the Amu Darya, supplying its wasteful use of irrigation water, will decrease, first during the first 12 years it will take to fill the massive Rogun reservoir (13.3km3) and then due to production regulation.
- Electricity production regulation, creating floods in the winter (peak electricity production- thus release of massive amounts of water) and insufficient supply in the irrigation period of spring/summer.
- Heightened threat of Seismic activity due to the new reservoir. Down stream nations will face a catastrophe in case of a dam breach due to an earth quake.
- Damage to the environment.
Uzbekistan has been aggressively pursuing the cancellation of the dam, penalizing Tajikistan by threatening and stopping Natural Gas supplies; creating transportation problems by refusing passage for trains and trucks and by creating difficulties for Tajiks who wish to enter Uzbekistan. At times Uzbekistan had implied it is willing to go to war over the dam.[9] As the case went for impact analysis by the World Bank, Uzbekistan agreed not to pursue further moves against Tajikistan as long as the work is suspended. They do suspect however, that on site work has recently been resumed covertly.[10]
Another potent issue complicating the conflict is the personality and autocratic style of leadership of both President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan and President Emomalii Rahmon of Tajikistan. Both presidents view the issue as symbolic, personal and not open for compromise. Personal animosity between the two (Rahmon claims to have physically fought Karimov in two separate occasions) doesn’t help.[4] Other international stakeholders in the conflict include Russia, which wishes to lead the actual construction through private Russian companies and has security interests in Tajikistan (Russia has military bases in Tajikistan as part of a long term security agreement). Pakistan and Afghanistan share a direct interest in the completion of the dam as they have signed a contract with Tajikistan to receive energy from the Rogun Dam as well as other Hydropower plants. China is another party interested in regional stability as well as sustainable use of water resources due to the proximity of Xinjiang which is expected to require more water in the foreseeable future as its population increases.
Stakeholder Analysis Matrix
| Issues > Stakeholders |
Production of sufficient energy in Tajikistan | Volume of water in the Amu Darya | Regulating water flow in the Amu Darya | Seismic Vulnerability | Environmental Impact | Geopolitical Regional Stability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tajikistan’s Government | Critical. The Gov. views energy shortages as its biggest barrier to progress. | Important for geopolitical Reasons. | Problematic. Peak demand for energy is during the winter – high volume of water released (may cause floods). Summer – Less, thus less volume to the Amu Darya. | Critical. Although through experience gathered in the Nurek Dam, they believe the threat is mitigated through Bolder & Cley structure. | Important. The government had agreed to an impact study and to wait until its results are published prior to continuation in the project. Uzbekistan is charging the Tajiks have continued covertly. | Very important. Uzbekistan is a strong regional power that can damage Tajik potential for growth by limiting export of Natural Gas and other economic measure. Military intervention is unlikely but possible. |
| Tajik People | Critical. Following several extreme winters with energy shortages, sufficient energy is viewed as critical. Long term development is also associated with hydropower | Secondary issue. | Secondary issue. | Critical. | Very important. | Very important |
| Uzbekistan | Not important. Uzbekistan holds energy as a geopolitical tool over Tajikistan. Energy independence will diminish its leverage. | Critical for the maintenance of Agriculture in particular Cotton and Rice. First 12 years of the project in high risk (as the reservoir fills). | Very important. Poor regulation will lead to floods and water shortages alternatively | Critical. Actual breach of the dam will be catastrophic to downstream regions, mostly in Uzbekistan | Very important. Salinity, Loss of habitat and degradation of land are all projected to be affected by the dam. | Important. Uzbekistan see it self as the region’s dominant power. Will argue for its water rights but can resort to strong arming Tajikistan |
| Russia | Has economic interest in project progress. Committed to the project and demands that Russian firms will receive the development contracts | Important for geopolitical reasons | Secondary issue | Important for geopolitical reasons | Secondary issue | Very Important. Russia sees central Asia as part of its immediate sphere of interest and Influence. Maintains military bases in Tajikistan as part of a long term agreement |
| Pakistan/Afghanistan | Very important. AF/Pak are expected to enjoy energy from the Rogun dam through the CASA-1000 infrastructure. | Important for Afghanistan. As security and political stability return, the demand for water will increase. | Secondary Issue | Important for geopolitical reasons. | Secondary issue | Very Important Pakistan & Afghanistan suffer from domestic instability and are vulnerable to external instability. Both rely on energy from Central Asian countries. |
| China | Very involved in development projects in Tajikistan. Refrains from actively supporting the dam. Imports Natural Gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. | Growing water demands from the Xingjian Province. Not directly related to the Amu Darya but to regional availability | Secondary issue | Important for geopolitical reasons. | Secondary issue | Bordering with Central Asian countries is the restive Xinjiang province. Stability in the region would offer progress and trade. |
| The World Bank + Other international institutions | Extremely important. Sees development of Hydropower as a necessary maojor part of modernizing Tajikistan. Require full impact study prior to active engeagement. | Very Important. Part of the larger issues to be studied in the Impact assessment. | Very Important. Part of the larger issues to be studied in the Impact assessment Very Important. Part of the larger issues to be studied in the Impact assessment | Very Important. Part of the larger issues to be studied in the Impact assessment | Views stability as essential for any international investment and involvement. Stalls the end of the impact study in order to assist current stability. |
Issues and Stakeholders
Regulating flow for a transboundary river to meet energy production, flood control, and water supply (irrigation) requirements
NSPD: Water Quantity, Ecosystems, Assets
Stakeholder Types: Sovereign state/national/federal government, Development/humanitarian interest, Community or organized citizens
In the Amu Darya, peak demand for energy is during the winter, but high volume of water released may cause flooding. The summer energy demand is lowest, but the downstream flow requirements are greater.
Following several extreme winters with energy shortages, sufficient energy is viewed as critical to the Tajik people. Long term development is also associated with hydropower.Environmental impacts and flow regime of a damming a transboundary river
NSPD: Governance, Assets
Stakeholder Types: Local Government, Community or organized citizens
Analysis, Synthesis, and Insight
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Learn moreASI:Applying the Water Diplomacy Framework to the Rogun Dam Controversy
Contributed by: Itamar (last edit: 13 May 2014)
- ^ 1.0 1.1 Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook. “Tajikistan”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html
- ^ Central Asia. (2014, May 6). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 15:10, May 13, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Central_Asia&oldid=607366022
- ^ Central Intelligence Agency “Uzbekistan”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html
- ^ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Central Eurasia Standard, “The Rogun Dam: Regional conflict and opportunity”, May 2013, online:http://cestandard.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/rogun-dam-a-nexus-of-conflict-and-opportunity.pdf
- ^ Kandiyoti, Deniz, “The Cotton Sector in Central Asia: Economic Policy and Development Challenges”, University of London, 2007.http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/pdf/20080605a.pdf
- ^ Weinthal, Erika, “Water Conflict and Cooperation in Central Asia”, United Nations Development Programme, 2006. http://hdr.undp.org/es/informes/mundial/idh2006/trabajos/Weinthal%20Erika.pdf
- ^ Kucera J. Tajikistan's Dream. Wilson Quarterly [serial online]. Summer 2013;37(3):52-64. Available from: Academic Search Premier, Ipswich, MA. Accessed May 3, 2014.
- ^ Nurek Dam. (2014, February 15). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 15:10, May 13, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nurek_Dam&oldid=595625499
- ^ Clare Nuttal “Tajikistan going Rogun”,bne, September 19, 2013. www.bne.eu
- ^ Diloram Abdullaeva, “Uzbekistan to lose 600 million dollars a year due to Rogun Dam”, September 24, 2012, www.12uz.com
